Soviet signals on Afghanistan

Press, 9 June 1980, Page 18

Soviet signals on Afghanistan

The signals coming from Moscow about Afghanistan are confusing to the point of appearing contradictory. Scarcely had the Soviet President. Mr Brezhnev, offered conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan when the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Andrei

Gromyko, in a speech at a luncheon to honour the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister, Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao, said that attempts to change “existing realities” in Afghanistan were hopeless. While Mr Gromyko was speaking, Pakistan was studying the last message from Moscow reiterating Soviet terms for withdrawal. The message to Pakistan was consistent with the terms offered by Mr Brezhnev in the last days of May and, in spite of .Mr Gromyko’s apparent belligerence, he added that the question of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan could also be solved. In spite of this Soviet attempt to run with the Pakistan hares and hunt with the Indian hounds, some semblance of consistency in the policy can be discerned. .Mr Brezhnev’s offer was characterised by a greater moderation of tone and the possibility of a deadline being set for the withdrawal of the troops. In return the Soviet Union wants international guarantees that countries which border Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan, would not interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs and would not provide bases for attacks on Afghanistan. From the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December the Soviet Union has claimed that it was protecting Afghanistan from external aggression. The basis for this claim seems slight; at the very most a few adventurous tribesmen on the Pakistan border took actions that the Islamabad Government did not back but could not control. At the time, it seemed more likely that the Soviet Union was manufacturing a lie to justify its action. Even if this was not the Soviet strategy, by looking for a way to solve what it considers external aggression, the Soviet Union is approaching the heart of its stated policies towards Afghanistan.

The question of international guarantees had been raised before the Brezhnev speech at the end of May. President Brezhnev made a suggestion of American guarantees on February 22. Mr Babrak Karmal, whom the Soviet Union installed as President of Afghanistan, talked of the cessation of foreign interference a month later. He sought talks with both Iran and Pakistan about the border. The question in all this that has to be asked is how far is the Soviet

Union likely to go in public in admitting that it made a major mistake in getting into Afghanistan and would like to get out without either losing face or seeing a hostile Afghanistan on its border? The latest Brezhnev offer may represent that point.

Much has been said about the Soviet gain over Afghanistan, but it can also be argued that the invasion has embroiled the Soviet Union in a problem that it does not know how to solve, in an enterprise that is costing Soviet lives, and one that has severely damaged Soviet prestige in the Third World. The Eastern bloc is demonstrating day by day that it does not want to lose the advantages of closer co-operatjnn with the West because of Soviet actions, and Communist parties in the West have shown a great deal of embarrassment over the Soviet invasion. These factors are all in addition to the spoiling of the Olympic Games and the harm done by trade embargoes. The Americans so far appear to have given no considered response to the latest Brezhnev offer. Possibly it appears to be too similar to earlier offers, but' perhaps they are waiting to see how serious Moscow is about its proposals. The Americans, quite rightly, would want words matched by actions and would be wary of any arrangement by which Moscow could dominate Kabul while Washington was seen to be restraining Afghan rebels on the border. The team from the Islamic Conference now seeking to mediate is unlikely to be effective. Moscow’s eyes are on Washington and Peking. How Washington could guarantee non-interference is difficult to prescribe. Presumably the Soviet Union has something specific in mind. At the moment there are more hints of flexibility in its approach than have been seen for some time. There is no reason for believing that the Soviet Union can be trusted or that it wants to relinquish its domination of Afghanistan; but there are reasons for believing that the Soviet Union is finding itself in a bind from which it would like to escape. Moscow’s most desired position

would undoubtedly be one in which it could maintain a friendly regime in Kabul and rid itself of the need to subdue the opponents of the regime. If Moscow genuinely believes that the opposition is inspired solely from outside Afghanistan—a thoroughly naive belief—nothing.would please the Soviet Union more than withdrawing its troops and handing over the control of the opposition to “international guarantees.”