U.S. sets deadline for blockade of Iranian ports

Press, 17 April 1980, Page 1

U.S. sets deadline for blockade of Iranian ports

NZPA-Reuter Washington The United States has passed word to its allies and to Iran that if economic and diplomatic sanctions have failed to break the stalemate over the American hostages by the week of May 11, Washington .is prepared to impose a naval blockade. Well placed sources said that the Secretary of State (Mr Cyrus Vance) planned to visit European capitals that week to discuss the prospects and. risk's of such a move. The sources said the object of a blockade would be to create political chaos that would frighten the radical clergy and their merchant backers in Iran that they, might lose control of the revolution — either to the extreme Left or Right. “It’s risky,” one Administration official said, “but we have tried everything else. Either Ayatollah "Khomeiny becomes persuaded he has to lose" by holding on to the hostages, or he himself could be displaced.”

The Administration’s planners had not given up hope that sufficient pressure could be generated by collective action and the threat of a blockade so that resort to a naval cordon would not become necessary. But ' other options hinted at, which were said to include such things as blacklisting commercial planes and ships that go. to Iran were widely viewed in. the Administration as ineffective. Already there were signs in Iran of jockeying in anticipation of a blockade, analysts said. In the last few days, for instance, well armed Kurdish irregulars had skirmished with Iranian Army units along the single railway line to Turkey. Since the revolution the Kurds had tried to avoid combat with the Army, preferring to fight the Revolutionary Guards. United States analysts believed that the Kurds, aware of the importance of overland supply from Turkey during a tight naval blockade, were positioning

themselves to threaten to cut off the supply route unless Teheran granted their demands for full autonomy. •

For three weeks last northern summer, the Kurds severed the Turkish railway in a demonstration of power. Similarly, the Baluchis were said to be moving armed bands into position near the roads to Pakistan. While the Baluchis also had long-standing grievances against central authority, some analysts said they aimed more to cut traffic from Pakistan to increase profits from smuggling, which had long been a cottage industry in the region.American officials, said that speculative reports that the United States might only mine key Iranian ports, without a blockade, made little sense. “•The Russians "■ could' rush in with minesweepers arid become local heroes, while we stand by

and look foolish arid ineffective,” one source said. Most analysis did not think the Soviet Union would try to run the blockade; directly, fearing the dangers of a direct military confrontation. If it ‘ tried to send in an uni J armed Soviet bloc merchant vessel to test the i blockade, one official said the United States would first order the vessel to turn away. If that failed, the ship’s rudder would be disabled by gunfire and the vessel towed to-the nearest port for repairs.

While officials conceded that the Russians had been building up military units near the Iranian border, most did not think either the Kurds or the Azebafjainis would invite them in. Both minorities had had experience of Russian occupation in so-called independence “republics” set up during World War 11. ’

Gulf build-up worries U.S., Page 8.