Washington as the real Falklands loser

Press, 16 June 1982, Page 24

Washington as the real Falklands loser

By

JAMES NEILSON.

Editor of the “Buenos Aires Herald," who left Argentina after threats to his life. .

Washington s small army of specialists on Latin American affairs is doing its best ■ to assess the damage that the Falklands war is likely to do to United States' interests. Some, like the United States Ambassador to the United Nations (Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick). a vigorous advocate of close ties between the Reagan Administration and such Right-wing dictators as General Leopoldo Galtieri. hope that when the fighting and the rhetoric die down the United States will emerge virtually unscathed. Others glumly appreciate that no matter who ends up with the islands — a symbolic prize of doubtful value — the United States is certain to be among the losers. Although the need for money and arms will, sooner or later,induce many Latin American leaders -.to forget the "anticolonialist" fervour now inflaming them, it will be a long time before the latent hostility subsides. The war, in fact, could do more harm to United States interests in Latin America than anything that has happened since the days of Theodore Roosevelt, the rise of Fidel Castro included. The dispute has revived the old struggle between the Eng-lish-speaking and the Spanishspeaking worlds. Britons and Americans, who have, by and large, forgotten this struggle or at least consider it superseded by newer conflicts, may find this a bit far-fetched. After all. they do not think of the Latin Americans as their

ancestral enemies: On the contrary. they often like them and tend to sympathise with. them. This, however, only things worse. ' " ■?' .'

The refusal oi-English-speak-ing people ’to take Latin American Anglophobia . and anti-Americanism very.-’ seriously. or the-habit of regarding it as something confined to Marxists or exotic religious fanatics, is very galling to Latin Americans: it reminds them that they do not count for very much in the modern world. * a world in large measure invented by the "An-glo-Saxons." Their feelings on the subject are similar to those of many Frenchmen but are much more intense because the disparity in material achievements, military ability, political weight, and cultural influence between Latin America and the Englishspeaking countries is far greater than the one — if it can be said to exist-at all — between the latter and France. That is why Argentina’s appeal to its Latin American "brothers" for "ethnic” solidarity has met with a fairly positive response. That Argentina is an Hispanic country means far more to democrats in Venezuela or Costa Rica than its being ruled by a repulsive military regime. Even Latin Americans who dislike the occasionally boastful Argentines, who fear Argentine expansionism, and who have grave doubts about the seizure of the islands, are reductant to take the side of the Anglo-Saxons.

As far as Latin Americans are concerned, the Englishspeaking powers — rich, efficient.- strong and complacent - represent the "other" foreigners, to be envied for their prosperity and damned for their materialism. This attitude is especially strong among the politicians 'and intellectuals who like to express themselves in Marxist terminology. But although they profess to’see the Falklands struggle as another round in the battle against imperialism, most know in their hearts that it is simply another episode in the endless conflict between "us" and "then." Latin Americans may be able to unite in deploring infamy, but they are able to unite on very ’little else. Although most would be gratified to see Argentina humiliate Great Britain, they would also be very worried by what such a victory could mean. Latin Americans have been speculating about the possible emergence of a regional bloc led by a reinvigorated, selfconfident, militaristic Argentina — an Argentina, moreover. that could soon become a nuclear power. Far from bringing real Latin American unity nearer, an Argentine triumph would deepen the cracks that already exist. Such neighbours as Chile and Uruguay would feel even more nervous than they are at present and they would be sure to strengthen their ties with Por-tuguese-speaking Brazil, a country which would oppose any Argentine attempt to lead all or part of Latin’America.

Bolivia and Peru, and possibly Venezuela, would tilt towards Argentina. -Paraguay would do its best to play off one giant against the other. The result would, perhaps, be some sort of confrontation between two regional alliances. Some Americans — and some Argentines - are under the impression that the sharp deterioration in relations between Buenos Aires and Washington signals the end of a beautiful friendship that had

lasted for many years, but Argentina has never been a friend of* the United States. For a long time it saw itself as a rival for influence in the Western hemisphere and. even when that pretension became manifestly ridiculous. Argentine governments busied themselves foiling United States', initiatives designed to create an “inter-American system" controlled by Washington. This time it has had more success than ever, even though the Falklands were invaded

with something else in mind. One consequence is likely to be a determined attempt by the United States to court Brazil, which has. over the years, been a far more reliable friend than Argentina ever was. Strangely, the old AngloPortuguese alliance, designed to build a barrier to Spanish ambitions, has its counterpart in the Americas. National interests being what they are. it could prove just as ’durable. Copyright. London Observer Service.