Kissinger breaks his silence

Press, 24 March 1977, Page 16

Kissinger breaks his silence

By

VICTOR ZORZA

in Princeton, NJ.

What began as a series of informal, off-the-record remarks by Dr Henry Kissinger now appears in this column only because he has agreed, with great reluctance, to be quoted on some of the crucial issues of our time. He was making his first speech since he left office, breaking “an unprecedented silence of 51 days,” said the German Ambassador to the United States, who introduced him to a group of leading politicians and opinion makers attending the American-German Conference at Princeton last week-end.

The “hermit of Acapulco,” as Dr Kissinger was introduced to the assembly, was persuaded to allow the quoting of his remarks only by the argument that this might promote national unity at a time when the East-West situation was becoming increasingly complicated. Indeed, he had prefaced his remarks with the observation that it would not be right for him to be making public statements on foreign policy, especially at a time when a new Administration has been in oower for only a few weeks. This was the first Administration in 16 years, he noted, after the turmoil of war, assassination, and Presidential resignation, which had a chance to conduct the operation of government in a normal fashion. He also believes that it is of great importance that the Carter Administration should succeed. “We all have a stake in its success.”

Those who heard Dr Kissinger speak in his days

of power often heard him ask for compassion and understanding in their attitude toward what he was attempting to do. He may have changed his tune now, but not the words. “I ask for compassion and understanding,” he says, “in a situation which any new Administration is bound to face as it takes over the machinery of government.” He takes a charitable view of claims that this Administration would conduct its affairs in stark contrast to the previous Administration. When he had first got into office, he savs with a chuckle, “I said exactly the same thing.” Washington is full of stories, some of them more true than others, about the confusion, the inefficiency, and the delays which afflict the operations of the White House these days. But Dr Kissinger’s charity extends

even to that. “The beginning of this process is alw’ays complicated,” he recalls with almost a hint of nostalgia. Nor is the end of the process, so far as the involvement of the United States in the global turmoil is concerned, within sight. “We are in a proces without end and without respite,” and without apocalyptic solutions to look forward to. Ever since the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the United States had believed that it could involve itself in foreign affairs when it chose, and even its involvement in Europe after World War 11, launched with the massive application of the resources then available to it, was

undertaken with a terminal date in mind.

But now the United States had to develop a permanent understanding of its interests as other nations had been compelled to do. And this understanding could not be changed by each succeeding Administration “because it either represents reality or it doesn’t.” Dr Kissinger was careful not to involve himself, even when speaking off the record, in the current debates about the Kremlin’s supposed quest for military superiority; but he did discuss the broader issues of what he calls “the inequality of power,” in the historical and philosophical vein so characteristic of him. A balance of power is necessary, he says, because without it there can be no relaxation of tension. In the absence of a balance, if an inequality of power develops, “this may encourage aggression."

World War I, however, was not brought about by the inequality of power, “but despite an equality of power which obtained at the time.” What Dr Kissinger is saying, in effect, is that the equality of power can give the leaders of nations a false sense of security. At the beginning of July, 1914, recalled Kissinger the historian, the leaders of the nations that were about to fight a world war had all gone on holiday — except, he added with another chuckle, the Austrians. “Not a single political leader expected anything . . . World War I came because they understood nothing but the elements of strength.” It came because the leaders of

nations had lost control over the military decisions. But could not the Russians of today be the Austrians of 1914? Dr Kissinger is not unaware of the dangers. The Soviet Union is an ideological State, "whose ideology is hostile to other States,” and incompatible with other ideologies. It is a bureaucratic State which “does not operate on the basis of unpredictability, risking all on the throw of the dice.” However, it goes on accumulating power, because it is not overly imaginative about what else to do in the field of international relations — “But one day that power could be used' to the disadvantage of the West.” But, having said that, he returned to the old argument about the new facts of power in the nuclear age, an argument which had gone on for two decades, and on which he claimed to speak with some authority, he said with a selfdeprecating smile, because he had participated in it throughout that period, “sometimes on both sides.” No leaders had ever had it in their hands to destroy all life on earth, he said. No leaders had ever had to face a decision of this kind. Dr Kissinger was not calling for the dismantling, even in the long run, of nuclear weapons systems, as President Carter had done. What he was saying was that it would be to the disadvantage of the West to fall behind “in each category of weapons.” This means that he would allow the Kremlin to be ahead in some categories provided that the West retained an edge in others.

Arms control experts believe that it is now quite impossible to have complete symmetry’ between East and West in all classes of weapons, and that a way must be found to allow each side to develop a mix of weapons which satisfies its own security needs without threatening the other side. The proposition seems simple enough. Is it beyond human ingenuity to accomplish this purpose? This is what tin debate was about during the Kissinger era, and this is what the debate is about now.

Dr Kissinger’s remarks focus the debate once again on the central issues which appear to have got lost lately in the heat of the argument about the new Administration’s attitudes and personalities. It is time to get back to essentials.—(Copyright, 1977 — Victor Zorza.)