THE PRESS SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1976. Yugoslavia after Tito

Press, 18 September 1976, Page 10

THE PRESS SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1976. Yugoslavia after Tito

“Diplomatic” illnesses are a conventional means of avoiding, or seeking to avoid, the consequences of what may be awkward diplomatic associations, temporary or otherwise. Thus the illness used to explain or. perhaps, excuse the postponement of a visit by President d’Estaing. of France, to Belgrade, hard on the heels of one by President Ceausescu, of Rumania, may raise some eyebrows in the chancelleries of the Western world. Marshal Josip Broz Tito may well be ailing: it would be surprising if he were not. at the age of 84. considering the strains, physical and mental, to which he has been subjected since he became Yugoslavia’s first Communist Prime Minister in 1945. Tito was fairly called the “ fir«t true Yugoslav ” when he managed to weld together the diverse religious, cultural, and political groups of people who now form his country. He is a Yugoslav bv birth: but it is not to be forgotten that in the First World War he served with the Austro-Hungarian army that, as a Russian prisoner, he embraced communism and took part in the 1917 revolution: and that he was later the organiser of the partisan forces which took over the government of his country after the collapse of the Axis Powers. Tito led Yugoslavia out of the Russian orbit and set the republic on a middle course, which has meant friendly association with both East and West. He has resolutely rejected satellite status.

Now it seems the time has come, as ft has in China because of the death of Mao Tse-tung. when the Yugoslavs, like the Chinese, may be wondering about the future. Tito’s departure as leader may not be long delayed. Furthermore, the unity of Yugoslavia, which he achieved partly as a response to German occupation of the Balkans, is now under strain. The recent hijacking of an American airliner, as a political gesture, by a group of Croatian nationalists, was one more reminder of

the divisions which are besetting Yugoslavia, and which Moscow’ is doing its best to exploit in the hope of bringing both Yugoslavia and Albania back into the fold of Marxist-Leninism as defined by Moscow.

Tito himself has been accused lately of introducing repressive laws to reinforce the authority of the State. It is said that there are increasing signs in Yugoslavia of a return to Marxist conformity. The Russians are working actively towards that end through antiTito groups now established in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself. The Russians also have allies in a hard core of dissidents inside Yugoslavia, reckoned to number about 20,000, w’ho are awaiting an opportunity to strike when the old Marshal dies.

Such threats no doubt explain Tito’s new sensitiveness to political subversion. He may fear that, after his death, the Russians will openly seek to regain control of both government and dogma in the Balkan region. It is not doubted in. the West that this is a major aim of Kremlin diplomacy, accounting for its sunport of anti-Tito movements in Kiev, Prague, and Budapest, and in Yugoslavia itself. Two years ago, Tito publicly made such charges. There have been reports, attributed to a defecting Czechoslovakian army officer, of the existence of a plan for the invasion of Yugoslavia through Austria, using Czech forces, with the object of acquiring Russian access to the Adriatic, as a gateway to the Mediterranean. Time will show’ whether these reports have any basis in fact. They may be an invention to bolster Yugoslav unity. But there seems no reason to doubt the stated aim of the so-called League of Communists of Yugoslavia, whose programme calls for a return to the Soviet bloc in the name of “ proletarian internationalism ”, Fears for a revival of Balkan disturbance after Tito thus seem to be well founded.