Too soon for Shah to go

Press, 7 December 1978, Page 20

Too soon for Shah to go

Because he is the focus of dissension and opposition in Iran the easy, but deceptive, conclusion to draw is that if the Shah goes, the country’s troubles would end. Almost certainly Iran would fall into chaos in which the military Government would hold such power as guns gave it, but would have little popular authority. No other leader in Iran is likely to stand a chance of holding the country together. Possibly the nearest is Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeiny, the leader of the Shiite Muslims, but exile for many years and an ability to inflame the passions of his followers do not necessarily make a sound political leader.

The opposition to the Shah has brought together conservative, religious people and liberals who would like to see political reform. Once the prospect of an Islamic republic came nearer fulfilment, significant forces would emerge to drive these diverse groups apart.

Ayatollah Khomeiny has been called a “tool of the enemies of this country” by Iran’s military Prime Minister (General Gholamreza Azhari) in an apparent effort to turn people against him. It seems doubtful whether this would work. General Azhari did not specify the enemies. The whole question of foreign involvement is difficult to resolve. Little has emerged which would link the Soviet Union with any events in Iran, but suggestions have been made that some of the Arab countries have encouraged the unrest because they see that an Islamic Iran would not supply Israel with oil. Ayatollah Khomeiny has been outspoken on this point. On the evidence available outside Iran, however, it is impossible to be sure that there is any important foreign involvement at all.

The West’s interests will be best served if foreign influences are excluded. The Soviet Union has given a

warning that the United States should stay out of Iran’s affairs, and because of the border between the two countries, the Soviet Union might feel that its own vital interests were at stake if Iran fell under a government propped up by the United States. From the West’s viewpoint, the new treaty of friendship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union is far from being assuring. Iran did not like the coup on its borders which brought a Communist Government to power and Iran feared that the Afghanis who drifted across the border would have fifth columnists among them. The presence of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan, however, is matched by the presence of American advisers in Iran. The United States will fear greatly the use to which its own vast supplies of weapons will be put by Iran. Fears have long been held about the stability of the Gulf and, while it is true that the great bulk of the West’s oil comes from that area, the threat tends to be theoretical rather than actual. No doubt Saudi Arabia will be viewing the events in Iran with concern, as will the rulers of Arab sheikhdoms. Yet the lessons they might read are that the era of autocratic rulers has gone. It is a pity that the Shah did not come to an earlier conclusion about the need for political reform. He seems determined to hold power to himself and the Government, which draws its power from him, seems determined that he should continue to do so. After the present dissension the Shah may be lucky if he remains even a constitutional monarch, let alone an absolute ruler. The force of the opposition to him dictates that sooner or later he must step down. The West’s interests would be served if he made it clear to Iranians that he is prepared to go, but later rather than sooner.. Some semblance of stability might then be preserved.