Pearl Harbour’s ‘day of infamy’ recalled

Press, 7 December 1981, Page 20

Pearl Harbour’s ‘day of infamy’ recalled

By

ROSS MADDEN

Today, a group' of middle-. aged, men , will stand, heads bowed, in the Pacific sunshine on a hill overlooking the vast United States naval base at Pearl Harbour, Honolulu, and remember the moment 40 years ago when 2000 bf their ' friends and colleagues died in “one hundred minutes of hell.” On December ' 7(. 1941, a Japanese naval force made a devastating surprise raid on the American Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour, destroying some of the world’s most feared battleships and turning America from a neutral power into an Allied foe. Four decades later. Pearl Harbour survivors will gather for services of remembrance at Honolulu’s Punch Bowl Memorial Cemetery to recall that sunny morning when hell came out of the blue skies above Pearl Harbour where the United States Pacific Force had been stationed in peace

in Washington

since 1939. The surprise attack, which lasted one hour and 40 minutes, gave the Japanese a stunning victory which 24 hours later brought America into the Second World War. President Franklin D. Roosevelt described it as “a date which will live in infamy — the day the United States was suddenly and deliberately attacked —. and one of the most awesome days in our history.” At ! 7.55 a.m. on December 7 a single dive-bomber, released from a Japanese aircraft carrier, shrieked down on Pearl Harbour, followed by nearly 200 more, plus scores of torpedo planes and fighters? Within a quarter of an hour, all the island’s'key airfields had virtually ceased to exist. - Lieutenant-General Walter C. Short, joint, commander at Pearl Harbour, later recalled: “On the first wave of the assault, I was able to get six

planes in the air. Of the 126 on the ground, only 43 were left fit for service.” At that moment in Washington, two gravely , courteous - Japanese, Ambassador Admiral Nomura and special envoy Kurusu, were presenting a note to the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. . It amounted to a declaration of war. But even before Cordell Hull had had time to react to the note, Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo were announcing the news of victory at Pearl Harbour and declaring: “The Japanese army and navy have entered into a state of war with the American forces.” The attack, first on the island’s airfields and then on the United States Pacific fleet, moored in Pearl Harbour, was the result of months of secret and meticulous planning by the Japanese High Command. Final orders for the assault had been issued at the start of November and by the middle of the month a task force of

about 30 ships, including six aircraft carriers, under Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, were ready for the mission. As news -of its success spread through Japan, crowds took to the streets of major cities singing the national anthem. At the same time as General Short’s air fleet was being massacred, a massive movement began against the United States Pacific fleet. The battleship Oklahoma, hit by four torpedoes within five minutes, rolled completely over, her bottom and . propeller rising above the waters of the harbour. The battleship Arizona blew up at the same time, amid a huge spout of flame and grey-black smoke, and within minutes two more battleships and a destroyer had been destroyed. The Japanese had every reason to be satisfied with their morning’s work. The navy had lost 2000 men, plus 700 casualties. The attack had resulted in the total destruction

of the prestigious Pacific fleet. But what was especially to gall America was that the “day of infamy” had been carried out by Japanese forces who emerged practically unscathed. It was later revealed that the enemy had lost less than 100 men, 29 planes and five midget submarines. Bitterness and recriminations swept the United States, as the key question was asked: Why had the harbour been so unprepared? The report of a hastily established congressional committee blamed the general lack of preparation on military chiefs in Hawaii. There was also severe criticism of American Intelligence for not monitoring closely Japanese naval codes. New techniques of aerial warfare perfected by the Japanese had been exploited with brilliant ruthlessness byAdmiral Yamamoto. Previously the Americans had not believed that torpedoes could be launched successfully in

Pearl Harbour’s shallow waters. And, it was also though, bombs could not penetrate a battleship’s massive deck armour. Both theories were tragically and spectacularly destroyed in 100 minutes. Ironically, the advantages of the Pearl Harbour raid turned out to be strictly short-term for the Japanese. By concentrating on the destruction of the fleet, they had neglected the considerable oil supplies on Hawaii which could have immobilised the United States for months. Anti-war sentiment had been high in the United States, but with the debacle of Pearl Harbour it was swept totally away. Following America's declaration of war on the day following Pearl Harbour, the fate of Japanese militarism was inevitable. But it took four and a half years to atone for the 100 minutes which changed the course of 20th century history —Copyright. Feature's International.