DC 10 crew ‘failed to recognise landscape’

Press, 14 August 1980, Page 3

DC 10 crew ‘failed to recognise landscape’

pA Auckland The crew of the ill-fated Air New Zealand DU IV which crashed into Mount Erebus possibly thought they were flying over sea ice just before the disaster, the Commission of Inquiry into the crash was told yesterday. The superintendent of the Antarctic Division of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Robert Baden Thomson, said the lack of rocky outcrops or any other features on the side of Mount Erebus might have confused the crew. The weather would have made surface definition difficult. Mr Thomson, who was a flight commentator on tour earlier Air New Zealand flights to the area, said the lowest altitude at any point on each of the flights ranged between 9000 ft and 1500 ft. _ At all times, he said, in the area of low-altitude flying the weather conditions were good, the skies clear, and visibility excellent. Mr Thomson said the flight crew did not appear to have any large-scale topographical maps of the area. He had some which he made available to the crew.

The captain and flight crew did, however, seem to be well informed of the elevation and terrain to be flown over.

“On the four flights I made there was never any action or procedure taken that caused me to doubt in any way the safe operation of the aircraft,” Mt Thomson said. In answer to a question, he said it was not until after the crash that he was aware of the height limitation of 6000 ft. Mr Thomson told the comImission earlier that he believed the biggest contributing factor to the crash was the failure of those on

the DCIO flight deck to rec-1 ognise features of the Antarctic landscape. The most significant of the landmarks was Beaufort' Island, he said, which would have been plainly visible for some minutes before impact Also visible to the crew would have been the eastern shoreline of Cape Bird and the north-eastern and northwestern coastlines of Lewis Bay. “I can only conclude that those on the flight deck failed to pay attention to surface detail and/or were, through their inexperience in i flying in the area, unable to recognise even quite' prominent features,” he said. Mr Thomson igave the I ‘ commission a list' of factors

he believed had contributed to the disaster, many of which were critical of the airline and the DCIO crew. One of the factors was the apparent failure of the airline to continue after February, 1977, with an arrangement whereby DCIO captains were briefed by officers of the United States Antarctic Support Force not less than three days before departure. “I had assumed that Air New Zealand would wish to continue to take advantage of the American offer to provide briefings on their operations and procedures, said Mr Thomson. “Indeed, I had assumed this was taking place until investigations into the DClu crash revealed otherwise. Had the briefings continued, said Mr Thomson they would have provided the November 28 flight crew with up-to-date information on telecommunication systems and procedures and navigational aids used by United States military operators. .They may also have revealed an anomaly in navigational co-ordinates ano would have created “some alarm” among the Americans by bringing to their at-

tention differences between the DCIO flight path and the normal route. Mr Thomson was also critical of inadequate navigational aids available to the crew. Although detailed topographic maps of the area likely to be flown over were readily available, Air New Zealand did not appear to have made any attempt to provide them or any similar ones. They would seem to have been necessary aids for the flight crews on such missions. . Audio-visual briefings of crews by Air New Zealand were also lacking, said Mr Thomson, in that they die not cover the most import' ant area for any aircraft ap. proaching McMurdo Sound. No coverage was provider

showing geographical features a pilot should be able to recognise when approaching McMurdo. "The inadequate briefings and poor maps and charts may have combined to confuse those on the flight deck,” said Mr Thomson. The captain apparently thought he was over the middle of McMurdo Sound, yet he was almost precisely where his planned flight path should have placed him

i —directly over Ross Island. "Apparently those on the flight deck were unaware that their flight path, which they followed with a high degree of accuracy, would take them over Ross Island and not, as they seemed to have assumed, to the centre of McMurdo Sound.” Mr Thomson said he believed the route almost directly over Mount Erebus to be potentially hazardous as McMurdo air traffic con- : trol would be likely to lose ; VHF radio and radar contact . with the aircraft. He said he failed to under- ' stand why the route was se--1 lected. s Mr Thomson said that as > flight commentator on four ' Antarctic flights his local ' knowledge had been sought and relied upon by the capl tains of each of the aircraft. I “One suggestion 1 always > made, and agreed to by all captains, was to follow the - operational route from the . northern coastline of AntarcI tica to McMurdo Sound i rather than the route recomi mended by Air New Zea- • land.”