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Hopes for Kampuchea

“The A.S.E.A.N. stand is clear,” the Philippines Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Carlos Romulo, has just said. “We want a political settlement after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Withdraw the Vietnamese troops and there will be a settlement. You cannot have a political solution with 200,000 troops breathing on their necks.” Most observers would probably agree with Mr Romulo’s hopes for a political settlement in Kampuchea. The early chances of achieving such a withdrawal and settlement seem remote. The Association of South-East Asian Nations, to which New Zealand pins its policies towards the area, is constantly holding discussions on the problem, the discussion at present being between Mr Romulo and Mr Suppiah Dhanabalan, the Foreign Minister of Singapore. Little seems to have come out of such discussions so far.

Mr Romulo pointed to the central problem; that is, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. If the Vietnamese suddenly withdrew, it might hot solve all problems because the most powerful fighting force is that of the Khmer Rouge, whose brutal Government fell before the Vietnamese invaders at the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979. The Vietnamese would not permit the Khmer Rouge, who made a number of border attacks on Vietnam, to take power again. This brings out one of the dilemmas of the tragedy of Kampuchea: some account has henceforth to be taken of Vietnam’s wishes for Kampuchea. Perhaps Vietnam does want to dominate Kampuchea completely and indefinitely. Perhaps it would agree to having a compliant Kampuchea. Perhaps Vietnam simply wants to have the produce of Kampuchea’s fertile rice lands to supplement the output of what was once one of the great rice-growing areas of Asia — South Vietnam. The very least it wants is to have a Government in Phnom Penh that does not attack Vietnam and in which the influence of China is slight. There is no doubt that a final political settlement has to take account of Vietnam.

Hopes for a military settlement seem ill-founded. The only large fighting force is that of the Khmer Rouge. Even the Khmer

Rouge lack sufficient forces to drive the Vietnamese out. If they could drive the Vietnamese out, neither the Kampuchean people nor others would want to see the Khmer Rouge back in power. Whatever the Khmer Rouge believe about their own effectiveness, they are viewed by A.S.E.A.N. as having little more than the ability to put pressure on the Vietnamese to get out of Kampuchea, or at least sue for a settlement.

Two other groups, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, and the forces of Prince Sihanouk, the former Head of State in the country, have neither the troops -nor the backing to be effective militarily against the Vietnamese. The recent move to have the three resistance groups form a coalition has so far failed, largely because the Khmer Rouge have refused to join. China’s offer to be host to a meeting of the three groups has the air of desperation. Until, now, China has been thoroughly scornful of the coalition proposal, and China has been the supplier of arms to the Khmer Rouge. One of the advantages of a settlement in the area would be that it might then be possible to woo Vietnam further from dependence on the Soviet Union. As long as Vietnam has its resources stretched to maintain troops in Kampuchea as well as Laos, Vietnam’s dependence on the Soviet Union is likely to grow. A settlement might also give to Thailand, across whose border some of the fighting takes place, a greater sense of security. The refugee problems there should also be eased. While Thailand has resolutely refused to accept the Heng Samrin Government established in Phnom Penh by Vietnam, the Malaysian Prime Minister has not been so adamant. If Phnom Penh and Vietnam can agree to the possibility of some choice for the Kampuchean people, the suggestion that the Heng Samrin authorities should be given a chance to compete in an election has something to commend it. The present situation can hardly last forever. The latest reports of fighting say that the Vietnamese-led forces in Kampuchea are moving close to the Thai border. As the Vietnam war showed, this is a recipe for disaster.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19820213.2.84

Bibliographic details

Press, 13 February 1982, Page 14

Word Count
706

Hopes for Kampuchea Press, 13 February 1982, Page 14

Hopes for Kampuchea Press, 13 February 1982, Page 14