Following line on Kampuchea

Press, 2 March 1981, Page 16

Following line on Kampuchea

By

STUART McMILLAN

The New Zealand policy on the invasion of" Kampuchea by Vietnam and the continued presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea has been very ■ simple: to follow the line of the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations. The question that has to be asked, however, is whether this is a foreign policy at all on the matter and whether it is even an abdication of sovereignty. Following A.S.E.A.N.’s policy has led to voting for the representatives of Democratic: Kampuchea in the United Nations for the last two years. Democratic Kampuchea is the name for the Governmer.t of Pol Pot who was- overthrown -when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. Pol Pot no longer heads the Government but leads the Khmer, Rouge forces , who. have been fighting, sporadically, against, the Vietnamese. forces and against the forces of the Government installed in Kampuchea by Vietnam and led by Heng Samrin. . A majority of those in the United Nations also voted to keep the representatives of Democratic Kampuchea in the seat in the United Nations. This is in spite of general repug nee at : the policies of Pol Pot when he Was in power. His Khmer Rouge murdered, and otherwise : brought about the deaths, of perhaps two million or more people. ~. ~ The arguments for sup- . porting. Pol Pot include’ the fact that he represented the legal government of Kampuchea, overthrown by an invader. It is this argument which'caused 1 many to vote for the Pol' Pot representatives. If the seat had been - vac?' d, the pressures might

have grown to fill it with the representatives of Heng Samrin. If that ..had happened, it would have been a denial of both simple humanity and international law. Any ’ aggressive country would have seen the precedent that-one country could invade another, overthrow the Government, set up its own puppet government, and get that administration recognised internationally: New- Zealand was persuaded by that argument. too., The more difficult task is to justify New Zealand’s oftrepeated policy of adopting the same line as the five countries of A.S.E.A.N. — Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. One line of argument is that A.S.E.A.N., as an organisation growing in strength, and generally.: based on worthy aims of co-operation, deserves all the support that it can get. A second line of argument is that .the countries of A.S.E.A.N.: are ‘hose most directly concerned and two of them, Singapore and MaIr.ysiarhave had a long' association with New Zealand and are fellow members of the Commonwealth. A third argument in favour of adopting the A.S.E.A.N. line is that because these countries are closest to Kampuchea and > Vietnam, their views should be best informed. A fourth line of argument is over trade. It may be argued, and here it is not being suggested that the New Zealand. Government was strongly influenced by this argument, that the A.S.E.A.N. countries are important, growing markets.

To. ignore their wishes on Kampuchea might be to jeopardise developing markets. The arguments against following the A.S.E.A.Ni line would have to include a discussion of whether a ruler forfeits legitimacy by massacring his "fellow countrymen. Rut even putting that philosophical point aside, other arguments are weighty. The first is that in encouraging the legitimacy of Pol Pot, it is one step towards supporting his reinstatement. He has. done enough sickening, deeds and .it is morally indefensible to assist him in any way. J The view that the countries _ closest to Indo-China necessarily know best about the area may be challenged. The Thai intelligence services, for example, are not . treated with a great deal of respect anywhere. Yet Thailand is a country which borders Kampuchea and Laos, both dominated by Vietnam. It may also be questioned whether -the support and encouragement which A.S.E.A.N. deserves should go -as far as “A.S.E.A.N. right or wrong.” In a number of countries which became bitterly divided because of their involvement in the Vietnam w'ar, many p:ople were brought to challenge the idea of “my country right or. wrong.” Such an attitude to a developing association of countries appears incredibly naive. For New Zealand the most serious question is whether a strict following of the A;S.E.A.N. line is really an abdication of sovereignty. It. would seem to have overtones of colonialism, involving less in practice than “where Britain goes we go,”

but with a [mentality akin to that sentiment. In the conduct of its international relations New Zealan d can, reasonably frequently, take advantage .of staying?with its friends. New Zealand has friendly relations with all the ; A.SK.A.N. countries and has very close relations with' some, but the circumstances are not the same as with tlje , major Western democracies. This would not seem to be a case for eschewing independence of thought. The first question that has to be asked independently is. whether A.S.E.A.N. is. right. To reply to this a brief summary of the ’present position is needed. The forces led by Pol Pot are the only significant forces opposing the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin troops.. Refugees on the Thai border swell the Pol Pot forces- and the Pol Pot farces exist because Thailand tolerates and helps them. Possibly Thailand permits the use of its territory for arms to be sent from China

to s the, Pot PotyJorces-,Other -y. ,' forces exist, .one 'of the most < : important being ithe; Khriier' [People’s -National: Liberation Front led [by [Son Sann,but are[few?and: ill- I Equipped. . L 4. V The over-all strategy has been to bring about a with-. drawal of .Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea by diplomatic pressure and by general if not overt support of the Pol Pot forces, the hope being that Vietnam, already wearied by war, will be pre- ’ pared to compromise. - -.. Thailand, in particular, wants, tlie Vietnamese out of Kampuchea because it has long regarded Kampuchea as a buffer state against a Vietnam a regarded as expansionist. China, long an antagonist of Vietnam, . sees all the more reason to be antagonistic to ■ Vietnam because ofVietnam’s now close links with the Soviet Union. - China’s view of a solution in Kampuchea differs from that of A.S.E.A.N. in that it believes that force is the only way to get the; Vietnamese - out. ’ '' [With a patience not to be observed in other countries of the region, China thinks that” the' process may take decades and is . prepared to wait. The Thais; whose repatriation of refugees into Kampuchea provoked a Vietnam-ese-led attack on Thailand, looks to China to strike at Vietnam should Vietnam strike again at Thailand. It is this dependence. on China that makes A.S.E.A.N. not reliable on Indo-China. After all, China has its own motives for acting in IndoChina and as long -as A.S.E.A.N. has to depend on China, both to keep the Pol Pot forces supplied with

weapons,-and -to be prepared -• .to.'strike (Vietnam, [‘ A.S.E.A.N. really, has got an independent line on ? . the whole question. It, follows;- of course, that [ : New Zealand is hitching its' icies to a group of countries taking their policies from -Peking.. . . ■:?/[■ : -.' [?■■ The A.S.EAk.N. countries, ;• realising the repugnance felt -? by many Western countries J towards Pol Pot, have realised that he must go if support for Democratic Kampuchea is not to ,be eroded. How willingly he .would be :? replaced is another question. J At the moment, however, a campaign has..been mounted to have a third force, led possibly by. Son Sann, possibly by Norodom Sihanouk, the former Cambodian ruler, and possibly,. by someone. [ else. The- Chinese are highly sceptical of all this. They believe that Pol Pot is the ■ only viable opponent of the Vietnamese and that there is no. real alternative to accepting him. The- question of- whether A.S?E.A.N.' is right over Indo-China is thus . a ques-tion-of Whether a protracted war (“bleeding Vietnam" is the jargon) is the cure to the pfbblem.^*' 'V 1 The history of the Vietnam war demonstrates clearly that border wars tend to involve the Countries bn whose borders they are [ being fdught. The result ‘ might be for, Thailand to become deeply [involved. This would confirm fears of Vietnamese expansionism (for . which I believe there is little evidence) and bring about ’ -a self-fulfilling prophesy. It is up to A.S.E.A.N.’s friends not to follow A.S.E.A.N. slavishly but to try to stop this happening.