Looking east from a W. German bunker

Press, 16 April 1980, Page 20

Looking east from a W. German bunker

By

IAN MATHER

in the

‘Observer,’ London

Seen from a bunker in West Germany, the Soviet " land forces are a daunting spectacle. The Red Army’s strength is around 1.8 million, and its tanks, apparently poised for a Blitzkrieg towards the Rhine, outnumber those of N.A.T.O. by almost three to> one. ’ From the Kremlin, the Warsaw Pact forces must appear barely adequate;. Moscow has to think in terms of fighting on two fronts, and must be uncomfortably aware that the Chinese army numbers no less than three million. The Pentagon estimates total Soviet forces at 4.8 million, a figure one million higher than that arrived at by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. ’ . ’ A United States Senator has shown how the Pentagon total can be reduced by cutting out “extras” such as construction troops (250,000), soldiers working on farms and railways (150,000), political officers (70,000), civil defence workers (20,000), supply, storage, research and development troops (60,000), coastguards (60,000), troops on the Chinese border (500,000), the Czech garrison (55,000), internal security and border guards (430,000) and other civilians in uni- , form (300,000). While it is 'debatable whether all these categories should be excluded since they would all play a part in any Soviet war effort, it remains true that many ancil- , lary jobs in the Soviet Union are militarised. Soviet soldiers perform functions,

such as working on farms to provide food, for the forces, which are carried out by civilians in the West. The Institute estimates that N.A.T.O.’ has 635,000 combat and direct support troops in Central and Northern Europe and the Warsaw Pact 910,000, -which puts N.A.T.O. in a tight spot, but not one in which the West would be overwhelmed. The Warsaw Pact’s superiority in tanks is even more marked, nearly 28,000 against just over 11,000. But here the numbers game is particularly misleading. Institute data 1 show that of the Warsaw Pact’s 24,825 tanks in Central Europe 14,325 are operated by the U.S.S.RJs allies. None of these allies has any of the Soviet T-64 and T-72 tanks built in the 19705, and very few T-62s built in the 19605. All but a few hundred are T-54/555, which first entered service in 1949, and some operated by Poland and Bulgaria are the even older T-34 model. Most of the 10,500 Soviet tanks in the region are T-625. Production rates of the newer T-64s and T-72s in 1978 were estimated at 2000 a year, putting the maximum number that could be in service today at 8000. However, not all are employed in the Warsaw Pact region. I saw a number in Afghanistan, and many others are deployed along the Chinese border. It is generally estimated that an aggressor in Europe would require a three to one advantage to stand 'a reasonable chance of winning. The

Warsaw Pact does not have anywhere near this over-all advantage. Since N.A.T.O. is by definition a defensive alliance, fewer forces should satisfy its requirements. N.A.T.O. chiefs have also decided to limit tfe number of tanks and rely instead on anti-tank weapons. By late 1978 it was calculated that N.A.T.O. had 193,000 highly accurate anti-tank missiles, excluding shorter-range oneman types. It can be argued that N.A.T.O. forces are badly deployed. In West Germany they are stationed more or less where they came to rest in 1945, and it has proved impossible to move them for political and economic reasons. The Warsaw Pact can, and

does, position its troops wherever it chooses. These troops also have the advantage of operating with standardised equipment under single command, whereas N.A.T.O. equipment is not standardised. Road and rail communications in Warsaw Pact countries are inferior to those in the N.A.T.O. area. There are fewer than 250,000 miles of paved roads within the entire Soviet Union, and in winter many are virtually impassable. During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the tanks churned up the soft tarmac of the roads, and mile-long traffic jams developed, an easy target for any enemy aircraft. The Soviet rail gauge is incompatible with that of

East Germany and parts of Poland, with the result that trains must stop at nine transhipment points, again providing easy targets to an enemy. In aircraft the Warsaw Pact has a 1.7 advantage, though much of this discrepancy can be accounted for by the Pact’s greater number of interceptor aircraft, useful only for defence. N.A.T.O. aircraft and crews are generally reckoned to be superior, although the Warsaw Pact might be able to carry out more missions, and its aircraft may be better protected on the ground. As in naval matters, political geography hampers Soviet strategic airlift capabilities. Moscow still cannot ■count on access to the Indian

Ocean. It is better placed to reach the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, but even Moscow’s friends can be difficult. Tlie Soviet Union’s perception of itself as a world power has led to new configurations which must be a genuine cause for concern, since, particularly in Europe, the Russians appear to have far more troops and equipment than would be necessary purely for defence. Few expect an unprovoked attack on Western Europe, but there is concern that the Soviet Union now claims the right, which the Western Powers have long exercised, to extend its political influence anywhere in the world, and the adroit use of military pressure is part of this process.