THE PRESS SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 1977. The future of Taiwan

Press, 27 August 1977, Page 14

THE PRESS SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 1977. The future of Taiwan

The visit of the American Secretary of State (Mr Cyrus Vance) to Peking has. as expected, done nothing to open the impasse in which Chinese-American relations are trapped five years after the Shanghai communique. The visit has succeeded as an "exploratory” mission. Both sides can be expected to benefit from Mr Vance's acquaintance with China’s leaders at a crucial point m Chinas domestic politics. But the question of the future of Taiwan is apparent!} as far from resolution as it was before Mr Vance's trip

The Chinese are as determined as ever that relations with the United States cannot become "normal” unless the United States severs its diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan and promises not to interfere in what the Chinese insist is strictly an internal matter While the Carter Administration is not yet willing to do this, the abrogation of the security treaty between Washington and Taipei and the transfer of American diplomatic recognition to Peking are being urged by many prominent Americans and are recognised as being inevitable within a few years. Mr Carter may fear the domestic political repercussions of appearing to "abandon” Taiwan: he may regard as genuine the reported fears of some Asian Governments that severing relations with Taiwan would upset the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Mr Carter may compare this argument about Taiwan's being a test of American intentions in Asia with the warnings which ensnared the United States in Vietnam. He may well conclude that a further general decline in Asian confidence in the United States is preferable to an unending difference of opinion with China.

If the United States accommodated the Chinese position over Taiwan, the island would not necessarily be immediately taken over by Peking: and the stability of the Western Pacific, in which the Chinese have as large a stake as anyone, might not be endangered. On one point, however, the Carter

Administration can act with greater certainty: Taipei still claims to be the Government of all China and is still pledged to rescuing China from the rule of the People's Republic. By continuing to accord Taipei diplomatic recognition, the United States is continuing to take sides in China’s civil war and to support a challenge to the claim of Peking to be the Government of China. Mr Carter cannot afford to countenance such a futile claim, which is denied by 2000 years of effort to preserve the unity of China.

The Chinese can be expected to go along with the survival of economic and cultural ties between Taiwan and the United States after the military and diplomatic ties have been cut. Japan’s relations with China and Taiwan are proceeding satisfactorily: they are founded on recognition of Peking's de jure sovereignty over Taiwan while the de facto autonomy of the island continues. The risk that China will invade Taiwan immediately after the United States transfers its recognition from Taipei to Peking is slight. The likely course of events in the short run is that Taiwan’s status will become something like that of Hong Kong—acknowledged to be an integral part of China but accepted as being autonomous to the mutual benefit of the Chinese and the West. The sooner the Americans address themselves to the problems of Taiwan's status once Washington transfers diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking, the sooner the full implications of the Shanghai communique can be worked out. The Chinese would clearly welcome a way out of the present impasse in their relations with the Americans. Their new economic programme calls for rapid modernisation which would be greatly assisted by access to American technology and their fears of the Soviet Union remain as profound as ever. But for the United States to expect them to sacrifice the crucial principle that China is one country to achieve these subordinate aims would be vain.