French Communist plans

Press, 5 October 1977, Page 12

French Communist plans

By

VICTOR ZORZA

There is more method in the madness of the French Communist Party than appears on the surface. Many observers believe that the Party is deliberately courting defeat in the coming parliamentary elections, and its recent tuctics provide considerable support for this view, but the Communists’ strategy is more sophisticated than that. The argument that they are courting defeat rests on the view that thev are doing eventhing possible to break up their alliance with the Socialist Party. without which the Left cannot possibly win the election next March. They are said to fear being reduced to the role of the junior partner in a coalition government which wou'd reflect the Socialists’ much greater electoral strength, and to prefer the political wilderness to the prospect of seeing their own strength eroded by their allies. They have therefore, it is widely areued. decided that thev would be better off in opposition, and have retimed to the extremist ideology which would ensure that the electorate would keep bo’h them and the Socialists out of power. It is tme that the crisis In the alliance is due to the Communists’ insistence on wholesale nationalisation, which ‘he Socialists cannot and will not accept. But it is not true that the demand for nationalisation is an empty Ideological call made in obedience to party dogma, or out of tear pt what the future might hold for th*m. On the contrary. it reflects the Communis* Party’s hardhe’ded nolitica’ realism French Socialist leaders ha'"- mad® it clear »o the leaders of other Western rations that thev need not fe?r the coming to power of * Socialist-Communist coalition because th». Communists fou’d not be allocated anv of the kev ministries, such

as those of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior. The Communists know perfectly well that they cannot count on these posts, and they are reconciled to it. But they are not reconciled to being fobbed off with a few minor ministries. Indeed it would be politically impractical to ignore their demands if th* election reflected anything like their present strength of about 20 per cent of the vote, compared with about 30 per cent for the Socialists. This is where nationalisation comes in. The Joint Programme agreed by the Socialists and the Communists in 1972 made provision for an elaborate management structure in the public sector, which includes not only the nationalised industries, but also the State television network and the like. A key element in each case will be a board of management which will consist of three equal parts. One third of the board will be elected by the workers in the industry concerned. one third will be appointed by the Government. and one third will represent the consumers. It follows that any political party which controls more than one of the three segments also controls the industry. This is what the Communists are after. Manv of the key French industries are already dominated by the Communist-led trade unions under the Confederation Generale du Travail (C.G.T.). The Communist Party’ has good reason to believe that when it comes to electing board members <n these industries, the C.G.T will be able to ensure that one third of the seats reserved for the workers’ representatives will go to Communist nominees. The other third will be appointed bv the Government, which means, in effect, bv the ministers of Labour, of. Planning. and of the other de-

partments concerned with industry, which are precisely the departments that the Communists hope to head in a coalition government. In this way the Communists would be able to control up to two thirds of the seats on the boards of many key industrial enterprises. But before the Communists could control them, the enterprises would have to be nationalised. This is what the present argument between the Communists and the Socialists is really about. It is about power, not about some oldfashioned ideological formula which requires Marxists to believe in the nationalisation of industry. The French Communists have readily shed the Marxist formulas which were unlikely to find favour with the electorate, such as the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” They have made every effort to introduce the cosmetic changes that might gain them some votes. But nationalisation is different. It is the issue which really matters to them, for good, practical reasons of their own. Their control of at least some of the nationalised industries will give them a power base which they can use in a number of ways to build up the Party’s popularity and influence. They began by demanding the nationalisation of a thousand companies, but have now come down to 729. If the Socialists come up with a somewhat higher offer than the 277 companies they are now prepared to nationalise, and the Communists come down further still, the compromise will give neither side what it really wants, but it will give enough to each side to make it possible for the alliance to survive.

The gap is still wide, but the self-interest of both parties will no doubt cause them to find a compromise with which they’ can go forward to the election. It is much too early to count the Communists out. — (Copy-z right. 1977. Victor Zorza)