THE PRESS TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1980. P.N.G. troops for Vanuatu

Press, 12 August 1980, Page 16

THE PRESS TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1980. P.N.G. troops for Vanuatu

. The presence of troops from Papua New Guinea in the newly-independent State of Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides, is probably the best way to deal with the rebellion on the island of Espiritu Santo. Although both British and French troops are already in the islands, it has become clear that they are not likely to take any decisive action, the French possibly because they do not want to offend those who speak French or otherwise embrace French culture there, the British because they do not want to offend the French. Various other suggestions were made, including a United Nations peace-keeping force, a; force from the South Pacific Forum countries, a force from Australia, and even a force from Cuba. Perhaps the Vanuatu Prime Minister, Father Waiter Lini' was a little devious or mischievous in suggesting that Cuba’s aid be sought; but after he made the suggestion at least one Pacific country decided to do something and that may have been the result he wanted.

The United Nations has shown no desire to get embroiled in Vanuatu. Even if it did so, the issue would have been bound to become complex, possibly attracting even super-Power interest. The Pacific Forum countries, of which New Zealand is one, would have been unlikely to agree to the establishment of such a force soon enough for it to be of any use. Australia is debating what it will do and so far it has sent some reconnaissance aircraft. New Zealand has shown no desire to become involved. A force from another Melanesian country, acting with the tacit approval of the South Pacific Forum countries, was a sensible solution. Papua New Guinea is far enough away from Vanuatu for there to be no suspicion that Papua New Guinea has any territorial ambitions. It will be necessary for other South Pacific countries to show considerable interest in what is happening and to encourage the troops from Papua New Guinea to leave when the time seems appropriate. The size of the problem is not

great. On the island of Santo are 32 committed secessionists, possibly with the vague backing of a few hundred more. Of the 32, seven are reported to have submachine-guns and grenades. The most effective action being taken by those committed to secession is broadcasting either from a fixed radio station or from a transmitter in a van. The fixed transmitter gets its power from a line from Luganville, the capital of Santo, installed by the French. The fact that the French have not cut the line leaves open the question of what they would do if the troops from Papua New Guinea interrupted the power supply.

In another country a rebellion of this size might be dealt with in a comparatively minor police action. The fact that it occurred in the time leading to independence complicated the issue greatly. A period occurred when Father Lini was without adequate authority and the colonial powers were unwilling to take action.. Besides, politics and customs—the rebellion is largely a custom movement—made it difficult for one island to be seen taking action against another.

With skill and luck, the rebellion may yet be resolved by negotiation. That would be the happiest outcome. That is what Britain and France have been hoping for. France is reluctant to use its troops to put down a rebellion lest this has ramifications in New Caledonia and Tahiti, where France has interests close to its heart and its economic and defence hopes. Papua New Guinea, which at independence faced a secessionist threat from the island of Bougainville, with its vast copper resources, can be expected to be impatient about a movement fob Santo to secede. New Zealand and Australia, in particular, may have to urge restraint on. Papua New Guinea,; and, at the same time, be convincing in their support. The action may. comfortably be accepted as one South Pacific country helping another. It should not be allowed to develop into anything other than that.