Proposal made for an Arab confederation

Press, 11 February 1981, Page 18

Proposal made for an Arab confederation

By

PATRICK SEALE

In a major development which could change the political map of Arabia, the Saudi kingdom and five of its lesser neighbours are considering joining together „ in a confederation of Gulf states, according to senior Arab delegates at the recent Islamic Summit. Under the summit’s cover, leaders from Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab . Emirates, Oman and Saudi t Arabia held an unpublicised meeting to discuss their plans. Their Foreign Ministers met in Riyadh on February 4 to study constitutional proposals which have already been • secretly circulated. These proposals, are understood to go considerably beyond the shared security concerns which first drew these countries together in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Gulf war. What is under discussion is nothing less than a sort of political marriage on the model of the Malaysian Federation, where the federal Head of State is elected in rotation for a five-year term from among the members. If it comes off, such a Gulf confederation, which Saudi 1 Arabia would be bound, to dominate, would greatly boost Saudi power and pres- ■ tige and be a major blow to the ambitions of Iraq in the Gulf. Iraq has been informed of the plan, and, in a diplomatic trade-off, is believed to have reluctantly acquiesced

in Taif, Saudi Arabia in exchange for Saudi and Gulf backing for its war against Iran. It is the war that is primarily bringing the Gulf States to move closer together. The leaders fear that, even if a. cease fire is arranged soon, the antagonisms aroused between Arab and Persian, and between Sunni and Shi’a, could take a. generation to appease with ► constant threats of renewed 'flare-ups. Their greatest desire is hot to be sucked in — a desire ardently shared by their Western friends and oil clients. But, if the Iraq-Iran war is the spur to the Gulf gettogether, it has also provided Saudi Arabia with the opportunity to make a bid for regional leadership. In the private words of a senior Saudi prince: “The war has won us 10 years.” By this he meant that Iraq and Iran, the kingdom’s two principal rivals, had each suffered such a setback as to give the kingdom its chance. Of all the complex interArab relations, the SaudiIraqi one is now among the most interesting and ambiguous. Saudi Arabia needed — and still needs — the muscle of Iraq to roll back the subversive tide of Shi’a revolution emanating from the Ayatollah Khomeiny Iran. But, although the Saudis have supported Iraq’s war effort, the two countries are really, adversary-part-ners. Ideologically and geopolitically they are at uh ■in in mi mi min mm in iin

odds, and, beneath the sur face cordiality of relations between Crown Prince Fahd and President Saddam Hussain, runs a current of caution and competition. The summit demonstrated that, for the moment at any rate, Saudi Arabia can have its cake and eat it: Iraq is doing the dirty work in the muddy plains of Khuzestan, while Saudi Arabia reaped the political glory of hosting the greatest gathering of Islamic leaders the modern world has ever seen. Undoubtedly the Taif Summit has done the Saudi image nothing but good. Brother Arabs were highly impressed with the Western efficiency of the arrangements, the meticulous staff work, the fastidious finish of the buildings and highways, the smart alert bearing of the Saudi security forces. But there was no loss of Bedouin hospitality or Islamic piety. It was as if the kingdom had managed that most difficult of exercises: squaring the circle between the best East and West. The picture the Saudis were trying, not unsuccessfully, to put over was of a strong,' stable regime which had fully recovered from the security hiccup of November, 1979, when insurgents stormed the Great Mosque in Mecca. In hard political terms, the significant aspect of this summit, assembling a quarter of the world’s nations, was that it signalled Saudi determination to play a

more assertive role in the world. The instrument for this new role is the Islamic Conference Organisation (1.C.0.), founded in 1969 but now for the first time under Saudi chairmanship. The aim of Saudi diplomacy is to demonstrate that this Muslim forum can be the most effective of all Third World bodies — better able to shape events than the now dormant Arab League, the gravely split Non-Aligned movement, or the powerless Organisation for African Unity. President

Saddam of Iraq, who is looking forward to hosting the Non-Aligned conference in Bagdad next year, finds himself upstaged. United in Islam and exceedingly well funded, the 1.0. C. is being pushed by the Saudis as the place where Third World disputes can best be resolved; where Khomeiny’s Shi’a mischief can best be countered; where the' cause of an independent Palestine can be best be promoted; and, where the encroaching Super-Powers can best be kept at arm’s length.

With these ambitions and backed by Gulf money, the 1.C.0. must be judged an important new player in international affairs. Can Saudi Arabia puli it off? It is essentially a cheque-book state: it has an. anachronistic social system; it remains heavily dependent on foreigners; it is unused to projecting its power abroad. Now it has manoeuvred itself to the centre of two new power groupings Saudi skills and nerves are going to be stretched in the years ahead. — Copyright, London Observer Service.