Reagan stiffens a box of soft centres

Press, 30 October 1981, Page 12

Reagan stiffens a box of soft centres

-By

R. H. C. STEED

in “The Daily Telegraph,” London

World War 111 of a special kind, between Russia and the West, is hotting up. The great reservation is, of course, that, under nuclear-age Super Power rules, any risk of actual fighting between the two coldwarring alliances is given the widest of berths. This does not rule out actual fighting between surrogates and proteges, as Korea, Vietnam and the ever-widening activities of Cuban and other Communist forces show. So far, and increasingly since “detente,” it has been a very onesided affair. But Mr Reagan, Mr Haig and Mr Weinberger are planning to stop this. The Russians have been waging World War 111 from the day World War II ended, and even beforehand have built up an enormous world-wide organisation for terrorism, subversion and propaganda. This was specially designed for twilight conflict and is now paying big dividends. The West, by contrast, has reacted only spasmodically and is still largely reluctant to recognise what is going on. It is bound throughout by the strictest democratic rules — on pain, among other things, of summary conviction by investigative journalism.

The assassination of President Sadat was a great victory for Russia. It was ample reward for her support of the efforts of the extremist Arab

States to isolate him after his peace agreement with Israel. Thanks to . the precautions taken by Mr Sadat, the danger of a power vacuum and a struggle for the succession was avoided. But the absence from his funeral even of the moderate Arab States was a chilling final rebuff.

True, they have deep feelings over Palestine. Yet at the same time they know that they have everything to fear from Russia and its followers, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and everything to gain from a Western orientation and stability in the region. No doubt fear — personal, political, dynastic and strategic — played a large part in keeping them away. On the very same day as the Cairo funeral, Russia was enjoying in Bonn .what could turn out for her to be the greatest success since the undisturbed building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. A quarter of a million people demonstrated against the N.A.T.O. decision to start deploying, from the end of the year after next, a relatively modest number of Cruise and Pershing missiles in response to Russia’s present huge and growing array.

It was as much a humiliation for Mr Schmidt as it was a victory for Russian intimidation, subversion and propaganda. Over a quarter of his

M.P.s, plus the same proportion of those of his Free Democrat allies, defied his orders by supporting the rally. Mr Schmidt,’s illness is certainly the result of over-strain in his efforts to reconcile loyalty to his. N.A.T.O. commitments with the increasing pacifism of his Left. We can be sure that both it and President Sadat’s murder were both gleefully celebrated in the privacy of the Kremlin. ' < .

. In Greece the triumph of Mr Papandreou’s anti-N.A.T.O> and anti-E.E.C, Socialist Party is as much a boost for Russia as it is a set-back for the West. TO a very large extent it is a product of the climate created by the decline in N.A.T.Q.’s effectiveness and the success of Russian power politics and propaganda in that whole region.

Another major battle was won for Russia by the Labour Party’s overwhelming vote for unilateral nuclear, disarmament and the closing of American nuclear bases. Should Labour win the next British election, this would be a disaster, as it would almost certainly lead to America’s withdrawal from an untenable position in Europe and, in due course, to Russian control. Yet Russia has also had reverses. In Poland she is losing battles which, unless she is able suddenly and brutally to turn the tide, will in the long run outweigh all her successes and perhaps result in her losing the whole war.

Nor must the Russian reverse in Afghanistan — of, of course, the danger to others from the continued presence of her armies there — be forgotten.

It is against this whole background — almost universally unfavourable to the West except fortuitously in Poland — that President Reagan has launched his re-armament pro- ' gramme, the nuclear component of which has just been announced. Allies are to be reassured, wavering friends encouraged, enemies warned. It will by no means automatically solve underlying problems — Palestine, Third World poverty, deep-seated national rivalries and so on. But once Russia’s power to exacerbate these for her own ends in a kind of global nihilistic revolution is limited they can be approached with far greater prospects of success. Naturally Russia has directed the full blast of her propaganda against what she portrays as an American grab for world domination and a lurch towards nuclear holocaust.

In reality Mr Reagan’s programme would create, over a period of some ten years, a balance with which a Russia not pursuing paranoid ambitions imposed by a failed economic, political, social and ideological system should be more than satisfied. Her huge conventional superiority in Europe would remain.

As for N.A.T.Q.’s much-dis-

cussed European theatre medium-range .nuclear weapons, even after the full Pershing-Cruise deployment, and even if Russia did not add a single warhead to those already deployed, she would still have an effective lead of well over 2 to 1, In naval forces America would become better able to project power at a distance, but Russia, while continuing to develop her own global capability, would still retain unquestionable superiority over a wide area round her own vast continental mass. The strategic and economic lifelines of the N.A.T.O. countries would remain highly vulnerable, although less so than at present. It is only in strategic nuclear weapons that America would eventually remain assured equality, thus ending- the ascendancy which Russia will hold during the next six years or so. owing to her newlyacquired ability to knock out practically all America's landbased missiles in a "firststrike.”

Mr Reagan has been obliged by environmental protest to scrap the housing system for the forth-coming MX missile whereby there would be many empty silos to confuse Russian targetting. This leaves the vulnerability problem unsovled until the end of the decade. Trident 2 will then, for the first time, provide the “counterforce” accuracy of a landbased missile with the invulnerability of a submarine.

In the meantime America is to provide increased deterrence with an impressive stopgap array of Cruise missiles and bombers. Given the firmness of purpose that America is now showing, they should be ample so far as she is concerned.

N.A.T.O.'s soft under-belly is now European morale, which has been sagging for some time and is now under unprecedented internal and external attack. It is no exaggeration to say that as much depends on leadership now as during the most difficult years of 1939-45.

The deterrent value of Britian’s quota of 160 Cruise missiles would be multiplied many times, by the example their prompt deployment would set and the proof it would give of loyalty to the American alliance. In an uncertain world which calls for the widest range of options, Britain should go for Trident 2, especially as it is to become the standard American type for decades. The dangers in Europe stem not only from outright pacificism and neutralism. There is also an insidious and growing tendancy to equate America morally with Russia to take a “six of one-and-half-a-dozen of the other" attitude and to blame America for anything that goes wrong. The fact is that it is just the most intractable problems, often mainly arising from the weakness and mistakes of the loudest critics, that finish up on Mr Reagan’s desk.