On the sidelines of crumbling Iran

Press, 5 December 1981, Page 14

On the sidelines of crumbling Iran

From “The Economist,” London

In the winter of 1978-79. the Iranian wall between Russia and the Gulf crumbled away. The West shuddered, concluding that its main source of oil lay within grasping distance of Mr Brezhnev. A year later, Russian soldiers stomped into Afghanistan, next door to Iran. Two years later . . well, twm years later nothing else has happened. Afghanistan has not been subdued. The Russians have left Iran alone. The grisly goings-on there are no fault of Mr Brezhnev’s: the Iranian civil war of assassination and execution belongs to a religion much older than Marxism-Len-inism.

Instead, both the West and, it is assumed, Russia, are content to pore over the spinning roulette wheel in Iran, waiting for the ball to settle on Islamic black or revolutionary red. To interfere, argue Western planners, would violate the rules of the post-imperial game. True. But the West should be asking itself whether Russia too is respecting those rules, or whether it is quietly doing something to make sure the ball lands on red.

In one rather ominous way, the Russians have been far from idle. Most of the 24 or more Soviet divisions usually stationed along their southwest frontier have been drawn up in the Transcaucasus region between the Black Sea and the Caspian. N.A.T.O. planners, as well as

the Government of nearby Turkey, have been watching with furrowed brows as Soviet battle-ready “A” divisions have been brought in to replace some of the Dad’s Army “C” divisions. The bulk of Russia’s Army in the Transcaucasus, run-of-the-mill “B” divisions, has had its equipment thoroughly overhauled. The aircraft recently posted to the region are thought to be among the most modern in Russia. It is reckoned that it would take Russia only two weeks to get its forces up to invasion readiness, along one of two roads: the one crossing the Soviet-Iranian border at Jolfa, which leads towards the oilfields of southern Iran; or the ane crossing the border at Astara, which leads towards Teheran. A Soviet airborne division could be dropped on objectives in and around Teheran in a couple of hours. No need to panic — yet. The Russians like to strengthen their defences where they see disorder on their borders, and the area to the south of the Transcaucasus is nothing if not disorderly. But the Russians are also pastmasters at the business of growling and glowering at a country in order to influence events inside it: think of Poland.

In Iran, Russia’s heavy breathing may be intended to do one of two things. First, more modestly, to intimidate anybody who might emerge on

top of the scrimmage there from hauling Iran back into alliance with the West. Second, and more alarmingly, to provide a handy source of support should Mr Brezhnev’s friends emerge on top of the Iranian pile.

The W’est. by contrast, has no say at all about events in Iran. In a couple of years time. America’s Rapid Deployment Force might, possibly, be able to drop a few men in central Iran to act as a tripwire deterrent to a Soviet invading force and might, just conceivably, be able to occupy and defend the country’s oilfields, south.

But a not very large cavalry squadron not yet assembled a long way away does not carry much clout inside Iran today. The mullahs held American diplomats hostage for a year while they protected the Russian Embassy in Teheran against demonstrators because they are afraid of Russia, and not' of America. To most Iranians, the symbol of American power is a charred helicopter in the desert. More than a year after the release of the American hostages, the West still has no better policy for Iran than a pious hope that the power struggle there will turn out the right way. The West’s main hope is that one day Iran’s Army will haul the country out of chaos. A genuinely non-aligned, mili-tary-ruled Iran would not be too bad from the West’s point of view. But other, less desirable endings to the present dark chapter in Iranian history

seem more likely. Even men of God divide between conservatives and radicals. The group, led by Iran's President. Hojatoleslam Khamenei. which favours closer links with Russia, seems to be on the rise. This clique is backed by the Russian-sup-ported Tudeh Party. As the mullahs are pushed into a corner by their enemies, they may corrie to depend upon the Tudeh, or upon Soviet weapons, or indeed upon the Soviet soldiers conveniently waiting in the nearby Transcaucasus. Equally, the main anti-mul-lah force in Iran today, the Mujahedeen, is a shadowy, undisciplined collection of pseudo-Marxist street-fighters. Its present leaders seem to he no friends of Russia. But they could tilt that way if the colossus in the north steps on to the scales.

Next door Afghanistan slipped into the grip of a proSoviet Government almost unnoticed by the West. When Soviet soldiers were airlifted in to protect Russian interests from the hostility of most Afghans, it was too late for the West to come in. In Iran there is a similar danger that America will notice too late that friends of Russia are running Teheran; and will then have to choose between bringing far-off forces to bear against a sovereign government backed up by a formidable military force in the north, and doing nothing. Can the West do something to avoid such a choice being forced upon it? Yes. Without

waiting for the slow build-up of the Rapid Deployment Force, it can send a military signal that counters the Soviet buildup in the Transcaucasus and shows Iranians that they are not condemned to living in the shadow of their northern neighbour.

The region of Anatolia in eastern Turkey provides an ideal place for a modest coun-ter-demonstration of Western strength. Turkey is a member of N.A.T.0., and an Ace Mobile Force seconded from Europe’s central front occasionally trains in Anatolia. The trouble is that even Turkey’s present military regime is reluctant to accept more than this. The

Turks have got enough on their hands at home, and they do not want to draw attention to their long border with Russia. Yet N.A.T.O. countries, especially W'est Germany, should point to the military and economic aid they have poured into Turkey in order to ask that country to play a fuller part in the alliance. In exchange for American facilities in Anatolia, for use in the event of a threat to Iran, Turkey should be given more military aid and harder evidence that N.A.T.O. would protect it against Russia. A modest N.A.T.O. build-up in eastern Turkey would be the proper response to the Soviet build-up in the Transcaucasus.