New men face huge tasks

Press, 6 May 1980, Page 8

New men face huge tasks

NZPA-Reuter Belgrade President Tito’s death ends an era of powerful significance in Communist history, creating a dangerous vacuum at a time of international tension. The Yugoslav leader’s vision ranged far beyond his Balkan homeland. Last survivor of the military and political Titans of World War Two, he was the first Communist Party leader to break free from Moscow’s control. Tito’s influence on a changing Communist movement was immense. As a world statesman, he gained formidable stature. He turned non-alignment into a compelling and credible third force. His death three days before his eighty-eighth birthday comes at a bleak moment after Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan, the development of new East-West tensions, a resulting slow-down in detente; and a drawn-out crisis over the holding of American hostages in Iran. In his last months Tito seemed preoccupied over what he saw as a gathering threat to peace. Last May, in an anxious speech, he warned against “attempts to divide the world anew, openly or covertly, at the expense of the independence of other countries.” As he lay ill in January. Yugoslavia voted with 103 other countries in the United Nations General Assembly i for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The vote mirrored Tito’s sense of history, his vigor-

j ous independence, and Yus goslavia’s own fear of Soviet - intervention. Tito’s illness, only days 5 after the Soviet thrust into - Afghanistan, provoked a spasm of Yugoslav appre- ■ hension. ! For Yugoslavs the coinci- ■ dence was a grim portent, a I throw-back to 1956 when I Soviet troops marched into t neighbouring Hungary, and > 1968 when Soviet bloc ; armies invaded Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia proi tested against both actions. Since 1948, when Tito : broke with the Kremlin, Yu- ' goslavs have lived with the r fear of a. Soviet attack, poli- . tical intrigue, subversion or attempts at destabilisation across the country’s 1700 km eastern border. Internally, Tito’s: Communist Party maintained su- ' preme authority, but it was a softer, gentler communism than in any of the countries of the Soviet Bloc. i When Hungarian Com-: munists braved Soviet tanks i in Budapest in 1956, they followed the independent “Titoist” road charted by Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia’s J vain search for “socialism with a human face,” 12 1 years later, was inspired by I Tito’s ideal. ’ Although the Soviet Union < may hope for a weaker Yu- ; goslavia after Tito, Com- 1 munist leaders in Belgrade do not. expect warlike ac- 1 tions from Moscow. “There 1 is a threat but no imminent 1 danger,” said one official. Nevertheless, the country’s < 270,000-strong armed forces < are; on alert to meet all con- ' tmgencies. Eight million {

■ civilians have been trained : as a home army, ready for guerrilla warfare, sabotage, or for police action against foreign subversion. Yugoslavia’s geographical • location in the Balkans, Europe’s historical “powder keg,” is both strategic and perilous. Belgrade is within easy striking distance for Soviet forces based in, or convoyed across Hungary. Neighbouring Bulgaria is a hard-line Soviet Bloc State with fast sea links to Russia. For 30 years, Bulgaria has quarrelled with Yugoslavia over the Macedonians who live in both countries. This is a potential for trouble, and Yugoslavs believe it could be exploited by Moscow. In a country that has been united only for 60 years, Belgrade faces enormous pressures from regional groups whose historical tendency has been to separate and fight rather than cooperate. In the 19705, Tito cracked down against nationalists within the Communist -Parties of Serbia and Croatia. In Muslim areas of Bosnia, there are fears of an Islamic backlash. Almost everywhere, there is a strong sense of regional identity and separatism is a potent force. Tito’s successors face their' biggest test in continuing his adroit policy of national togetherness. They are convinced that: failure could produce disruption and chaos, making Yugoslavia vulnerable to Soviet pressure or penetration, '

1 The new leadership ber lieves it may be threatened !, also by militant Serbian and t Croatian nationalist emigres living in the West who in il recent years mounted ■- frequent terror attacks r against the Tito regime. d There is a lesser fear from pro-Soviet hard-liners who y may be tempted into new t activity or turn to Moscow d for support. In Czechoslovakia and Afe ghanistan, the Soviet Union t justified military intervention by saying it was res quested by homebred Com--1 munists. In Yugoslavia, the s Stalinists were routed by 3 Tito 30 years ago and later ■’ attempts by elderly pro-So-t viet elements to organise ' were swiftly neutralised by Tito’s police. 1 ■ “The Russians' may try to ’ create an atmosphere for I intervention, but they won’t . find many people here to a ask them in,” a Yugoslav “ official said. Economically, the new rei gime faces enormous chal- ; lenges. There are 675,000 . Yugoslavs working- in West- . ern Europe, at. home 750,000 , are unemployed, inflation is ; running at nearly 30 per .cent,'and the foreign trade r deficit is about .$6OOO milr lion. t Even as Tito lay ill in hospital, Government offi- ! cials met to seek a solution. ; But the quest for economic ■ viability is fraught with danr ger. To impose austerity and ! restore centralised economic I direction would be to tamper i with workers’ control, Tito’s : biggest achievement and a hallowed legacy* > /