Russian admiral set out to scare West

Press, 6 July 1977, Page 20

Russian admiral set out to scare West

By

STUART McMILLAN

of “The Press”

Although some Western leaders have done more than their share to generate alarm about the Soviet Navy, the Soviet Union has done its bit too. The Com-mander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, has written a series of articles about the Navy which amounted to 54,000 words.

As m. first article said, one of the roles for a Navy is psychological — the use of ships to enforce a naval presence for diplomatic reasons. Admiral Gorshkov scarcely needed any ship- to produce the same effect. His words were enough. Many conclusions have been drawn about Soviet intentions from the Gorshkov a-ticles and the Soviet Union has been seen as challenging the superior position of the Americans at sea. Yet the Navy in the Soviet Union, like the navies of most other countries, has to compete for funds from

the Government. Admiral Gorshkov disposes of such funds as he obtains, but he does not decide on the amount of the funds.

Amon, the most authoritative conclusions drawn from Admiral Gorshkov’s articles were those of the Halifax Soviet Naval Seminar in Canada, in September, 1973. Professor M. MacGwine, convener of the seminar and a former commander in the Royal Navy, summarised the conclusions thus: Gorshkov was considered to be arguing:

1. That the nuclear age has not ended the importance of armed forces as instruments of State policy. 2. That the relative importance of navies as a means of achieving political objects in peace and war is increasing; naval forces are especially capable of demonstrating the economic

and military power of a State, and of projecting

that power in peacetime. 3. A country cannot be a great Power without a strong navy, and history shows that Russia has always suffered when it neglected its Navy.

Which left the question of whether Gorshkov was announcing a new policy or advocating one. The consensus at the seminar was that he was advocating one. It was considered that the rate of construction was not sufficient to support an expansion of naval missions, and that sea denial appeared to be the aim of the Soviet Navy, not something more ambitious.

Geoffrey Jukes, senior fellow in International Relations at the Australian National University, in evidence to an Australian Parliamentary committee on foreign policy last year, also argued that an announcement of that kind would be left to the politicians, and would not have been so

vague that a group of experts could spend almost two days arguing about what the words meant. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from all this is that it makes more sense to regard what Gorshkov said as another attempt, by another member of the armed services, to persuade a government that not enough money is being spent on defence.

The Gorshkov articles were spread over 13 months in 1971 and 1972. Admiral Gorshkov was installed as Commander-in-Chief in 1956. He is considered to be the “architect” of the modern Soviet Navy, but its expansion from a coastal defence fleet to an oceangoing naval power began before his appointment. Expansion of Russian naval power began in the early 1900 s, but was interrupted by the Second World War. It resumed in the late 19405. Then the perceived threat was from American aircraft-carriers. The Soviet

response was to counter these with conventionallypowered submarines and cruisers armed with guns. The heaviest concentration of ships was in the Baltic and the Black Sea, coastal areas closest to vital Soviet centres.

The danger of seaborne invasion was-considered in the mid-19505, to have been replaced by the danger of surprise nuclear attack, possibly from aircraft from carriers, and later from missiles carried by submarines. This caused a reassessment of naval defences and reliance was placed on long-range guided missiles. A vast reorganisation of the Soviet Navy followed. Enter Admiral Gorshkov.

The planning was to meet enemy ships well away from Soviet territory. By the 1960 s the Russians were learning the details of the American Polaris missile and it was decided to establish an anti-submarine capability. Perhaps earlier than 1960 the Russians decided to build their anti-submarine helicopter-carriers. Various adaptations followed as the range of the Polaris missile increased. The need was seen to push the “sea frontiers” further and further away. Deployment of a permanent force in the Mediterranean began in 1964, in the Indian Ocean in 1968, and in the Caribbean in 1969. Russian naval activity also increased in the Atlantic and the western Pacific. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in which the Soviet Union had to back down before American naval power, was also influential in provoking a big Soviet resinee.

In the 1960 s the Soviet Union, realising the undeniable threat of submarines armed with Polaris missiles, began producing its own submarines armed with ballistic missiles as a threat to the United States.

By then, also, the Soviet Union had a considerable Navy which could be used to impress others — and was.

The Soviet Union was at a disadvantage in that it was unable to provide air cover for naval forces far from their bases, which meant that it had to- consider that any battles would be fought relatively close to a shore from whence aircraft could come.

It is still difficult to assess if the carrier, the Kiev, has changed that Basically it carries helicopters, but it can take vertical take-off aircraft which must slow to a few kilometres an hour so that they have almost come to a halt before they land on the deck.

If the Kiev is more than an anti-submarine ship, it changes the pattern of Soviet ship-building since 1966. Until it appeared last year, every surface combat ship since 1966 appears to have had a primary role of anti-submarine warfare.

One other major American development is coming up. After 1980 the Trident, a new submarine strategic missile system, will be introduced. It will mean that the Soviet Union could be attacked from American west coast territorial waters.

This might mean that the United States will withdraw completely from forward deployments. It might also mean that the main reason for Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean —• that of keeping track of American submarines, — will no longer exist.

If the United States decides instead to use the Indian Ocean, Soviet ships will almost certainly sail that ocean in greater numbers. That should give people something to count because the Soviet Ships will almost certainly be closer to Australia than they have been until now.