An H-bomb and a hi-jacked lorry

Press, 4 December 1979, Page 21

An H-bomb and a hi-jacked lorry

Pakistan hopes to test a thermonuclear (H-bomb i device by next April, in defiance of the efforts of America and other nuclear powers to prevent further countries from acquiring the weapon. The claim that Pakistan might be just a few months away from a test was made to the

“Sunday Times” by a high-level miltary source from Islamabad, the country’s capital. Evidence has been uncovered of secret operations by Pakistan in three continents to acquire the necessary nuclear material and knowledge.

Hitherto, the Americans have estimated that Pakistan was two to three years from possessing a nuclear device. An official in Washington said: “We could be wrong. If someone says it could happen in the next three or four months I wouldn’t bet against it. The Pakistanis have been consistently a jump or two ahead of us.” The biggest jump of all, according to intelligence V

sources in Europe and informaton from Pakistan, has been —

THE DESERT HIJACK: This was the missing piece in a jig-saw puzzle that tantalised western intelligence men. The queston was: Where was Pakistan getting uranium, the vital ingredient for a nuclear device? The answer emerged as an act of skulduggery in the desolate wastes of subSaharan Africa.

Three months ago a lorry carrying 20 tons of uranium concentrate — an orange powder known as di-uranate — set off from a French mining base at Arlit in northern Niger. It was supposed to run 1500 miles south to the West African port of Cotonou, the first leg of a journey to France as another consignment for the French nuclear industry. It never reached Cotonou. An insurance company was asked to pay out on the loss. The comr* ’-'’d Ao rrjHf® searched, but there was n» s.gu oi me lorry.

Weeks later, reports began to reach the Arlit complex that nomads had found a truck in the arid wastes of the Djado plateau 400 miles to the north-east — in the Opposite direction from Cotonou.

The uranium lorry was found, overturned and empty, beside a desert track that leads north to the border of Libya, less than 100 miles away. There was consternation among the French. Had the load of uranate been spirited away to Libya, which was known to be a supporter of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions?

Intensive investigations brought confirmation that the uranate had indeed gone to Libya and then On to Pakistan. Furthermore, sources in Europe and Pakistan believe that several earlier truckloads that were baffingly “lost” went the same way.

"The qunatities that have disappeared are sufficient to make at least two nuclear devices,” a

French intelligence specialist said. The uranate hijack saved Pakistan the first expensive steps in converting uranium ore (assuming enough could have been obtained) to weapongrade uranium U 235. And Pakistan was prepared for the remaining stages, thanks to— THE ALMELO RIP-OFF: The most advanced and economical process for the necessary “enriching” of

uranium uses a gas centrifuge that acts like a sort of giant milk separator. This was developed jointly by Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany in a high-security research establishment at Almelo in the Netherlands. The Dutch intelligence agency, B.V.D. has confirmed that a brilliant young Pakistani metallurgist, Abdul Qadir Khan, by an unexplained breach

of security was emnloyed at Almelo in 1974-75 with access to the most sensitive material. It was only three years after he returned to Pakistan that it was discovered he had taken with him the secret technology, design and shopping list for parts of an advanced pilot centrifuge with he subsequently duplicated at a military compound on the outskirts of Rawalpindi in Pakistan.

Having acquired the Almlo secrets, Pakistan had to acquire a lot of sophisticated components. This meant poking further holes in western security arrangements designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Pakistan engaged in a whirl of— NUCLEAR SHOPPING: In the summer of last year it bought 31 high-frequency “inverters” (electrical con-

trol equipment), of a type used by British Nuclear Fuels, from the Emerson factory in Swindon, England. These were flown out before the Department of Trade, alerted by a question in the House of Commons by Frank Allaun, the Labour MP, could impose licensing restrictions.

Other vital parts — flow-forming equipment, valves, gauges, aluminium cylinders, radiation-proof glass, welding equipment — for the gas centrifuge were bought through a number of Shell companies in Switzerland, the Netherlands, West Germany, France, and the United States.

These parts are sold over the counter for a variety of industrial uses, including industrial centrifuges required for nonuranium purposes. It is only when they are put together for the enrichment of uranium that the international restrictions against their sale-export apply.

The pilot centrifuge outside Rawalpindi is said by experts to be able to produce in one year enough weapon-grade U 235 for a single thermo-nuclear explosion.

Pakistan’s strong-man, General Zia, has always denied he is reaching for nuclear weapons (though he wants “nuclear technology for peaceful purposes”). The device he hopes to explode in the spring will not be a deliverable H-bomb, but the distinction is academic.

This is emphasised by a secret United States military intelligence report which says: “Some countries might seek to further their political and even military’ objectives by the acquisition of a very modest nuclear explosive capability . . . Here we are concerned with single, unweaponised nuclear explosives. Since they themselves may have a political impact, they may be the ultimate goal.” There are signs that two possible sites (one may be a diversion) are being pre-

pared for a test explosion — one in the Sind desert, where the C.I.A. says “something funny is going on.” and the other in the wasteland of south Baluchistan, where armyengineers are working under unusually tight security.

Pakistan's three nuclear installations near Rawalpindi are working round the clock, guarded by a battery of Crotelle ground-to-air missiles hooked to an early-warning system. Mirage fighters, on constant alert at a nearby base, scramble even when a flying club trainer inadvertently strays too close. The high-level military source in Islamabad said: “Before, we miscalculated about our chances and, of course, there were some unforeseen holdups. But now the race is on. General Zia has inscribed his name firmly on the cracker. Only God. an accident or another coup can stop it”

By

ANTHONY MASCARENHAS,

“Sunday Times,” London