Australia’s naval dilemma

Press, 15 July 1982, Page 16

Australia’s naval dilemma

The British decision to. keep the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Invincible reopens defence questions in Australia that the decision to buy the Invincible seemed to have closed. Australia’s only carrier, H.M.A.S. Melbourne, has been laid up. Another carrier has to be found, or Australia will have to reappraise its intention to retain a fleet air arm; and with it, its ability to operate certain types of aircraft at long distance from land bases. So far, senior Australian Ministers have spoken only of finding an alternative to the Invincible. The older British carrier, H.M.S. Hermes, has been mentioned although it could be no more than a stopgap while Australia faced the enormous cost of having a new carrier built This was the charm of the Invincible: it was to cost “only” $4OO million, with about the same amount for new naval aircraft. A new carrier is likely to cost at least twice as much.

The lessons of the Falklands war are being assessed by Australia’s naval planners, as they are by other navies. Without aircraft carriers it would have been very much more costly, and perhaps impossible, for Britain to -recapture the islands at such a distance from a land base. Yet the carriers were, potentially highly vulnerable to missile attacks: At least a dozen smaller British warships were needed. to protect the carriers; in turn, this fleet required a second fleet of supply ships, which also, had to be protected. This was an expensive way to provide barely adequate air cover for a landing force.' ■.

Australia has no obligation such as the Falklands that might require it to mount an expeditionary force, alone, far. from friendly land bases. It has, however, obligations and interests in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific that might require aircraft to operate out of range of Australian bases. Aerial refuelling is being debated'by the R.A.A.F. To many, a carrier still offers the most, assured way of providing aircraft far from land bases. ' Australia’s carrier debate also raises questions about the kind of war Australia

(and New Zealand) might one day be required to fight. Both countries have navies built up from the days when antisubmarine warfare and convoy protection were vital to their survival. According to one school of thought, another major war might be over in a matter of hours. Only if a war lasted for months would convoy protection become important. The Australian Labour Party has argued for some time that the country should buy more submarines instead of a new aircraft carrier. Again, the lesson of the Falklands is that surface ships can be very vulnerable to submarine attack, a factor that kept the Argentine Navy in port for much of the war. Submarines might best serve a naval policy with the object of protecting Australia’s enormous coastline from invasion. No such invasion is likely and submarines are a much less flexible instrument of policy than surface ships. Britain’s nuclear submarines did not deter or stop the occupation of the Falklands by an eriemy. Australia again like New Zealand has for some years, been moving away from a concept of “forward defence” which generally meant working with a larger ally who was able to make good deficiencies in defence equipment. Both countries have come closer to an attitude of self-help, and of regarding their prime object as defence of their own territories. Yet both still depend on seaborne trade to survive and both have vast oceans, and scattered islands, as their, “neighbours.”

If Australia does not retain an aircraft carrier, both countries will have to accept that the territory they can hope to defend effectively has shrunk closer to their shores. A new carrier for Australia, along with aircraft and support facilities, would be enormously costly. Other arms of the Australian services would suffer. A further review of the manner in which Australia and New Zealand are to be defended, and of the threats that both countries believe they should be prepared to meet, has become one. of the pressing outcomes of the South Atlantic war set off by Argentina’s ambitions.