Mitterrand in Japan

Press, 20 April 1982, Page 20

Mitterrand in Japan

The visit of the French President, Mr Francois Mitterrand, to Japan has been significant because it was the first by a • French President to Japan; because of the attempts by the United States and Western Europe to persuade Japan to repair the imbalances in trade, which are heavily in Japan’s favour, the visit has had special importance. Here was the president of a country renowned for pursuing its national interest with singlemindedness meeting the Prime Minister of a country renowned for pursuing its economic interests with vigour; yet no fireworks were set off. President Mitterrand praised Japan’s industrial abilities but grumbled that its success had been achieved partly through economic aggressiveness. Japan, which has more reason than any other country to know something about, the horrors of nuclear warfare, was given the standard French line that France had to have a nuclear force, independent of the United States and the Soviet Union. The visit may have been historic; the tunes had been played before.

France will be host to the economic summit meeting of the seven leading Western industrialised nations in June. Before President Mitterrand went to Japan, he said that he hoped that the friction with Japan over trade would be settled by negotiation. The continuing friction bodes ill for the June meeting. The United States is determined to make Japan more responsive to American demands for greater access to Japan’s markets. The Japanese, as the article printed on this page today argues, consider that they have adapted quickly to the oil price shocks and that this is one very good reason for their success. They also argue that the high

interest rates in the United States have helped to make American exporters less competitive.

To some extent the difficulties are compounded by different national outlooks. The Americans say .that they want some demonstration of Japanese sincerity in efforts to reduce the trade imbalance. The Japanese ask for specific instances and have set up an office of a trade ombudsman to look at the complaints of foreigners. Japan looked at 99 instances of complaints about trade barriers and made concessions on 67 of these. This determination by the Japanese to look at specifics and the determination of the Americans to seek some overt sign that the Japanese are taking them seriously, is part of th ;• tangle of claim and counter-claim. If cultural misunderstandings are the cause of some of the trade friction, such misunderstandings have to be tackled to enable the world’s economic giants — the European Economic Community, the United States, and Japan — to do business harmoniously.

The United States, for its own economic reasons, intends to keep interest rates up; Japan, in spite of the widespread pressure, fails to convince other countries that it will take. more imports. Both positions tend towards trade protectionism. If American industries cannot export, they will press for protection of their home market. If Japan cannot adjust to accept more imports, retaliation may be expected in the form of resistance to Japan’s exports. Little time is left before the June summit meeting for the industrial giants to come to terms. If they fail to do so, the kind of barriers that they set up will be barriers to smaller traders as well.