Judge’s ruling on voice tapes

Press, 30 April 1981, Page 5

Judge’s ruling on voice tapes

The Commission also disagreed with the interpretation by Mr Chippindale of the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder. (‘‘The Press” published the transcript in full when the chief inspector's report was released.) Mr Justice Mahon heard the tapes and closely analysed them. His conclusions differed substantially from those of Mr Chippindale. For instance: Captain Collins: Tell him we can make a visual descent descending. (Interjection) Unidentified: My God. Captain Collins: On a grid of one eight zero. First Officer Cassin: Yes. Captain Collins: And make a visual approach to McMurdo. First Officer Cassin: OK. "I must say that I am at a loss to understand how the interjection ‘My God,’ presumably thought to have been uttered by a flight engineer, can be interpreted as an expression of alarm as to the decision of Captain Collins to advise McMurdo that he was able to make a visual descent. A flight engineer alarmed at such a decision would certainly not content himself by uttering a brief invocation to the Deity and thereafter remain silent. It would be his duty as one of the flight engineers, and particularly if he were the flight engineer on duty at the panel, to express a reasoned opposition to an announced

inteudon ou the part of the captain.” "The next part of the transcript purporting to exhibit some measure of doubt on the part of the crew reads as follows: “? Where are we? (Thought to be Brooks) ? About up to here now’? [sound of rustling paper]” “It is to be noted that these two questions are asked by persons not identified except that the second question was evidently thought to have been asked by one of the flight engineers. It is not known to whom the flight engineer was speaking but it seems clear that a map was being referred to. In addition, I can see no warrant for adding a question mark to the second phrase ‘About up, to here now’. I should have thought that the flight engineer, if indeed he was the person who spoke, was merely answering the question by pointing to a map. “The next passage from the transcript relevant in this context is: Flight Engineer Brooks: Where’s Erebus in relation to us at the moment Unidentified: Left about (twenty) or (twenty) five miles. Unidentified: Left do you reckon Unidentified: Well I don't know — I think Unidentified: I've been looking for it First Officer: Yep Yep

Unidentified: I think it’ll be erh Brooks: I’m just thinking of any high ground in the area that’s all Mulgrew; I think it'll be left yes Flight Engineer Moloney: Yes I reckon about here Brooks: Yes — no no I don’t really know Brooks: That's the edge.” “First of all, it will be observed that the second sentence referring to Mount Erebus being about 20 to 25 miles to the left would be correct, on the assumption that the crew believed they were flying down McMurdo Sound. Then there are following comments made by persons, believed to be flightengineers but not identified, which appear to now evidence doubt as to the validity of the statement thatMount Erebus is situated to the left, about 20 to 25 miles away. As will be seen, this fragmentary discussion cannot really be reconciled with the positive answer to which I have referred. “Then there -follows a discussion which commences ‘I am just thinking of any high ground in the area that’s all.’ This comment is identified as being made by Flight Engineer Brooks. It is obviously an explanation offered to the person who indicated the location of Mount Erebus. Then there are the following remarks by Mulgrew’ and Moloney. Were they directed to the same subject matter? They may have referred to another feature, not deciphered, which was also located out to the left towards an area covered in cloud. Then the final comment ‘That’s the edge’ can only be interpreted as a reference by the commentator to the edge of Ross Island as a reference point to whatever landmark had been under discussion, which may not have been Mount Erebus.

“When this excerpt from the CVR transcript was published by the newspapers after the release of the chief inspector’s report, it was naturally interpreted by the public as indicating lack of knowledge by the air crew as to the' aircraft's position. As will be apparent by now, that interpretation was totally misconceived. . “The next passage in the transcript which requires attention and reads as follows: . Unidentified: What’s wrong? Unidentified: Make up your mind soon or — Captain: We might have to pop down to fifteen hundred here I think > First Officer: Yes OK First Officer: Probably see further in anyway. “The first two phrases are uttered by persons who are not identified and, upon my own experience of listening to those same phrases, I was quite unable on either occasion to relate them to any suggested remarks being made to Captain Collins. “The portion of this part of the transcript refers to the decision of Captain Collins to

move down to an altitude of 1500 ft. First Officer Cassin then expresses the view that they can probably see further in, which obviously means further up the Sound. I also note that in another version of the transcript, Captain Collins does not say that ‘we might have -to pop down’ but says that they might have to ‘drop down.’ The chief inspector seems to have criticised this decision to descend to 1500 ft because it seemed to him to indicate that there was no proper visibility at 2000 ft or that the visibility ahead was worsening. As already stated, I consider that there is no evidence at all that the visibility ahead was worsening. “On the contrary, as previously indicated, the two pilots and the other three official occupants of the flight deck would only have seen a long, flat, white expanse of snow running away into the distance. I interpret the decision to descend to 1500 ft as being an attempt to discern in the far distance some sign of features like. Mount Discovery which would be nearly straight ahead, and McMurdo Station which would be forward and to the left. “The next part of the transcript relevant in the present context reads as follows: Captain: Actually those conditions don’t look very good at all do they? Mulgrew: No they don’t.” “The first comment I would make about these two remarks, and they were certainly quite clearly made, is that no-one knows what ‘conditions’ Captain Collins was referring to. As with all attempts to interpret a transcript of this kind, the unknown factor is to identify the particular direction or view which is being referred to by the speaker. A reference to ‘those conditions’ obviously means that Captain Collins was referring to weather conditions located a long way off. So the question is, in what direction was he pointing? I should have thought that the only reasonable inference is that he was

pointing forward and to the right where he believed that he saw cloud over the area of the Taylor and Wright Valleys, it being recalled that he had been advised previously by Mac Centre that those areas were free of cloud. “The next relevant item from the transcript is a single phrase uttered by Flight Engineer Brooks. It simply reads ‘I don’t like this’. Once again, the question is whether Mr Brooks was referring to the weather conditions immediately surrounding the aircraft, or whether he was directing attention to areas of cloud located somewhere in the distance. The fact that he uses the word ‘this’ leads, in my opinion, to the inference that Mr Brooks was referring to the present situation of the aircraft. What did he mean by that observation? “According to the Captain Wyatt transcription it was also followed by an irrelevant conversation. But I will assume for present purposes that the remark did refer, to the aircraft’s location. Proceeding once more upon the assumption that the flight crew were looking ahead at a long vista of white ground, then the probabilities are that Flight Engineer Brooks was concerned with the fact that despite the clear visibility in front, there were no features of terrain discern--ible in the far distance. Only six seconds after Flight Engineer Brooks made the remark just quoted, Captain Collins says ‘We’re twentysix miles north. We'll. have to climb out of this*. It? therefore appears that Captain Collins and Flight Engineer Brooks unanimously decided that it was time to fly away, and reached that decision simultaneously. “These different passages from the transcript which I have quoted are those which were relied upon by the chief inspector to support his allegation that the crew was ‘uncertain’ of its position and that there was some degree of ‘mounting alarm’ on the part of the crew. The answer

to all this is that nowhere in the remarks passed at any stage by Captain Collins or by First Officer Cassin is there the slightest suggestion of uncertainty as to the aircraft’s position, dr any concern as to the circumstances in which the aircraft was flying as generating the suggested ‘uncertainty.’

“What has been relied upon are the various remarks bandied . back and forth by people behind' the two pilots, who-certainly included passengers, venturing opinions as to the location of Mount Erebus, and remarks of a similar kind. The only real expression of concern made by anyone is the remark of Flight Engineer Brooks ‘I don’t like this’fassuming that it was not part of an irrelevant conversation) and. as I say. it was made only six seconds before Captain Collins made his decision to fly away.

“It will further be observed that after making that decision Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin then began a discussion as to whether the aircraft should turn away to the left or the right. This discussion., both from the transcript and from listening to the actual voices on the tape, .was very obviously a conversation containing not the slightest degree of urgency and indicating no concern whatever. It might almost be described as a casual discussion as to the direction which Captain Collins should take when he increased altitude and began to climb away from McMurdo Sound. That discussion was still continuing when the ground proximity warning device suddenly sounded six seconds before the plane struck the mountain.

“As soon as the device sounded Flight Engineer Brooks adopted the standard procedure of announcing the altitude, and then Captain Collins gave the following order ‘Go round power please.’ There is discernible, from listening to the tapes, a rising inflexion in the voice of Captain Collins as he gave this order and, indeed, that would be understandable in view of the unexpected' sounding of the alarm system. But I would emphasise tiat the order ended with the word ‘please’, and there was certainly no apparent indication of alarm or dismay by Captain Collins when he gave 'that order. “I have taken this trouble to examine these different ’'sections of the transcript of the CVR because of the following four statements made by the chief inspector in his report: (a) ‘There were discussions on the flight deck indicating that some of the speakers believed they were to the west of Mount Erebus, but the two Flight Engineers on the flight deck had voiced frequent queries about the procedure and expressed their mounting alarm as the ap-

proach continued on at low level toward the area of low cloud.’ (b; ‘The apprehension expressed by the. Flight Engineers indicated that these members of 'the crew were endeavouring to monitor the flight responsibly but their suggestions of caution, as with the captains decision to climb out of the area, were overtaken by the speed of the sequence of events.’ (c) ‘The Flight Engineers endeavoured to monitor the progress of the flight and expressed their dissatisfaction with the descent toward a cloud covered area.’ (d) ‘. . .the crew was not certain of their position.

“In my opinion the chief inspector’s rendition of the transcript represents a bona fide attempt on his part to reproduce what was said. But I find myself obliged to agree with the rather different remarks which I have already cited from the transcript when it was by no means certain whether those exact observations were ever made, and that he was persuaded to adopt that course because of his firmly held opinion that the crew had been uncertain of its position. That is to say. the chief inspector had a natural inclination to ascribe to remarks of doubtful meaning an interpretation which favoured his own theory because, believing as he did in the validity of that theory, he also believed that members of the flight crew must from time to time have expressed apprehensions. “I am satisfied that there was no deliberate editing of the transcript so as to conform with the chief inspector’s opinion. All that happened. in my view, was that as a sequel to that prevailing opinion he was naturally inclined to construe a barely audible observation, which was capable of possible reference to appreehensions about the weather, as if the comments did in fact refer, to the weather. This inclination to hear what the listener expects to hear is a familiar feature of the ordinary judicial process. It is a constant feature of Court proceedings when someone with an interest in the outcome is testifying as to what he heard a party say, or as to what he thought that party meant by a comment which he made,” his Honour said.

“Broadly speaking, my conclusion with’regard to the CVR transcript in the case of the fatal flight is that only limited reliance can be placed upon anything which is alleged to have been said by anyone on the flight deck apart from the two pilots, and it is indeed certain that such statements as can clearly be interpreted and identified as being made by people on the flight deck behind the pilots cannot be construed as throwing any light on the state of mind of the pilots at any given time.”