Carter diplomacy: a new grand design

Press, 30 December 1976, Page 10

Carter diplomacy: a new grand design

By

VICTOR ZORZA

l in Washington

Suddenly, everybody’ is talking about the prospects of a Chinese-Soviet rapprochement. Only a year ago the very possibility of it was laughed" out of court. Now’ the argument is no longer about whether a rapprochement might occur, but how to prevent it. The question which few’ people ask. however, is why the West should try to prevent it. Wouldn’t the whole world stand to gain from a lessening of tensions between China and Russia? The Wash-ington-Moscow-Peking triangle. which became part of the Nixon-Kissinger "grand design.” was built on the unrelenting hostility of China and the Soviet Union As the Carter team begins to draw up its own grand design, should it not seek to develop a new concept — a detente triangle? It is not something that would come naturally to Mr Zbigniew Brezinski. Mr Carter's national security adviser, who has often stressed the benefits derived by the United States from continuing Chinese-Soviet hostility. When hostility between Russia and China was one of the main facts of international life. Dr Kissinger could easily maintain, as he often did, that it was not for the United

States to Interfere — which was a diplomatic way of saving. let them stew in their own juice. This was one of the few aspects of Dr Kissinger’s policy which met with Mr Brezinski’s -approval.

Those who advocate ' a policy of strict non-interven-tion in the Chinese-Soviet dispute maintain that Peking will consult its own best interests and will act accordingly. In their view, any attempts by the United States to interfere in order to keep the dispute alive would be counter-productive. It might push Peking further into Russian arms instead of keeping it out of them.

The contrary view, that the United States should work against a rapprochement, is ably presented in a paper by Professor Donald Zagoria distributed recently bv Columbia University’s Research Institute on International Change of which Mr Brezinski happens to be the head. Professor Zagoria's views obviously do not commit Mr Brezinski in any way, but the two. men have been associated at Columbia for a number of years. Whether this means anything only the future will show.

Professor Zagoria lists the

benefits derived by the United States from the ChineseSoviet dispute. Militarily, he says, half of the Soviet Armed Forces are tied down on the Chinese border, which gives Moscow a strong incentive to avoid a crisis in the West, Ideologically, Peking is challenging Moscow’ in the Third World and in the international Communist movement. Politically Moscow must contend with the virulent, worldwide campaign against Soviet influence. Diplomatically, the

dispute has given Washington diplomatic leverage against Moscow — something that Mr Brezinski himself has also stressed on a number of occasions.

Professor Zagoria's recommendation is that, to preserve these advantages. Washington should "tilt” toward Peking by accelerating the process of normalisation with China, He believes that a formula could be found which would preserve the independence of Taiwan without compromising Peking’s claim to sovereignty over the island. He says that while United States arms should not be sold "directly” to China. Washington should facilitate such sales by allies.

Professor Zagoria’s argument deserves serious attention, so far as it goes, but in my view it does not go far enough. If the Carter plan tor restructuring the world order implicit in his campaign speeches is more than pre-election rhetoric — and I believe it is — then it cannot be accomplished without bringing both Russia and China into it. But he will not be able to bring them into it if they remain at odds. An important part of the Cartelgrand design, which was so signally lacking from the Nixon plan, is the recognition of the needs of the

less developed countries-, and of their role in a new world order. This requires a new framework of inter-

national relations which can-not-be devised by’ the United States alone.

Both Russia and China ould have to be brought in-

to it if the structure is to have any stability. Attempts at strategic arms limitation between the United States and Russia will be increasingly bedevilled by- China's

growing nuclear arsenal, unless Peking is brought into the S.A.L.T. negotiations. There are many other Areas in which a Sino-Soviet reconciliation could promote international co-operation and stability rather than detract from it. On the other hand, however. too rapid a development of Chinese-Soviet detente would certainly d* prive Washington of some of ihe most important dipin mafic cards which Kissinger has used so ablv in the past. For the first year or two th* new Administration will need all the cards it can get for the "tough" negotiations which Carter has promised to conduct with the Kremlin What this analysis suggsests therefore, is that in the short run the Carter Administration may wish to use th* many means available to it to slow down and to limit the extent of the Chinese Soviet rapprochment which is now in the making But it should be clear in its own mind, ami it should make it clear to others, that this is simply a holding operation, and that its ultimate aim is a detente triangl* from which both Russia and China could benefit — to sav nothing of the United States and the rest of the world. (c) 1976, Victor Zorza