THE PRESS SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1979. Return of an exile

Press, 3 February 1979, Page 12

THE PRESS SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1979. Return of an exile

When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiny burst on to the world scene, largely unannounced, some weeks ago, many outside Iran were perplexed about the man and the forces he headed. Already, however, it is reasonably clear what he wants to do immediately: he is determined to prevent the return of the Shah to Iran and oust the Government of Dr Baktiar, which the Shah left behind him. Beyond these two aims, uncertainty surrounds what the Islamic Republic the Ayatollah wants to establish would be like

Whether the Ayatollah will be able to achieve even his immediate aims will depend on whether his Islamic Republic is acceptable to the army and even to some who have supported him as an opponent of the Shah. Although Ayatollah Khomeiny is certainly revered by many millions of Iranians, the political alliance which brought about the downfall of the Shah and the return of the Ayatollah may not hold together This religious and political leader has found common cause so far with many who shared his distaste for the Shah’s regime, but who disliked it for different reasons Should Dr Baktiar’s regime fall in its turn, many of the Ayatollah’s erstwhile allies may fine they have not enough in common with him to continue to co-operate with him.

This possibility is stronger because of the significant doubt whether he really understands the economic and social problems which created the dissatisfaction on which he has capitalised so dramatically up to now Iran has changed much in the 15 years since the Ayatollah was last on Iranian soil. More important than whether the Ayatollah’s political and popular support will begin to wane is whether the armed forces will tolerate the Ayatollah’s crippling of Dr Baktiars Government. Should some of his support evaporate and the army make known its displeasure at a confrontation between him and Dr Baktiar. the Ayatollah may be forced to decline a definite place in Iran’s new power structure and be content to offer general guidance from the sidelines

Such a retirement would offer Iran's best prospect for reasonable stability in the next few months. Unhappily, the Ayatollah’s pronouncements and what is known of his character suggest that he will not be willing to assume such a role. If he overreaches himself, the Ayatollah may precipitate a crisis in which the armed forces feel they have no choice but to intervene. A military government may give Iran a superficial stability, but will probably not be able to solve the fundamental economic, social, and political problems which, it is now apparent, have been simmering beneath the superficial stability of the Shah’s rule.

Others must make difficult decisions in anticipation of how events in Iran will unfold following the Ayatollah’s return from exile. The position of the United States appears particularly awkward. The Ayatollah embodies an Iranian resentment against foreign intervention and influence in Iran which has very deep roots and which the Ayatollah is directing, for the moment, against the United States ir particular and the West in general The Soviet Union will not neces sarily benefit from the emergence of a regime in Iran which includes Ayatollah Khomeiny. or over which he exercises a dominant influence Such a regime will be strongly nationalist and Islamic and not. therefore, a regime with any fundamental affinity with the Soviet Union However, while the United States calculates where its advantage lies as the Iranian crisis unfolds il would at least be well-advised not to be caught out by the unexpected emergence of any new individual or group in the way it was caught out by the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeiny His triumphant return to Iran has opened a new chapter in Iranian history, even if his own part in writing that chapter may be less important than his dramatic welcome suggests. He has been able to orchestrate responses in Iran from a distance: now he has to come to grips with Iranian politics at their centre. Iranians will now begin to judge what his ambition really means.