Diplomatic make-believe over Kampuchea

Press, 11 October 1982, Page 20

Diplomatic make-believe over Kampuchea

By

STUART McMILLAN

With more than a touch of make-believe, the members of the United Nations will soon decide on who should represent the country that was once called Cambodia and is now called Kampuchea. Undoubtedly, helped by the vote of New Zealand, they will choose to do as they have done for the last three years and allot the seat to the representatives of Democratic Kampuchea. The fact that the country, and this Government in exile, are not democratic, and that the representatives do not control more than a sliver of Kampuchea are perhaps only minor aspects of the makebelieve.

After all. if democracy is the condition of laying some claim to having the will of the people represented, the original holders of the name “Democratic Kampuchea,” having embarked on an active policy of killing the regime’s opponents, would, had the Government stayed in power, have found it only a matter of time before they could lay claim to representing the will of such people as were left alive. Democratic Kampuchea at that time was led by Pol Pot. That Government fell when the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea in the last days of 1978 and the first days of 1979. The Pol Pot forces became guerrilla fighters on the border of Kampuchea and Thailand and retained the seat in the United Nations. In later years those who supported the cause of Democratic Kampuchea retaining the U.N. seat insisted that Pol Pot, whose name was too closely associated with the atrocities which were committed in Kampuchea between 1975 and 1979, be shifted aside. In name at least, he became merely the commander of the Khmer Rouge forces. The make-believe process was well under way. The Democratic Kampuchean Government, which realised that those who remained alive in Kampuchea might not welcome back the Pol Pot

Government helped the makebelieve a little by renouncing collectivisation as' a means of tilling the fields, and then later announced that it was no longer Communist. The abandonment of collectivisation as a policy in the areas that Democratic Kampuchea controlled may’ have been accurate enough but no-one believed, except officially, that the Democratic ’ Kampuchean officials and forces were no longer communist.

The question arises to which fairy-tale does the whole affair of representing Kampuchea most closely correspond? On the surface, at least, the Hans Christian Andersen story of the Emperor's New Clothes seems closest. In that, the emperor is persuaded to go through the motions of nutting on a new suit woven for him which he does not see but does not like to admit that he does not see. Those in his court likewise refuse to admit to not seeing it and those before whom he parades are similarly reluctant

The latest garment to be donned by the Democratic Kampuchean Government is the trappings of a coalition between the old Democratic Kampuchean Government, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and a former Cambodian Prime Minister, Mr Son Sann, leader of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front. The three parties signed a coalition agreement but most reports have it that they have had very little to do with one another since. Perhaps Sihanouk and Son Sann co-operate. The most co-operation to be had out of the Khmer Rouge is that it is refraining from attacking the K.P.N.L.F. as it used to do. An armed clash between the members of the coalition government would be bad for those who believe in fairy tales. The paper coalition has become an important character in the tale and this year more believers than ever are expected to vote for Democratic Kampuchea to retain the seat. The New Zealand Labour

Party which threatened, if it became the Government, to withdraw recognition from the Old Kampuchea because of the Pol Pot years, might become persuaded’ by its leader, Mr Rowling, who has just been to Thailand, to back the new Democratic Kampuchean coalition. That process might be going on in Governments as well. Last year 77 countries voted in favour of the old Democratic Kampuchean delegation, consisting of Mr Pol Pot. Mr leng Sary, and Mr Khieu Samphan.

Thirty-seven countries voted against, and 31 abstained. Some of those which abstained may join the supporters. One possibility is Rumania. The Solomon Islands, which last year voted against Democratic Kampuchea and later advised that it had not meant to, may be able to be counted on for a vote (one way or another).

Australia, which abstained last year, has not announced which way it will vote, but it would be surprising if it changed this year. The opponents of the coalition have their own form of make-believe. The Heng Samrin Government, now ruling in Phnom Penh, was installed by the Vietnamese invaders. The countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations understandably do not favour the Vietnamese method of invading a country and installing a Government of Hanoi's choosing. They consider that this is a distinctly unneighbourly thing to do. China, which sees the entire world in the light of what it thinks the Soviet Union is doing, and the Soviet Union, which would like to belong to the big league and see the world in terms of what the United States is doing but has to keep thinking about what China is doing, have their own versions of the fairy tales both sides are spinning. China keeps sending arms to the Khmer Rouge. The two other members of the coalition have been hoping for arms too, from China or anyone else, but have found that the coalition does not work that way so far.

Prince Sihanouk, who mixes penetrating insight with hyperbole but does not say in which he is indulging at any particular time, recently said that he turned down 40.000 Khmer volunteers in Thailand because he could not arm and keep them. One of his arguments for obtaining arms is so that his forces can defend themselves against the Khmer Rouge. China arms the Khmer Rouge because it sees Vietnam's links with the Soviet Union and believes that the whole Indo-China mess is aimed at encircling China. The neutralisation of Kampuchea between China and the Soviet Union is considered necessary for any real settlement. Prince Sihanouk believes that this is the kind of thing he is very good at.

The Soviet Union, which would like to build up its direct links with Kampuchea is finding itself outplayed by Vietnam diplomatically. The theory behind all the coalition make-believe is that the Khmer Rouge and other fighting groups will irritate the Vietnamese occupiers of Kampuchea and the Phnom Penh Government so that eventually a negotiated settlement will be sought and a Government installed in Phnom Penh which is acceptable to Vietnam, to China, and to A.S.E.A.N. Part of this settlement will be that the Vietnamese troops will all go home. That is the part which is expected to be most acceptable to A.S.E.A.N. However, the fulfilment of this plan depends on a number of very difficult balancing acts. The khmer Rouge and others have got to do enough to irritate the Vietnamese but not enough to provoke Vietnam into attacking Thailand. The Vietnam war demonstrated convincingly how war spreads across the borders of countries which provide sanctuary. The deposed Sihanouk and the present situation over Kampuchea in the United Nations could not be closer to the point. If Vietnam does attack Thailand to try to get rid of the border camps from which guerrillas attack Vietnamese and Phnom Penh troops, then the whole

picture changes. If the matter is settled on the ground, and the border fighters are defeated, then Thailand faces the prospect that perhaps 40.000 Khmer Rouge fighters, well armed with Chinese weapons, will be forced into Thailand. That country is not going to tolerate 40,000 experienced and armed troops within the country, so in the end. if the Khmer Rouge do not surrender their weapons, then Thailand will have to engage them in battle.

The worst outcome of the whole situation would be the fulfilment of what a straightforward thinker might believe was the purpose of the whole exercise anyway. That is. that, diplomatic and military sup-’ port were being given to a Government in exile in the hope that it would find itself in power. If the coalition came to power in Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge could be expected to make short work of the K.P.N.L.F. and Sihanouk’s forces, both of which are much smaller and are heavily pressed for arms.

So, faced with all that, what is a poor country to do? It is comparatively easy for New Zealand because it has decided that where A.S.E.A.N. goes New Zealand will go. Australia went through a crisis of conscience about continuing to support the Pol Pot representatives and in February of last year withdrew recognition of Democratic Kampuchea and abstained in the credentials vote in the United Nations. What is a country like Australia going to do?

It will certainly find it difficult to change its mind, in spite of intensive pressure from A.S.E.A.N. The spell of the make-believe having been broken, it would be hard for Australia to fall under it again. Australia, even if it decided to support the coalition, would be caught in its own logic. It has been giving aid to Kampucheans, making sure that only the refugee camps of the K.P.N.L.F. and Sihanouk receive it. If Australia sup-

ported the coalition by a vote it would be seen to be inconsistent about the aid question. What it is doing is saying that it supports a negotiated settlement as A.S.E.A.N. does. A visit of Sihanouk to Australia has been suggested. He is a colourful character and may attract considerable attention while he is there. Australia will not receive him as a Head of State, but he will still see some important people.

The campaign for the Democratic Kampuchea coalition to hold the seat for the coming year is in full swing. Prince Sihanouk scarcely needs anyone else to help in any campaigns he undertakes, but A.S.E.A.N. has been doing more than its bit. African countries have been wooed in particular. Hopes are high, in that camp, that Democratic Kampuchea will at least hold and possibly increase its majority.

The Heng Samrin backers are not expected to launch their campaign until the middle of this month. They, too, have been wooing the Africans. Vietnam is the most vigorous backer. Just how strenuously the Soviet Union will exert itself remains to be seen. Some indications exist that the Soviet Union wants some of the world opinion against it over its invasion of Afghanistan to soften, and is prepared to give a little over Kampuchea, which is not nearly as important to it as Afghanistan, to try to get less criticism voiced over Afghanistan.

Probably a military solution cannot be achieved. As far as those who vote for Democratic Kampuchea are concerned, the last thing they should want is a military victory because this would mean the return to power of the Khmer Rouge. The fairy tale would then not be the Emperor’s New Clothes, but closer to Little Red Riding Hood. In the fairy story the woodcutter enters the story just in time to save Little Red Riding Hood. Those who are making believe now cannot guarantee the same sort of ending.