N.A.T.O. keeps ahead of Warsaw Pact

Press, 29 July 1976, Page 9

N.A.T.O. keeps ahead of Warsaw Pact

By

DAVID HAWORTH.

of

the Observer Foreign News Service

Brussels The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation believes it can still maintain a technological advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries, despite the steady increase in Soviet arms production over the last three years. The economies of most N.A.T.O. member countries beginning to improve, governments seem better disposed towards additional defence expenditure. Defence planners in Brussels have taken heart that United States expenditure on its armed forces is to be increased this year by between 7 and 9 per cent in real

terms, and that only Britain has announced any intention of cutting defence costs. It is evident that the alliance has - been alarmed by the advantage the Soviet Union took during the last three years of recession in the West to increase the pace of the arms race. The Warsaw Pact nations maintained their armaments production during this period —despite their participation in the on-going mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna and also, of course, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.) between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless. N.A.T.O. headquarters officials feel that if member countries can meet their commitments set

out in the force plans, the alliance can maintain a lead over the Warsaw Pact’s arsenal or at least keep pace with its reinforcement. And, as mentioned, the technological “edge” still belongs to the West. But there is a continuing anxiety in N.A.T.O. circles about the alliance’s capacity to respond speedily to any pre-emptive strike by the Warsaw Pact. If, for example, the Soviet Union decided to slice off the northernmost part of Norway to give it access to an Atlantic seaboard bow, could the alliance as a whole rush reinforcements to the Norwegian forces?

A recent N.A.T.O. report suggested that the United States could not increase the strength of its current division strength in Europe to any substantial degree during the first 30 days of conflict in Europe. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union could more than double its divisions in the “central theatre” in the same period. The United States and its allies have, therefore, been focusing on what they call the “reinforcement lag,” and the new force goals laid down for the alliance members are designed to make up some of the weaknesses which are inevitably caused by the logistical problems of the Atlantic.

The study stressed that it should be a primary United States goal “to ensure the earlier arrival of reinforcement forces in Europe.” It also pointed out the need to obtain more time by improvements in anti-tank sysiterns, electronic warfare, and I tactical air power. Another aspect of this same need is the prestockpiling of equipment in Europe for use by United States forces when they arrive in any emergency. Some materials have already been

placed in Germany for this purpose. Also, Norway is taking steps to store equipment in her northern regions for southern-based forces from other alliance members or for use by United States reinforcements.

While such moves are. as defence planners in Brussels put it, “all to the good,” they certainly represent a response to the pace of Warsaw Pact armament—which according to intelligence reports has been developing faster than was anticipated even a few months ago. The new .force targets do not, however, overcome the main political-strategic dilemma the alliance has always faced. As it relies soj heavily on a nuclear re-i sponse to any Soviet aggression using conventional forces against Europe, at| what point of escalation will! the N.A.T.O. nuclear arm be deployed?

No one in N.A.T.O. seems to know how the alliance should react if the WarsawPaet nations were to “take out.” say, Finland or Austria. Both are neutral countries which are not alliance members, but if either were to fall under Soviet military domination, the strategic consequences for N.A.T.O. could be crucial. Will the nuclear deterrent be deployed against the Warsaw Pact only if the territory of an alliance member is violated? Not even this is clear, for it is possible (to use the Norwegian example once more) that N.A.T.O. might decide not to risk a Third World War over a limited land grab bv the Russians. In other words, would the United States take the same view of such a manoeuvre by the Soviet Army as they did about Moscow’s intended positioning of missiles on Cuba? The answer is probably negative.