Changes in the S.I.S. bill

Press, 31 October 1977, Page 20

Changes in the S.I.S. bill

Many opponents of the Government’s amendments to the Security Intelligence Service Act have done little but proclaim their objections. They have commanded a lot of public attention: they have done nothing to ensure that the amendment bill in its final form will be an improvement on the draft submitted to Parliament more than a month ago. Others have done much more. They have submitted to the Government their ideas on how the bill could be made more satisfactory. Some of the results of their submissions, among them those of the State service organisations, have appeared in the changes that the Government intends to make during further debate on the bill.

Throughout its life, the S.I.S. has survived and worked without a prohibition on the publication of names of its officers. Even under the proposed prohibition the names of officers could be made known in other parts of the world. Generally, the S.I.S. staff will not make themselves known: that is part of their business. Obviously, even when the service is successful in its work, it does not want to attract attention. Those who object to the prohibition are not really concerned about this: they are concerned that any misuse of security methods will not be capable of being brought to public notice. A satisfactory compromise to meet all points of view on this point is impossible. On balance, the public mind would probably be more at rest if the security of the Security Service were left to the capabilities and ingenuity of its staff, and if the security of the individual and of political freedom against a secret bureaucracy were reinforced by the chance to expose any misuse of power. The final answer on this choice is never known until events have proved where the greater threats to freedom lie. It may, however, be noted that a misuse of S.I.S. powers could be made publicly known without the naming of any member of the S.I.S. staff. If the urgency to reveal information on S.I.S. staff is compelling in what someone believes is the nation’s best interest, the maximum penalty will be 81000. That is the price for breaking the law to shift the balance from the law’s concern for the special protection of the service’s secrecy to the protection of public freedom from bureaucratic domination. By any standard, 81000 is a small price to pay for the preservation of that freedom. It is a high price to pay for vexatious or frivolous revelations. But this kind of argument to accommodate a law that may serve one purpose well and another badly if powers are misused is not a legally attractive argument. The usual way out of this kind of legal impasse is to provide specificdefences in the statute. This could be done here.

On one aspect of secrecy surrounding the S.I.S. staff the Government has proposed a modest change; former members of the S.I.S. would not be under the ban on the publication of information on S.I.S. staff. While a member of the S.I.S. staff could not legally disclose information he has learned through his connection with the service, he would not be prevented from making known his former employment. This might be of material importance if he wished to dissociate himself publicly from the service and its activities.

Many objections have been raised against the term “potential espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or subversion” in the provision requiring the director of the S.I.S. tb inform the officials on the Intelligence Council of new areas for surveillance. Clearly the service is bound to act on suspicion. Its job is not to act after the event: indeed it is precluded by the law from doing so. If the evidence and perpetrators of espionage, or terrorism, or subversion are plain enough, the need for S.I.S. surveillance disappears. The objections are founded on the opinion that “potential” is a word that can be too widely, and oppressively, interpreted. The word might well be replaced by “suspected.” In practice, and in secret, the change of wording might be of little consequence: nevertheless, the intent of the law should be clearer.

An inference that public servants might be directed to assist the S.I.S. will be removed. The change is probably academic since it seems extremely unlikely that the S.I.S. would seek the assistance of any person, in or outside the State services, unless it were confident of his co-operation. Nevertheless, these and other proposed changes in the bill are to be welcomed.

Much of the bill has not been the subject of controversy. That is one reason for surprise that the Opposition has declared its intention to repeal the bill’s provisions at the first opportunity. Another reason for surprise is that the Opposition has permitted the assumption that it is prepared to allow a return to procedures with which the former Chief Ombudsman found fault.

The Opposition’s duty, in the course of opposing what it finds wrong in legislation, is surely to make known what kind of law it prefers. Unless the Opposition is rejecting all the recommendations of Sir Guy Powles that have been adopted in the amendment bill, and unless it wants none of the improvements proposed by Sir Guy, a more positive response might be expected from the Opposition. Many people outside the House have recommended improvements in the bill. Having conducted its own committee inquiry, the Opposition should be able to do so as well.