THE PRESS FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1979. S.A.L.T. 2 at last

Press, 11 May 1979, Page 14

THE PRESS FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1979. S.A.L.T. 2 at last

An announcement has been made in Washington that a second treaty on strategic arms will be signed soon between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is welcome news, for the talks, called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, have been continuing for more than six years. The latest round began in December, 1978. The persistence with which the two countries have stuck to negotiating is in itself evidence of a will to reach an agreement. In the coming debate about the treaty, which will be concentrated in, but not restricted to, the United States, it will be as well for all to remember that had there not been a will on both sides for it, the treaty would not have emerged.

The American announcement said that there were a few secondary points to be resolved. The Soviet Union has not so far made any announcement. It may be waiting for a resolution of the points, or it may be waiting to see how the Carter Administration fares with the treaty in Congress

Senators Howard Baker and Henry Jackson seem determined that the treaty will be amended; but these are early days. Under the United States Constitution, the Senate must approve of the accord. Article 11. Section 2, of the Constitution, dealing with the powers of the President says: ‘ He shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties . . President Carter has

taken unaccustomed steps for him to consult members of the Senate about the treaty. It looks, at the very least, as if there will not be an outright rejection of S.A.L.T. 2.

The treaty will place limits on the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. This limit applies to forces capable of attacking other countries with long-range nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union now has more delivery systems than are deemed to be allowed under the new treaty; it will have to scrap some. In this way the treaty may be said to bring about a reduction of nuclear weapons systems. The treaty also limits qualitative improvements, not just increases in the number of weapons. The systems being limited are intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and missiles launched from aeroplanes.

The opposition in the United States to the treaty comes mainly from two quarters, one reflecting the attitude to the other. There is a widespread distrust of the Soviet Union and a belief that it will cheat on the accords if it can get away with it. The demand is for a method of verifying that the Soviet Union adheres to the treaty's provisions. The United States

has recently become handicapped in its surveillance of the Soviet Union because it has lost its listening posts in Iran. Administration officials have been arguing publicly that various other methods of surveillance of tne Soviet Union make verification possible. Some senators have yet to be convinced on that point.

The Administration’s jargon for its aims has been that it wants “deterrence” and “essential equivalence.” This means that it wants sufficient nuclear might to make any attack by the Soviet Union so costly to the Soviet Union that it could not be countenanced in Moscow. It means having sufficient weapons — and to be known to have sufficient weapons — for the United States to hold its own against Soviet might. The different characteristics of the weapons of each side do not allow for a simple counting; nor can either side allow the other to improve the accuracy or carrying ability of one of the missile systems, thereby altering the strategic balance: hence the qualitative limits set in the treaty.

The basic question about S.A.L.T. 2 is not simply one for the superpowers. It is whether the world will be a safer place with the treaty or without it. The two countries have no more momentous matters to decide than whether their own people and material wealth can be destroyed by the other within minutes. That, at least, will give them a strong motive for not getting their sums wrong. When they have agreed, it may be assumed that neither is going to have an obvious advantage. The two see benefits in having a treaty, both for a sense of security and to limit the already prodigious amounts of money they spend on nuclear arms. It is hard to draw any conclusion except that the world will be a safer place if the treaty is observed. The alternative must also be considered. To renounce the treaty at this point would be to allow the nuclear arms lace to continue unabated.

In spite of his occasional sabrerattling, the President of the Soviet Union, Mr Brezhnev, acts like someone who has come to terms with the awesome power that he and President Carter possess. The treaty, on which he has set his heart, and on which he staked his career, is sure to outlast his rule. The United States and the world need a sense of security for the postBrezhnev era. Ratification of the treat)' is essential to that end, and those who doubt the trustworthiness of either party must somehow be persuaded that both sides will observe the rules. The will to ensure that a treaty is made may even extend to the means to reassure the sceptics on both sides.