The secrets of Cyrenaica

Press, 4 March 1978, Page 16

The secrets of Cyrenaica

This is the first of two articles by DOUGLAS HODGE based on hitherto secret documents relating to the Second Libyan offensive in November, 1941, and the Battle of Egypt, 1942.

“Dear SATTERTHWAITE. 1 send you this with best wishes and grateful thanks for ail you have done here.’’ wrote MajorGeneral B. C. Frevberg, G.0.C., 2nd N.Z.E.F, on April 27. 1942. on the well-thumbed cover of a secret document — “The New Zealand Division in Cyrenaica and lessons of the campaign. '■ which has been presented to the South Canterbury Returned Services Association by Colonel S. M. Satterthwaite’s widow. The document, together with a second declassified document, “The New Zealand Division in Egypt and Libya, Operations Lightfoot and Supercharge,” will be bound in a protective cover and made available to members. The pamplets are particu'arly interesting and revealing to those who ed in the campaigns. General Freybergs account of the operations of the division in the second Libyan offensive gives a general picture of the battle. The division had been withdrawn after taking part in the campaign. Fighting took place over a wide area, but the mam operations were the battles fought near Tobruk.

A smaller, mixed Imperial Force met a wellequipped German force in a series of open warfare engagements. “The campaign illustrates the German conception of an active defence in which the counter-attack was employed upon every possible occasion, showing a boldness we would do well to study, both from the large aspect of defence as well as from the point of view of the tactical employment of various arms,” said General Freyberg. Tanks had become the German commanders’ basic weapon, and the need of an armoured component to support an infantry division was established, said the report. A captured German maior belonging to a lorried infantry regiment had criticised General Rommel bitterly for temporarily separating the tank regiments from the infantry. The German High Command was resourceful and. in some cases, ruthless in committing troops to a forlorn hope, the report continued. “Although at the commencement their action was offensive and they were ready to move and strike with boldness, it is

equally true that when opposed and fought with determination they showed a tendency to panic, especially if they were left without the immediate support of tanks. The report we had of General Boettcher’s calls for help when the Afrika Division was left in the Tobruk sector without armoured support during General Rommel’s turning movement is an example of this.” said the summary. The report notes that as the campaign progressed the morale of the German infantry fell. “It is certain that it is not proof against heavy pressure, and it has again been demonstrated that although the German is a hard fighter he is not a tough one. The German Army, however”, said General Freyberg, “is always formidable.” The infantry appeared to have degenerated into “tank followers.” The German infantry soldier had lost his old skill with his personal weapons, and the enemy artillery fire was not impressive. “Those of us who are old enough to remember fighting upon the Somme know that the German infantry deteriorated from the moment they got the 'deep dugout habit.' Once we perfected the creeping

barrage and rushed the dugout entrances, the Germans surrendered without further resistance. The dugout habit played a large part in the disintegration of the German infantry soldier. I believe.,a similar condition exists' today. They depend entirely upon the tank. Knock out the tank and we have gone a long way to achieving success,” said General Freyberg. The test for toops, said the report, was whether they could take it and fight back. “For the first time in this war the odds were about even and we had a chance to fight back. We know now that we can both ‘take it’ and ‘fight back.’ Nobody, I hope, doubted it. This is the acid test of war and it is a test the Germans have yet to pass through. Then, as now, the Germans had a long start, and during the earlier years they hammered us unmercifully. Later on, when we had the guns and ammunition, the Germans became the receivers and they sought cover underground like rabbits. They could not 'take it.’ This time it is a tank war in which again they have had a big lead in the equipment race. But the time is coming when the tide will

turn. When it does, the Germans will have to show they can ‘take it.’ The experience of this campaign makes me feel certain they can’t,” said General Freyberg. The Eighth Army was to take Cyrenaica. Plans for the relief of Tobruk depended on success in the armoured encounter. It was considered certain that Rommel would fight for Tobruk. “General Rommel was not, of course, an unknown quantity. Every bit of information about his record had been studied and we were quite ready for a war of rapid movement and bold tactics,” the report continued. The move of the division to its assembly area at Bir Kanayis began on Armistice Day, 1941. “From what we have since learnt it is clear that German intelligence was strangely lacking and it is doubtful if they had any idea at this stage that the offensive had begun. General Rommel was away in Athens or Rome, celebrating his fiftieth birthday, when the battle started,” said the report.

The armoured battle had gone in the Allies favour, and it was reported that

German headquarters considered the situation “one of extreme urgency.” The report studies the advance to cut off the fortress line, the capture of Capuzzo, and the move on Tobruk. News from the Tobruk front was not good as it was reported that Sidi Rezegh had been retaken by the enemy .Time was of the essence.

“Surprise and the bayonet were our means, and speed was the vital factor, we had the legs of the enemy and, in my opinion, would keep the initiative so long as we did not get tied to the ground,” General Freyberg said. Point 175 was taken by the Sixth Brigade at great cost on November 23. The next move was to open the way to Tobruk. Good news came from Tobruk at 1600 hours on November 26 — troops from the salient had pushed out to Ed Duda. The Fourth Brigade was then given the mission to open the corridor. “Nineteenth Battalion was ordered to attack and join hands with the Tobruk garrison. The attack that night went through 10,000 yards to Ed Duda. The Sixth Brigade attack to consolidate on Sidi Rezegh

carried out by weary troops was delivered with the greatest dash and determination against superior numbers. Sidi Rezegh was a bloody battlefield,” the report continued. The Fourth Brigade (Eighteenth and Twentieth Battalions) was in action throughout November 27. “The Germans used a flag of truce to gain time to replenish and re-inforce for a counter-attack on Eighteenth Battalion,” said the report. While the Sixth Brigade was reorganising its defence a Bren carrier of the Twenty-first Battalion captured Major-General Von Ravenstein, Commander of the Twentyfirst Armoured Division, out on a somewhat daring reconnaissance. “His marked maps gave us the whole German plan to destroy us,” said General Freyberg. On November 29 the enemy advanced with tanks from the south and took Point 175. The Twenty-first Battalions was caught napping by a ruse. “Tanks came forward with men wearing berets standing up in them, and our forward troops, who were expetting the South Africans, were surprised

completeiy, not realising their mistake until the tanks were into our lines,” the report said.

Rommel’s attack developed. Sidi Rezegh was lost and the enemy recaptured Belhamed. The New Zealand Division was in an unenviable position. Eventually, the remnants of the division withdrew from the line.

Heavy fighting in the Belhamed-Zaafran-Sidi Rezegh area had resulted in the splitting of the junction of Eighth Army forces with Tobruk, and the withdrawal southwards of Fourth Armoured Brigade. It was, the report said, a battle to destroy the German forces, and the New Zealand Division went some distance towards achieving this in its attacks at Sidi Rezegh, Belhamed, and Ed Duda.

The report also deals with the operations of the Fifth Brigade Group in the Bardia sector and the part it played in the battles between Acroma and Gazala.

“The situation in which the battalions of the Fifth Brigade were placed on the Bardia front was most critical, but their stand had saved them, for we now know that General Rommel decided in view

of the situation near Tobruk that Fifteenth Armoured Division should return at once to assist in the battle there, while Twenty-first Armoured Division was ordered to move along the Trigh Capuzzo against the New Zealand Division’s rear. The result in the Bardia sector was that the threat to our battalions was removed and they were able to reorganise,” General Freyberg wrote. On December 15, the Fifth Brigade joined the rest of the division in Egypt, having played a very’ important part in breaking the resistance of the three Italian divisions defending the Gazala position. General Freyberg said there were a number of outstanding lessons from the Libyan campaign. “Our next campaign may be in closer country, where our methods will be different and where the infantry soldier and the field gunner will have more important roles than has been the case in the desert fighting. We must not become obsessed with desert warfare,” he said.

The will to win required constant attention. Physical fitness was difficult to achieve, but he could see

no substitute for long marches and digging. “In our next campaign we may be fighting in mountainous or close country. The tank may, as in Greece, be seriously handicapped by the country; the rifle and machinegun, as well as the field artillery, will then have added importance.” Training, wrote General Freyberg, should be based on physical fitness and proficiency and confidence in the use of weapons. The impressive superiority of the Royal Air Force in Libya had to be borne in mind when considering the lessons of the campaign. “We had much to learn from the Germans in handling tanks in battle and also from the German methods of co-ordination of tanks with artillery, anti-tank guns, and infantry,” said the report. Of all the factors which contributed towards success, surprise was still the most important, “To achieve surprise we must be highly trained: We must train to reach the highest standard of efficiency in movement, in the use of weapons, and in co-operation with other arms. Training now is more necessary than ever,” wrote General Freyberg.