Britain holds key to Rhodesian deadlock

Press, 17 December 1976, Page 12

Britain holds key to Rhodesian deadlock

The Geneva talks on the future of Rhodesia have been adjourned until January 17. This article, reprinted from the “Economist,” London, was published just before the talks ended. It argues that Britain will have to play a much larger role in establishing an interim government in Rhodesia.

Six weeks, half a decision. If the pace and productivity of the Geneva talks on the future of Rhodesia do not increase sharply, even the single issue on which tentative agreement has been reached — the date of independence — will be in jeopardy. Can outsiders help to get things moving? Dr Kissinger, who first cajoled the participants to the conference table, believes so. And although the conference chairman, Mr Ivor Richard, took no shining new plan back to Geneva after his talks in London last week, Britain has already decided, reluctantly, that it will have to forsake stand-offishness for a “direct role” in the interim government that launches the new state of Zimbabwe.

This was something that all the black groups favoured, and although the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, evidently believing that one U-turn deserves another, has now said he is against it, it

does seem that Britain will have to get involved. Mr lan Smith, the Rhodesian leader, will not like it but, as he hinted recently before returning to Geneva from Rhodesia, he will probably accept it in the end. The issues unresolved are the nature of Britain’s role and the moment at which the Government can best spell out what it is prepared to do.

Britain could send an official who would in effect be a governor-general, whatever title he is in fact given. He would have to hold powers of veto over the actions of the ministers in this interim government, though he would know that the veto could be sustained only by his moral authority. Britain could provide a chief of staff for the Rhodesian army but it cannot send troops; if an outside force were called for, it would best be a Commonwealth one.

This interim government will be short-lived. Its most

important tasks will be to draw up a constitution and to organise elections. One question is the willingness of the Rhodesian army to support this process. The evidence is that it probably will. But its loyalty would certainly be put to the test if guerrilla war continued during the period of transition.

The best way of avoiding that is to win an agreement that has the backing of as many as possible of the parties concerned, including the guerrillas. Such backing will not be given to any agreement that keeps the two ministries of defence and law and order in the hands of Mr Smith’s Rhodesian Front. So Britain will have to ensure that those portfolios go to men acceptable to both sides — perhaps Rhodesian whites like the former Prime Minister, Mr Garfield Todd, or officials from Commonwealth countries acceptable to both blacks and whites.

The structure of the government will be difficult to work out. The blacks were never happy with Dr Kissinger’s proposals and even Mr Smith seems to be preparing the way to negotiate on the basis of something

other than the formula of a council of state and a council of ministers. But the blacks will find it hard to agree among themselves on the proportionate strength of each faction in the government, however it may be designed. This matter would be eas-

ler to settle if the leaders present at Geneva would agree to stay out. They would be well advised to do so: it would give them greater freedom to campaign for election to the more important post-independence government.

Bishop Muzorewa’s African National Council whose popularity in Rhodesia has been demonstrated this month wants elections to choose the head of the interim administration and the allocation of ministries.

But the groups that draw most of their strength from the guerrillas reckon they would not be free to campaign and, even if they were, they would probably fare poorly. If the blacks prove unable to reach a decision among themselves, it may be necessary for Britain to take the initiative and allocate posts and responsibilities on the basis of its own calculations and soundings.

That could require the Foreign Secretary (Mr Crosland) to stir his stumps, go to Africa and talk to the presidents of the African countries most concerned. But it would be preferable to give the black groups at Geneva time to work out

among themselves the framework of a government that each could accept: this Britain would then have to sell to Mr Smith. If. however, when the conference adjourns, no joint proposition has been put, Britain should spell out more clearly what part it is prepared to play. The danger in waiting even that long to try to break the logjam is that the black groups may drift not closer but farther apart and that Mr Smith may be provoked into pulling out. He stands little chance of gaining international acceptance by withdrawing from the talks. But his troops are at present giving the guerrillas a bloody nose and, with South Africa’s help, Rhodesia could probably live in a state of siege for some years yet.

Some guerrilla leaders might not mind that. There is little doubt that victory would be theirs in the end, courtesy perhaps of Russia or Cuba. The dangers in that course of events far outweigh the dangers, real though they are, that come with Britain’s limited acceptance of responsibility without power in Rhodesia. It is the only way forward.