The ebb and flow of violence in Ulster

Press, 6 September 1980, Page 14

The ebb and flow of violence in Ulster

By

DAVID BERESFORD

in the “Guardian,” London

At the end of July there was an. unsuccessful attempt to hijack a bus in the Falls Road, West Belfast, which—at the time — gave some heart to the security forces in Northern Ireland.

A hijacking in the heart of Belfast’s “Provieland” was hardly unusual, but the circumstances of its failure 'were — the would-be hijackers, a group of youths, were chased away by local residents who handed the bus back to its startled driver. The incident appeared to demonstrate the long-awaited rejection by the Catholic community of the politics of violence. With hindsight, it was perhaps, more a demonstration of the dangers in try-, ing to identify trends in the Irish troubles. The following week West Belfast exploded into what the morning papers were to describe as “ah orgy of violence’’ and what the police described as “the. worst rioting in years.” Optimistic reading of trends in Northern Ireland is not only dangerous for the reputation of commentators—the Provisional I.R.A. being wont to contradict such, analysis, post factum, with bombs and bullets — but can

also reap a toll in mangled police officers and soldiers.

Labour’s “hard man” in Northern Ireland, the former Secretary of State, (Mr Roy Mason), is still well re- 1 membered at army headquarters in Lisburn for his October 1977, statement that the I.R.A. could no longer “sustain a campaign” — a remark met by a bombing campaign which lasted for three months. The most obvious indicator of trends in violence in Northern Ireland are the statistics which are turned out every month by the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.G.) The figures most popularly used to chart progress in the “war” are those for fatalities, which show the current death toll is. well below the peaks of 1972 (the introduction of direct rule) and .1976 (tire collapse of the Constitutional Convention), but well up on the all - time low of 1978 (when the I.R.A. is believed to have been completing its reorganisation as well as suffering supply problems with explosives). Broken down, the death statistics show that. since 1970 terrorist fatalities have

been consistently well below those for the security forces. Last year, for the first time during the present troubles, civilian deaths fell below security force deaths — reflecting selective targeting by the I.R.A. as well as the massacre of 18 troops in a single incident at Warrenpoint. R.U.C. deaths have, surprisingly, remained fairly constant during the decade, despite a substantial growth in the size of the force as well as its greater involvement in “front-line” activities over recent years. . Sectarian assassinations, are well down on the early 19705, but have been rising since 1978. It is notable that although there are twice as many Protestants as Catholics in Northern Ireland, the sectarian death toll has been higher for Catholics with the exception of 1976 when there was a Republican backlash against. Protestant killings, The figures on the wounded show a steady trend down from the 1972 peak to the low of 1978 and a small increase since then. The main weakness in statistics for the dead and wounded is that they can be considerably affected by chance. For instance, a

simple technical failure by the I.R.A. in an attempted mass mortar attack on Newry police station earlier this year saved, by Army estimates, at least 40 lives — which could otherwise have made 1980 one of the worst years for security force deaths since 1972. A few seconds hesitation in pressing the button at Warrenpoint could have made 1979 a comparatively good year for the security forces so far as deaths are concerned. The trend is, however, reflected in the statistics for shooting incidents, which show a steady decline since 1972 with a slight rise in 1978, and those for bombing incidents (bombs exploded and neutralised), showing a decline from 1972 which would have been steady but for the sectarian pub bombings of 1976. But here again there is a weakness in the statistics in that the level of shooting incidents does not reflect improved targeting and the bombings do not show the many changes in technology such as the developed use of incendiary devices and a rise over recent years in the weight of individual bombs. Army intelligence, with its customary obsession for secrecy, is unfortunately not

prepared to release its statistics on the .localisation of violence, but a breakdown is available for the last three years between Belfast, Londonderry and the rural areas. These confirm the impression that there is a nascent trend away from 'Belfast. The estimated 'weight of explosives in Belfast fell, for instance, from 603 kg in 1977 to 130 kg in 1979, while in the rural areas the. figure rose from 615 kg to 4658 kg. Deny has, .however, remained popular with tire bombers, suffering 57 explosions in 1979 — an estimated 305 kg in . ; explosives — compared with 26 in 1977 (58kg). Shootings in 1979 were down in Belfast and Derry compared to the previous two years and marginally up in rural areas. Two other statistical pointers to trends in the war are the figures for people charged with terrorist offences and government compensation payments. The volume of charges match, with a time lag, the. figures for shootings, bombings, . killings and wbundings. The compensation figures . — broken down, into damage to property and ! personal in-: jury — show an initial peak in the 1975-76. financial year and a 1978-79 peak for' damage to property. Both

sets of figures reflect the delays in processing claims, but are also distorted by inflationary factors which,- if they were taken into account, would show much more of a decline in real payments over recent years. But perhaps the most telling statistics about Northern Ireland at the moment is the simple fact that 11 years has made this the longest round of troubles in three centuries of Irish conflict. That alone encourages the belief that the prospects for peace are growing. It is apparently in Stat belief that the Government is pressing ahead with troop reductions, the accelerated transfer of security responsibilities to the police and the search for a path towards devolution. But whatever the statistical trends, the chances of peace must depend, as always in Ireland, on a range of " imponderables including k at the moment, the consequences of . political ‘ initiatives by Westminster (always attended by the. risk qf sectarian conflict) and policy decisions by the I.RA. onsuch matters as the handling .of the H-block prison controversy! and the recent rise in sectarian killings by Protestant paramilitaries.