THE PRESS FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 1977. China's new directions

Press, 26 August 1977, Page 12

THE PRESS FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 1977. China's new directions

China appears to have settled down, politically and economically, after the troubles and uncertainties of the year in which the two giants of the Chinese revolution died. Industrial production reportedly rose in the first half of 1977. Now the Party Congress and the election of a new Central Committee appear to have given China a new, stable political leadership, which awaits only the seal of approval of the National People's Congress, which will assemble before the end of the year, before its claim to authority will be complete.

Three men will guide China through the next few years: the new Chairman of the Communist Party. Hua Kuo-feng, the reinstated Vice-Chairman. Teng Hsiao-ping, and the veteran Minister of Defence. Yeh Chien-ying. These three appear to agree on broad policy. Under their leadership, China will repudiate the extreme Maoist position of frequent, political mobilisation of the Chinese people. The three will concentrate on economic development This will require tighter political and economic discipline of the masses and the encouragement of administrative talent and technological skills. The army will be modernised and less reliance will be placed on the Maoist concept of a mass “guerrilla” army: agriculture will be mechanised more quickly and less emphasis placed on selfreliance.

While Mao was alive, he accepted that the Chinese would periodically veer in these directions But whenever China appeared to him to be heading too far in the direction of fostering privileged technical or bureaucratic strata, Mao pulled China back to more radical political and social goals. The hanging questions at the moment are whether Mao’s favoured policies have been thrown out along with the “gang of four” and whether China has shifted permanently in a pragmatic, moderate direction. The routing of the gang of four has been followed by widespread purging of other radicals in the party hierarchy and. if Teng Hsiao-ping has his way, they will never regain positions of influence.

How permanent and far-reaching

is China's shift to more moderate policies will only become clear when the position of Hua Kuo-feng becomes clearer His personal inclinations and allegiances are still puzzlingly obscure. What is already clear is that Hua cannot risk exposing himself to the charge of being disloyal to Mao. He owes his position today, at least in part, to Mao's declaration before his death that w’ith Hua in charge he was at ease. It may be Hua who will prevent China swinging too far, in the next few years, from Mao’s fundamental teachings. If this is to be his role, he and Teng Hsiao-ping may balance and complement each other in the manner that Mao and Chou En-lai balanced and complemented each other in the first quarter century of the People’s Republic—one providing theoretical and revolutionary inspiration, the other providing the administrative counter-balance to ensure that economic growth was not too seriously jeopardised by revolutionary fervour.

A struggle between Hua and Teng, combining political and ideological rivalries with strong regional undercurrents, is not impossible: but more likely is a collective leadership within which the two co-operate to the extent needed to preserve China’s unity and to ensure that neither political nor economic goals are placed in jeopardy. Hua has already called for another great leap forward, which brought instantly to mind Mao’s “great leap” of 1958. The leap was economically disastrous in the short run but achieved important social and political goals. The task of governing China, it must be remembered, cannot safely be compared with the task of governing any other country The pragmatic policies of Teng Hsiao-ping appear to offer the best prospect for China’s rapid economic advancement, but too extreme a repudiation of the Maoist mass line and of the principle of collective leadership in which the major currents of feeling in China are represented could spell serious political trouble. The Chinese have been moved too long by the inspiration provided by Mao’s revolutionary vision for any Chinese leader to ignore that vision entirely, even in pursuit of economic progress.