Afghan tale told among Muscovites

Press, 27 February 1980, Page 24

Afghan tale told among Muscovites

By a Moscow correspondent

Hafizullah Amin, the deposed Afghap President, was not executed but killed by accident, according to an account now., going the rounds of informed Russian circles-in Moscow. The .account differs sensationally from Western and official Soviet versions of December’s events in Kabul. It suggests that the Afghan Government had been asking for Soviet help long before the Russian intervention on 27 December, The first call came from the previous President, Noor Mohammed Taraki, whose agrarian and other reforms had met with violent opposition in both the country and the army. A leadership struggle led first to the exile of Babrak Karmal, now President, and then to the arrest and execution of Taraki himself. The terror now attributed to Amin already existed under Taraki, and only Soviet advisers saved many revolutionary leaders from execution. When Amin took over last year,’ his Government found itself in control of only two or three provinces. He too asked the Soviet Union for military aid, and his request was backed by _ Soviet advisers, often victims of the rebels.

However, his request was refused in the summer and autumn for global political reasons. Moscow was hoping for Salt II ratification to ease budgetary problems; it was also hoping, despite discouraging signs, for normalisation of Chinese-Soviet diplomatic relations; and it was

reluctant to do any thing, that would push N.A.T.O. into a decision to deploy cruise mjssiles in Europe. But by. the beginning of December Jt became clear that none of these problems was going to be solved sat- 1

isfactorily — SA.L.T. was prejudiced by the. “Soviet troops in Cuba crisis”; China was opting for closer American ties; and most N.A.T.O. members had opted for the new missiles. At an enlarged Politburo meeting (i.e. with co-opted foreign policy specialists), the decision was taken to “aid” Afghanistan. Present at this meeting were the Minister of Defence, Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, and the head of the K.G.8., Yuri Andropov. President Brezhnev was also present; but because of his illness he was already restricted to only two or three hours work daily. The principal basis for the Politburo decision was that action was necessary to improve the strategic position towards China — not against Pakistan or Iran. (The Afghan frontier is believed to lie close to Chinese missile sites.) Moscow told Amin that his request had been granted; and on the morning of December 27 the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul visited the presidential palace with the head of the Soviet aid programme to discuss the details of intervention. Because there were several rebel groups in Kabul it was decided that Amin should move to a palace on the outskirts that would be

easier to guard. The fact that Amin took this advice is said to be evidence that he was not afraid of Soviet intervention. Similar evidence is provided by the fact that the airborne troops which arrived that night met with full cooperation at Kabul Airport. Had Amin been afraid, he would have escaped and ordered opposition to the Soviet landing. The main government buildings were taken without opposition. It is unlikely that Amin realised what the Soviet Government intended after the intervention, however. On the 28 or 29 of December there was to be a meeting of the Central Committee of the Afghan Party. At that meeting there would be a vote of thanks to the Soviet Union for its aid, which would legitimise the intervention. This was to be followed by elections, at which Kar mal would be elected to the leading position and Amin would be demoted to number two or three. Amin was to remain a visible part of the Government, to supply further legitimisation under Babrak’s firm control. The plan went wrong ... Amin had moved to the palace outside Kabul with a small group of aides. The palace was guarded by Af-

ghan soldiers and Soviet military advisers, and a Soviet Deputy minister of Internal Security Affairs, Lieutenant-General Victor Paputin, who had been sent to Afghanistan, was made responsible for Amin’s safeWhen Soviet troops began to arrive in Kabul at 7-8 p.m. on December 27, they took the radio station, the old

presidential palace and other government buildings. One column went to Amin’s palace and sur-* rounded it. Then, for sonie reason, fighting broke out at the palace and Amin was

killed. Although It is not clear how Amin died, the present account insists that there was no “revolutionary tribunal” and that he does not seem to have died at Soviet hands. As a result of Amin’s untimely death, the Soviet authorities were in an embarrassing situation. Their claim to have been invited by the Afghan Government now seemed a fabrication, Karmal had not yet arrived in Afghanistan, and there was difficulty in getting him back quickly. The security failure which led to Amin’s death was blamed on Paputin, who was recalled to Moscow. According to the account now current in Moscow, Paputin got as far as Sheremvetova Airport, where he committed suicide. Western reports that he was killed in Kabul are said to be quite wrong. Soviet papers reported his death but without saying when or where he died. Babrak Karmal was moved from Czechoslovakia to East Germany, from there to Bulgaria, Moscow and only then to Kabul. On the way back to Kabul he broadcast an announcement that Amin had been tried and shot. — Copyright London Observer Sendee.