Divided opinion about Carter in Moscow

Press, 16 September 1976, Page 20

Divided opinion about Carter in Moscow

By

VICTOR ZORZA

k in Washington

The Soviet press has been speaking about Jimmy Carter with two voices, which may reflect two distinct and even opposed views in the Kremlin. “Pravda” has denounced his talk of using economic pressure against the Soviet Union as an “attempt to interfere in Soviet internal affairs.” Mr Carter had warned Moscow that if it embarked on further Angolatype adventures, he would respond with a “total withholding of trade.” To “Pravda”, this meant that Mr Carter wants to put economic pressure on the Soviet Union in “order to promote American foreign policy objectives.” Soviet newspapers have repeatedly described Mr Carter’s foreign policy remarks as “contradictory.” He said he was for peace, the Moscow “New Times” noted, but he wanted to achieve this by a “demonstration of strength,” not just by good will.

He was for the easing of tension, said “Pravda,” but he also wanted to “talk tough’-’ to the Soviet Union, and to increase United Stated military power. The impression conveyed by these comments was that

the., Kremlin would prefer President Ford to Mr Carter, as it preferred Nixon to McGovern.

The other Soviet view, however, is that the real Mr Carter is not as bellicose as some of his public remarks might suggest. It was the Democratic Party platform, said a Moscow radio commentator, that was “contradictory,” but Mr Carter himself had “repeatedly emphasised” his “firm intention” to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Taken as a whole, he said, Mr Carter had put forward “quite a positive” foreign policy programme — a startling contradiction, it would seem, with the .views of “Pravda.” As for Mr Carter’s own contradictions, the “New Times” explained, they were due to electioneering considerations, which made it necessary for him to take a harder line in public. But these were merely “superficialities and expediencies,” while Mr Carter himself was, in fact, “inclined towards realistic posi-. tions on fore’„ . policy.”

Which of, these two views represents Moscow’s real judgment? One of the rules of Kremlinology is that if two contradictory views are expressed in the Soviet

press, then the Kremlin itself is probably divided on the issue.

This impression is strengthened by some of the questions which the Kremlin’s own “Washingtpnologists” have lately been asking. They want to know why some “anti-Soviet” remarks made by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski last year, long before he began to be talked about as a possible secretary of State in a Carter Administration, have been cut from a newly published book. The omission may even incline them to the view that Dr Brzezinski may well have changed his spots, that he is no longer America’s “anti-Communist ideologist no. 1” as he used to be described in the Soviet press. And if that were so, then the foreign policy of a Carter Administration might be less anti-Soviet than Dr Brzezinski’s pronouncements had led Moscow to expect. Dr Brzezinski’s hard-line view on detente, and on how the power of the United States should be used to force the Kremlin to liberalise its policies, was set out at great length in an interview broadcast last year by Radio Free Europe. It was published recently in a book edited by George Urban, called “Detente,” which brings together the views of some of the West’s leading foreign policy experts.

The book, published in the United States and in Britain, seems to have been studied very closely in Moscow, where Dr Brzezinski’s original broadcast has evidently been compared with' the later version.

What is missing from the book is Dr Brzezinski’s support of the-Jackson Amendment, and his expression of regret that the Administration had not pressed for the kind of concessions that Senator Jackson had demanded from the Russians. “I have no doubt,” he said in the original version, “that

the Russians are amenable to pressure on many other and more important issues too. But we must summon up the will to exert pressure.”

This too is missing from the book version, and 'it is no wonder that the Soviet analvsts should wonder what the ' policy impications of these omissions may be. They are as inclined to read between the lines of Western statements as Kremlnologists are to read between the lines of “Pravda.” The only person who could answer their questions is Dr Brzezinski, but, when asked, he says with a laugh that he is not particularly anxious, just now, “to do their intelligence analysis for them,” and to clarify the points that puzzle them. “Let them speculate if they want.”

He does say that the cuts were made by (he book’s editor, who confirms this. It is also true that the published text retains a great deal of what is most objectionable to the Kremlin, especially where he advocates pressure on Moscow to force internal changes in the Soviet system. There are those in Moscow who believe that Mr Carter’s Own calls for the use of pressure in dealing with the Soviet Union mean that a Carter Administration will seek to force such internal change.

When asked about this, Dr Brzezinski is far l.ss categorical than he used to be about the need to exert direct pressure on the Kremlin to produce major and far-reaching changes in the system. He speaks of “an extremely slow and difficult process.” In his own meetings with the Russians, he says, he argues that the closer EastWest relations he favours “will inevitably produce changes both in us and in them.” They find this more acceptable than the harsher language of some of his writings. It is a theme that Mr Carter may find it necessary to take up himself.

An American foreign policy designed to change the Soviet system may or may not achieve its objective — but the Kremlin is still so insecure about the permanence of the system, so sensitive about its deficiencies, as to be greatly alarmed by any attempt to “interfere in Soviet interna! affairs.”

If it believes that Mr Carter as President may do so, it would be prepared to pay almost any price to prevent it, and to help President Ford win the election by making to hi/.; the concessions that would show the Ford-Kissinger foreign policy to be a spectacular success.

(C) 1976, Victor Zorza.