Neutron politics

Press, 5 November 1977, Page 14

Neutron politics

By

DAVID HAWORTH,

in Brussels

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation officials are gravely worried about the political arguments over the enhanced radiation nuclear device — the so-called neutron weapon.

European members of the alliance are very nervous about the political repercussions which might follow if they opted for the device, which has frequently been condemned as “inhuman” because of its potent fall-out. Those who oppose. it also claim it is more likely to bring nuclear warfat: nearer, than act as a deterrent.

These arguments are strongly countered by N-A.T.O. experts — and by the U.S. Government.

The weapon, commonly referred to as a “neutron bomb” though it is in fact a v.arhead, is a very small hydrogen weapon designed to kill enemy troops within a restricted' radius while causing little physical damage. The new weapon is the latest of several military innovations over the last 15 ' ears to give U.S. tactical nuclear weapons a more circumscribed “punch" and lessen hazards to nearby civilians. There is no known defence egainst the fast neutrons which the weapon releases. The protection of tanks, for example, would require a one-foot layer of lead or a two-foot layer of concrete blended with iron. The present U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are smaller, more accurate and have less fall out than corresponding Soviet weapons. The Russians have never made any special effort to reduce blast, heat or fall out to reduce collateral damage to civilians. The issue has now become a oolitical rather than a military one. This is disconcerting for N.A.T.O. officials. As they see it, the

question of whether or not the alliance is to have neutron warheads is essentially a military matter. After all, NA.T.O.' member countries have been able to deploy nuclear weapons (there are some 7000 in Western European storage at the moment) for many years. The neutron is. merely a different type of nuclear weapon and does not involve a different principle should World War 111 break out.

But because of British and German indecision about whether to have neutron warheads, a completely noncommittal attitude by Italy and grave doubts by the Danes and Dutch, the acquisition by N.A.T.O. of the neutron device must be held to be at least problematical. “The neutron would provide us with a more discriminating array of responses if there is a Warsaw Pact attack,” a N.A.T.O. military expert said. “If the primary objective of our armoury’ is to prevent conflict. "then the neutron substantially fits the bill.” He instanced the "systematic progress by Warsaw Pact members in deploying nuclear artillery.”

President Carter last July said that he believed N.A.T.O. had adequate strength to stop a Warsaw Pact invasion without using nuclear weapons. Advocates of the neutron warhead say it is an added measure of deterrence. The President’s assessment is similar to that of the London Institute of Strategic Studies which, after reviewing the current balance between the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. concludes: “The over-all balance is such as to mak* military aggression appear unattractive.” Discussion of the advantages of neutron weapons in N.A.T.O. councils is not new. The subject has been on the agenda of each of the

six meetings of N.A.T.O. nuclear planning group 1974 through to 1977. There is also the menace of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 mobile launch missile — a formidable threat to Western Europe because it is almost impossible to detect from where it will come: it can be fired from a railway truck or lorry and carry a warhead with the force of 25 million tons of TNT.

Military opinion is unequivocal about the virtues of the neutron device. It believes that the neutron could stop and break any Russian offensive into Western Europe and could prevent a limited conflict from turning into a nuclear cataclysm. These experts say that because the weapon is “plausible” to Warsaw Pact strategists it will therefore increase deterrence. But others say the Russians would not be deterred any more than they would be by the present N.A.T.O. tactical nuclear weapons, because they do not consider the limitation of collateral effects important. President Carter has delayed a final decision on whether the neutron weapon production line should be started. He was due to make up his mind this month. However, the continuing doubts and hesitations on the part of America’s European allies means that nothing final will be decided until spring 1978 at the earliest.

There is no question of the United States “going it alone” in the manufacture of neutron warheads: it is not a weapon of any strategic use to the United States alone. It is specifically designed for use in and around Europe. If, therefore, for whatever reasons, the European N.A.T.O. members decide against the deployment of neutron warheads, none will be made. — O.F.N.S. COPYRIGHT