S.I.S. policy changes urged by Ombudsman

Press, 7 August 1976, Page 2

S.I.S. policy changes urged by Ombudsman

PA Wellington A security intelligence sen ice is needed in New Zealand, and the surveillance of known or suspected espionage activities is of the highest national ini|»ortance. says the report on the Security Intelligence Service by the Chief Ombudsman (Sir Guy Powies). The report was tabbed in Pari -iment yesterdav h\ the Speak e. (Sir Roy Jack). The oH.uirv was instigated by .he then Prime Minister (Mr R va! ng). in August last year, »r.r in the terms of refererci Sir Guv was told he cot Id make a report to Parlumeni "as you think fit.” A confidential report has beer given to the pres? it Prime Minister (Mr Muldoon) Sir Guv said the service was tost ified. and was acting in conformity with its statute in keeping under close scrutiny the activities of organisat'c.ns (and their members) which pursued political doctrines calling for the revolutionary overthrow of the State. The service was also justified in informing itself about organisations that existed separately but had fallen under a substantial degr*e of subversive influence. Sir Guy recommended that the priorities attached by the service to espionage, subversion and terrorism be reconsidered in consultation with the Intelligence Council, won the object of allotting higher priorities to espionage and terrorism and lower priorities to subversion. The report said the service had to continue to be able to receive information

from sources, generally in the manner in which it had done so in the past, and which seemed basically sound. However. Sir Guy said nc would recommend that any university student sources should not be required to supply the sendee with information relating to activities within the precincts of a university. “Vetting.” the term given to ifo-cribe inquiries made bv the S.i.S. as to the trustworthiness of people employed, or whom it was proposed to employ, in Government departments, should be continued, subject to modifications. These were: That consideration be given to an examination of the principles and practice of classification of information for security purposes within Government departments. That the practice of Government departments in requesting initial and subsequent vetting of employees b? reviewed, with the object of securing greater uniformity. That the subjects of name checking and normal vetting should normally be informed that this was being done. That an unclassified document be issued within the State services, setting out as far as practicable the manner in which vetting was done. That the service be more ready to interview the subject of vetting at vetting stages, and particularly when a qualified or negative opinion was indicated. That where possible the service disclose to the department the reasons for qualified or negative clearance. That the criteria for trust-1 worthiness should be re-1 considered with a view to! ensuring that they include specific reference; to convictions and types of conduct indicating untrustworthiness and un-|

satisfactory performance of employment. [That the criteria should be i reconsidered with a view to inserting an express indication that less weight should be given to incidents which had occurred during the youth of the subject of the vetting and that in such cases it would be desirable to interview the person concerned or obtain further positive evidence about his present attitudes and activities. That, on the completion of vetting procedure, the . subject should be notified of his rights of appeal. That any person who had been vetted should be notified of the opinion formed as to his trustworthiness. In the case of! I a negative or qualified; opinion the reasons on which the opinion was based should be stated. If the Director of Security was of the view that compliance in whole or in part of the recommendation would involve disclosing confidential sources, he should notify the Commissioner of Security Appeals, who would then decide how much of the requireIment should be complied i with. ■ Sir Guy said the question [of intercepting communication, including telephone communications, needed urgent attention. He recommended that the Minister in charge of the service issue a warrant for any such interception if he was satisfied by the director or an officer on oath that such interception was necessary for security reasons. He recommended appointing the director to the Intelligence Council, and amending the council’s terms of reference to include internal! as well as external inteili-l gence. He said consultations! should be held at Ministerial! level between the service and; the police to improve work-1 ing relations both generally! and specifically, in relation; to terrorism. Consultations! should also be held to in-

[elude other interested Gov jernment agencies, such as th< [Ministry of Defence and the [Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the objective of deter mining clear lines of respon sibility for counter-terrorism Sir Guy said the notior that New Zealand had nc secrets of sufficient importance to warrant any special steps Jo guard them from unauthorised publication or espionage was a “wholly untenable proposition.” "Some examples of things which. in our national interest, we would obviously want to keep to ourselves, are our attitudes in out [economic negotiations anc bargainings throughout the ; world, our attitudes in out political contacts with othet (nations, our attitudes with [reference to the development [of some of our crucial raw (materials, elements of our military posture and capability, and so on.” Sir Guy said the service had advised him that about 10 per cent of its work in counter-subversion was concerned with protest groups. The sendee had opened personal files on a number of people engaged in political protest activities, which suggested that they might conceivably in future become subversives, or become a (target for subversives. “Officers of the service a.e better trained now, they have a greater degree of political sophistication, and they are more cautious in drawing a conclusion that a particular individual or orgajiisation has entered the ranks of the subversive.” Sir Guy said. He had been impressed by submissions “made to me by moderate and sensible people” concerned that suspicion of the service had, and was continuing to have, an inhibiting effect on free expression of political views in [New Zealand. j Consequently, he said, he. [would recommend that no [intelligence should be obtained about any person or [body which was not actually (engaged in espionage, sabotage, or subversion unless the advice of the Intelligence Council had been obtained.