THE PRESS MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1981. A risky decision

Press, 2 March 1981, Page 16

THE PRESS MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1981. A risky decision

The decision to- use Air Force planes to carry stranded travellers across the Tasman was a calculated risk. Had the New Zealand Government acted through the present crisis in a belligerent, provocative way, the use of Air Force planes could well have been seen as a further incitement and might, have encouraged the unions to dig their heels in further. But because the Government has wisely avoided taking stands or actions which might have further inflamed the situation, there is a reasonable chance the decision to use Air Force* planes will be seen as it should be seen—-not as an effort to break a strike, but as an effort to relieve the plight of individual travellers to whom the interruptions of international flights were causing increasing inconvenience rind even hardship., [Entering into the Government’s , calculations may have been a feeling that using the Air Force planes would have public support. The unions, apparently far from united behind the present stoppages and not yet enjoying public support for their stands bn the. arrests .or original claims on wages, may find it difficult to make another issue of the use of Air Force planes, in spite of the emotive overtones of “calling in the ' forces” . The unions might■have’ been expected by the Government to object strenuously to the use of Air Force planes if this greatly weakened the > hands of the employees in their dis-

putes with the employers. It does not appear to do so, for the employers have far more compelling reasons than getting .irate passengers off their hands to bring the disputes to a speedy close. Other pressures will have much-more effect on the employers than airport lounges full of stranded passengers. The Government’s decision may, however, have been roadly timed. It has. looked surreptitious that the flights began on a Sunday, and there are reasons for thinking the Governments could have waited another day or two, especi-, ally in the case of the disputes in which Air New Zealand is involved, before calling in the Air Forces. If the Air Force planes were being used to clear a backlog of stranded passengers after the industrial issues had been resolved, there need have been no hint of the Government’s introducing another bone into an already contentious industrial scene. But it must be assumed that the Government felt that the distress and personal loss of the stranded passengers were sufficient reason's, to run the risk of using Air Force planes before the disputes were resolved. Certainly it is not in the Government’s own interest to inflame the situation further. It presumably took what could yet be interpreted as a highly provocative decision only because it thought it was a necessary decision; to spare individuals greater inconvenience and'distress than they have already suffered.