THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1982. Off to Sinai

Press, 3 February 1982, Page 16

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1982. Off to Sinai

The discussions in Canberra about a New Zealand contribution to the police force which has become known as the Multinational Force and Observers to be stationed in the Sinai desert are about size, equipment, and co-operation with other forces, not about whether some New Zealand troops will go. This decision, for better or for worse, has been made. New Zealand linked its decision at first to Australia’s. Australia linked its decision at first to Canada’s, but later made it conditional upon participation by acceptable European countries. New Zealand’s decision thereby came itself to be linked with the decision of acceptable European countries. Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands pass the acceptability test. Since Israel has said that it will approve the contribution of the Europeans, the way has been cleared for New Zealand to join.

The path to the establishment of the force has not been straightforward. The purpose of the force is to patrol the Sinai desert area from which Israel will withdraw on April 25 and which will then revert to Egyptian sovereignty. Under the Camp David Accords, as the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has become known, provision was made for a United Nations force to help keep the peace. It became clear that such a proposal would not be given approval within the United Nations. The United States, which has agreed to provide the largest number of troops, decided to establish the force independently of the United Nations. The European countries approached by the United States to join the force first appeared to be reluctant. Indeed, there has been a noticeable lack of enthusiasm there, as well as in New Zealand, for the force. Eventually the European countries came round to support the plan. They were, perhaps, influenced by the fact that Europe had been less than fulsome in its adoption of American views on Poland and wanted to oblige the United States in some other way. They may also have been influenced by the argument that the Camp David Accords contained the only proposals for the immediate future that showed any signs of getting some action.

At the time of their first announcement about joining the Sinai force, the Europeans made a statement affirming their views. on the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in the settlement of the Middle East question. Although this statement was not an integral part of the decision to join the

force, the Israelis, understandably .enough, saw the two statements as being bound together. The not inconsiderable weight of Mr Alexander Haig, the American Secretary of State, was needed to bring the, Israelis around to accepting the Europeans’ view. The wrath of the Americans was also visited upon the Israelis about-the sudden annexation of the Golan Heights into Israel. ~ '

In the latest manoeuvrings, the Europeans have affirmed that their participation in the Sinai force is part of the Camp David peace process. They do not appear to have withdrawn their earlier statement about the involvement of the P.L.0., but they have not bothered to repeat it. This helped Israel to accept the Europeans in the force. The question that remains is whether the force will do any good or- any harm. Because it will patrol the area in a way yet to be defined, the Israelis will withdraw from the Sinai according to the agreement they reached previously, and which has just been reconfirmed. The Middle East problem is both about land and about displaced people. It must be admitted that the return of land to Egypt is part of the resolution of the Middle East’s problems. From that point of view, the fact that there is to be a force is likely to do good. The greater problem is that of the Palestinian people. It does nothing one way or the other over that. It may be that time will show that the whole Camp David Accords approach is a sterile one and, because the establishment of the force is part of the agreement, it may hinder more hopeful approaches. On the whole, hopeful approaches to the Middle East are rare. If this agreement is not acted on, no-one seems to have a useful alternative. One worry has been that New Zealand’s participation will harm New Zealand’s trade prospects in the area. This consideration cannot be put aside, even though, so far, the response from Middle East countries has been muted. Some complaints have come out of Libya, Syria, and Iraq, but almost as if the complaints had to be made as a matter of form. There is no firm evidence that New Zealand will do itself any immediate harm by joining. It seems likely that any real protest will be directed first at the Europeans. New Zealand would do well in this touchy business to continue to link its participation with the views of the Europeans.