A.N.Z.U.S. sets limits to defence debate

Press, 25 May 1977, Page 20

A.N.Z.U.S. sets limits to defence debate

STUART McMILLAN of the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty

of “The Press” examines the place

Treaty in New Zealand’s defence policy.

Successive Governments have described A.N.Z.U.S. as the cornerstone of New Zealand’s defence policy. Cornerstone it might be; it also blocks the view . While it may be in the national interest to have A.N.Z.U.S., the long tradition in which New Zealand has been in the position of appearing to woo a protector State obscures the issues at stake.

The debate on defence is a case in point. The defence es + ablishment in New Zealand wants increased defence spending and the main argument it raises is that the country needs to play a credible role in A.N.Z.U.S. The debate is circumscribed by the alliance framework. With this approach. New Zealand appears to put itself in the position of being identified with the interests of the United States. To some people this is almost a denial of New Zealand itself. Such identification seemed to be most marked at the time of the Vietnam war. Those who felt this way considered that it was unhealthy, both for New Zealand and for Australia. At least some American diplomats have come to regard the period in this light. . In fact, it is now official American policy that America’s allies should do more for themselves. The policy is nearly eight years old and was enunciated on Guam by Richard Nixon early in his first term as President.

What needs to be done is to consider the problems of defence, putting national interests first.

It is, nevertheless, possible to believe that and still consider that it would be foolish

10 break with A.N.Z.U.S. at present. There is one major qualification of this: that the Untied States is unlikely to enter another war on the Asian mainland. If it did then consideration of New Zealand’s national interests — New Zealand has to live, as a small country, on the fringes of Asia — might mean that the worth of the American connection would have to be weighed very carefully.

It might, again, be impossible for New Zealand to refuse to join the United States. Although it was membership of the SouthEast Asia Treaty Organisation which was cited time and again as justification for New Zealand’s intervention in Vietnam, many people close to the decision at the time believe it was the American guarantee of New Zealand’s defence under A.N.Z.U.S. which was the deciding factor. Thus, although the A.N.Z.U.S. pact talks about “an armed ’attack in the Pacific area,” New Zealand might again be persuaded into joining the United States to show the flag, almost anywhere in the Pacific basin. One argument sometimes advanced for leaving the alliance is that the United States is an untrustworthy ally, and the finger is pointed at Vietnam. The argument sometimes comes from the Left, but it is fundamentally an argument of the Right, which would not want to give up A.N.Z.U.S. anyway.

It is hard to know what people who believe this really wanted in Vietnam. The United States tore itself apart domestically and economically, and lost many men. What more could it have

done? My impression from American’diplomats and public statements is that Americans are touchv on the subject of their trustworthiness and, if anything, are out to demonstrate it.

Another argument for withdrawing from A.N.Z.U.S. sametimes given is that New Zealand, as part of the alliance, might become the target for a nuclear attack. It is a fundamental question for anyone interested in national interests and survival. But the possibility of nuclear attack seems rather unlikely. New Zealand, unlike Australia, has no installations of importance to the nuclear defence system of the United States and would not warrant a major strike. Nor do I find it credible that New Zealand would be hit because there was an American ship in a port somewhere. In any event, a break with A.N.Z.U.S. would not necessarily appear to others to separate this country from the United States.

Whatever others thought, to New Zealand, the United States, and Australia, the effect of New Zealand’s breaking with A.N.Z.U.S. would be dramatic-—so dramatiic that the move would not be justified. The most dramatic effect would be in Australia where the defence establishment considers A.N.Z.U.S. to be highly important. Australian attitudes on defence are generally much stronger than those of New Zealand appear to be. This is one source of the adverse reaction of many Australian Defence Department officials to the New Zealand proposal, in 1975, for a nuclear-weapon free zone in the South Pacific. If New Zealand broke with

A.N.Z.U.S., one of two things would be likely to happen in Australia. Either Australia would move to a closer association with American interests, or more likely, it would attempt to be selfreliant in defence — nuclear weapons and ail. Australians have already been pondering the implications of the Guam Doctrine and working towards greater self-reliance in defence. Even some Left-wing Australians, who are prepared to renounce the American alliance.

would be prepared to see Australia develop nuclear weapons. New Zealand’s interests would not be served by either of these paths Australia might take. Apart from defence considerations, New Zealand’s over-all relationship with Australia would be harmed, perhaps irrevocably. If I had to single out one compelling reason for not withdrawing from A.N.Z.U.S., the relationship with Australia would be it. None of this is intended

to suggest that absolute reliance should be placed on A.N.Z.U.S. Australians are asking, for instance, whether the United States might decide that its strategic interests did not permit it to take Australia’s side in a conflict with Indonesia. The question has to be asked; planning has to take account of more than one possibility. Notwithstanding _ the argument that A.N.Z.U.S. should be retained because it would be a senseless gesture to give it up, it does not follow that the defence establishment’s argument for increasing defence expenditure to play a credible role in A.N.Z.U.S. is a sound one . Rethinking defence now that the certainties of the 1950 s have gone and the “Holy Wars” of the 1960 s and early 1970 s are lost is an agonising business. Policies become complicated by defence departments everywhere wanting to get their hands on the latest weapons. In Australia, for instance, a lobby exists to acquire the Fl 5 fighter plane, which has the reputation of being marvellously sophisicated, but may be irrelevant to the defence of Australia, however wonderful it is for such tilings as A.N.Z.U.S. exercises . The argument here is exposed to the criticism that what is being advocated is a continuation of New Zealand’s cheap ride in A.N.Z.U.S. It is rather an argument for putting New Zealand interests first and is not an argument, as such, against increased defence spending. It is an argument against automatic increases of defence spending to suit A.N.Z.U.S. In what some observers regard as the absence of any direct threat to New Zealand for the next 15 years or so, it is not a bad time to have a debate on defence.