THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1982. When the war is over

Press, 16 June 1982, Page 24

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1982. When the war is over

The battles have stopped in the Falkland Islands, at least for the time being. An Argentinian surrender has been announced, but the Argentinians have not been prepared for this outcome. If they see thousands of their troops returning.home unarmed, the truth may become clear to them. Had the battle for Port Stanley gone ahead the casualties on both sides — bad enough now — would quickly have grown worse: the town would probably be wrecked and its people killed or injured in great numbers. “Great Britain is great again.” said the British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, returning home after she had announced victory in the House of Commons. Mrs Thatcher touched a deep core of sentiment in Britain about the war. In the moment of victory such views are understandable. These are not the views which will help in deciding the future of the islands. Calculations have already been done on the number of ships, of aircraft, and of troops, that would need to be posted to the South Atlantic to deter Argentina from trying to seize the islands again. The cost of this has been calculated at $5OO million a year, rising throughout the rest of the 1980 s. The British public may well lose their enthusiasm for the islands when it becomes clear how much it is going to cost the British taxpayer each year to keep the islands more or less safe for the 1800 people who live there.

It is no wonder that Mrs Thatcher has suggested a peace-keeping force made up of several countries. New Zealand-defence resources are stretched to their limit in the Pacific already and it .would be ridiculous if an attempt were made to stretch them to the South Atlantic, except by way of a purely token representation. New Zealand has pleaded poverty to its A.N.Z.U.S. partners, Australia and the United. States, over Pacific defence; these two' countries will seem more than a little incredulous should New Zealand offer to supply a force of any consequence in the South Atlantic.

The long-term solution to the Falkland Islands should not come to depend on a permanent. force of British . troops, or British and other troops. Negotiations with Argentina over the future of the islands cannot be expected soon because of the lives that’have been lost; but talks must be held again one day and the Falkland Isjanders who have seen lives lost and who will hear more about the cost in money tqrms of bringing about the Argentine surrender will have to consider their future.■ ■ ’ ’ . •

i World reaction to the end of the war — it that is indeed what has been reached —

must be one of relief. Britain was backed by most Western countries. The question that must occur to many people is whether, if Argentina tried to take the islands again in a year or two, the support from many Western countries . would be as wholehearted as it was this time. A number might consider that Britain should settle the issue with Argentina. The attitude of the United States will be allimportant in this. There are strong indications that the United States does not want to see a continuing problem in the South Atlantic. The suggestion that Britain’s governor of the islands may leave some of his regalia behind lest it incense, the feelings of a number of Latin American countries, is a slight concession to the United States and the changed circumstances. It hardly reaches the level of magnanimity that the American Secretary of State, Mr Alexander Haig, hoped Britain would show when the war was over. Without a doubt, once it is all over the United States will spare no effort to repair its relations with Argentina and the rest of Latin America. The confusion over the vote at the United Nations, in which the American Ambassador. (Mrs Jean Kirkpatrick) wanted to change her vote from vetoing a cease-fire in the Security Council to abstaining, is an indication of the way in which the United States is torn on the issue.

The days in which General Galtieri will continue to rule Argentina are almost certainly numbered. In Britain, Lord Carrington resigned because the Foreign Office, which was under his charge, did not supply warning of Argentina’s intentions. General Galtieri obviously had no real idea that Britain would react with such force and strength of purpose. Whether this was because he was badly advised by his representatives in Britain or whether he decided to win support from Argentinians who were distressed economically and by treatment, and did not worry about the consequences, is difficult to say. He risked and lost the lives of a great many young Argentinians unnecessarily. In doing so he risked, and it will be surprising if he has not lost, his own position. If he goes, and Argentina turns to a more enlightened government, the time for Britain to show magnanimity would be even more appropriate. The first opportunity to give some sign of readiness to be conciliatory will be in the way that the Argentinian troops are removed from the islands. Britain will be judged by millions of Latin Americans by the manner in which the war is concluded and the way in which troops return to Argentina.