Power shift in the Kremlin

Press, 31 May 1977, Page 20

Power shift in the Kremlin

Speculation about the sudden removal from high office of President Podgomy, of the Soviet Union, must rest on unsure ground. It is not the habit of Politburo members, now numbering 14, to think aloud; and it has never been the practice of the Kremlin’s ruling triumvirate, Leonid Brezhnev. Alexei Kosygin and (until now) Nikolai Podgomy. to lay any policy cards on the table. Nor it is likely that age has anything to do with the first high-ranking change since Nikita Khrushchev was toppled from the office of First Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964. The average age of Politburo members is 66: Mr Kosygin is 72, Mr Podgorny 73, and Mr Brezhnev had his seventieth birthday last December. The birthday was a notable occasion, in which more honours were heaped on Mr Brezhnev, including the title “Voghd”. meaning “Leader” — an honour which was denied to Mr Khrushchev, and bestowed on Lenin and Stalin only posthumously. But, inevitably, there has been speculation about what might be going on in the Kremlin. One guess, a few months ago, was that Mr Brezhnev might be contemplating adding the Presidency to his major office, following an example set throughout Eastern Europe of combining the party leadership with the post of Head of State. Another theory was that Mr Brezhnev might be preparing to retire, because of failing health. That would seem out of character. He so obviously enjoys the exercise of power, just as he enjoyed the adulation accorded him right throughout his birthday year. A more probable explanation of Mr Podgomy’s

eclipse is that somewhere, in terms of policy, he had come into conflict with majority opinion in the Politburo. Mr Brezhnev had initiated one notable leadership change Instead of making decisions and giving effect to them himself, he had required their prior endorsement, within the Politburo. This meant that in a period of a dozen years there were only three dismissals for challenging the consensus judgment. Mr Podgorny’s may be the fourth.

Whether there is any link between Mr Podgorny’s fall and his recent proselytising tour of southern Africa, raises an interesting question. The Russian leadership has made no secret of its intention to wield, if possible, major influence there. The Kremlin was openly identified with the Marxiststvle liberation movements in GuineaBissau, Angola and Mozambique, and is giving at least moral support to guerrilla harassment in Rhodesia and South-West Africa. In the Russian view, widespread unrest there may hasten its spread to South Africa itself. Was Mr Podgorny accused by the Politburo of having failed to counter BritishAmerican diplomacy for negotiated solutions rather than solutions by force?

If the moderates in the Kremlin were to prevail, Russia’s influence in southern Africa would fade. But if Mr Brezhnev is resolved to increase his efforts to drive a Marxist wedge deeper into Africa, as he plainly is. he may think himself better equipped for the task if virtually all power of decision is concentrated in his own hands.