Modest changes in American strategy

Press, 27 August 1977, Page 9

Modest changes in American strategy

By

CHARLES MOHR

of the

New York Times News SerI vice (through NZPA) Washington After months of preparation and study, President Carter has issued a secret directive on national strategy that will commit the United States to modest increases in defence spending, will seek to improve the combat ability of American forces in Europe to absorb an initial attack, and calls for light, mobile, and flexible forces to meet threats in such areas as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and east Asia. In the relatively brief and crisply worded directive, Mr Carter also ordered the See-; retary of Defence (Mr Harold Brown) and military planners to review the targeting policy that would direct nuclear warheads to locations in the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. One aim of the targeting review, said Administration sources who discussed the new strategy directive, is to maintain the capability of i inflicting unacceptable damlage to the Soviet Union (even if that nation struck first with nuclear weapons. [But another aim outlined by JMr Carter was to develop [options for limited nuclear [responses by the United [States to avoid escalation to unlimited conflict.

Although the document does not mention the word detente, Mr Carter instructed that diplomatic instruments be used as an integral part of national strategy concerning the Soviet Union — which is apparently seen as the only plausible major enemy.

The document does not, as some hawks had feared, concede the loss of a large part of West Germany in the case of a sudden, surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact forces. Neither does it commit the United States to a policy aimed at being able to stop such an attack in its tracks, which probably would require massive increases in defence spending. Mr Carter, therefore, reasserted American adherence to existing North Atlantic Treaty Organisation strategy of a forward defence. But more significantly, he ordered that United States policy should be to see that a surprise attack by communist forces resulted in a minimum loss of territory! and that pre-war boundaries be restored as rapidly as' possible.

He reaffirmed that the United States should increase defence spending by about three per cent a year in real terms with inflation discounted in conjunction with similar action by the other members of N.A.T.O. The directive also instructs that American forces in Western Europe achieve enhanced initial combat ability, or the ability to respond rapidly to an attack. Steps should also be taken, the directive said, to assure the safety of lines of communication and supply, presumably to keep N.A.T.O. forces in combat readiness after an invasion. Arms limitation agreements, for instance, should be sought if they enhance United States national security, Mr Carter directed, and efforts should be made to draw the Soviet leadership into a widening pattern of

[global co-operation, and increased United States-Soviet [ trade. i Mr Carter’s directive was [made after a prolonged review of strategy and force posture by lower-level officials of the National Security Council and the Defence and State Departments and extended debate in the socalled Special Co-ordination Committee dominated by such figures as the Secretary of State (Mr Cyrus Vance) the Secretary of Defence (Mr Brown), and Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, the White House National Securit; Adviser.

The policy adopted by Mr Carter may calm the fears of both hawks and doves, without satisfying either entirely. It does not, an Administration source remarked, represent a radical departure from past strategic policy but is intended to be a more sophisticated and flexible outline for managing relations with the Soviet Union.