China after Mao’s death

Press, 22 July 1976, Page 16

China after Mao’s death

By

VICTOR ZORZA

The impending death of Mao Tse-tung is beginning to be discussed in e Peking press — not openly, of course, but between the lines.

This, at least, is the impression conveyed by an article in “Red Flag,” the party’s ideological journal, which called for a purge of “those in power within the party taking the capitalist road.” and then added that the party had carried out such purges under Mao. and would go on doing so — presumably after Mao. “Over many years,” it says, “undei the correct leadership of Chairman Mao, our' party has acted in this way, and will continue to act in this way.” For a long time Western analysts found it difficult to accept that the Chinese press was controlled, in the main, by the radicals, while the country's administration was controlled by the moderates, and that the radicals were challenging the moderates for the control of the country. But after the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping, China’s top administrator, at th. beginning of the year, it was at last accepted that the campaign waged between ->e lines of the press against

certain allegorical figures had indeed been directed against Teng. Recent history is repeating itself. There is reason to believe that the campaign now being waged in the press against “capitalist readers” is aimed at the Prime Minister, Hua K u-feng — even though he acts at the sam: time as the country’s top administrator, delivering authoritative speeches and conferring with foreign leaders. Hua was con rmed in the post of Prime Minister onlv after the Peking riots brought about Teng’s final downfall. Teng was accused of engineering the riots in order to regain power, but it now seems that the radicals may have been compelled to withdraw this accusation. The most outspoken of the radical journals, called Study and Criticism, now concedes that Teng “might probably not have been acquainted with the desperadoes w’ho were playing with fire in the Peking riots.” It is difficult to see what could have compelled the radicals to withdraw the key accusation against Teng. One possibility is that an internal leadership . inquiry has cleared Teng of this particular charge. The political charges against him have certainly not been withdrawn, and

Study and Criticism insists, as does the rest of the press, that Teng was acting in the interest of both “counter-revolutionary elements” and “high officials” in the party who had taken the capitalist road. 'ndeed, the continuing campaign against these “high officials,” who remain unnamed, provides a number of clues suggesting that Prime Minister Hua is one of them.

For one thing, there is a consistent effort to make it appear that these officials are still to be found at the very top of the party hierarchy. For another, some of the charges made against them seem to be aimed specifically at Hua.

The latest press campaign, for instance, is directed against those who want a “ r ectification” camp?’™ that is, a purge of party members. It so happens that in a speech Hua made last October he called for just such a “rectification,” making it clear that what he really wanted w;,.. a .rge or the more radical* elements.

Another press campaign condemns “high officials” who oppose the use of the urban militia, which is the radicals’ private army, for public security duties. It so happens that Hua, who was

the Minister of Public Security before he became Prime Minister, and who still retains control of the Ministry, fought hard to prevent the radicals and the militia from taking over the security duties performed by his men. It was Hua’s control of the Ministry of Public Security which provided the power base that enabled him to rise to Prime Minister. Both factions are jockeying for the best position at the moment of Mao’s death, and their manoeuvring on such issues as the militia and the purge is designed by them to grasp more power for a possible showdown.

The policy issues in the struggle between the radicals and the moderates are real enough, but they have been overlaid for the time being by the struggle for brute power. In order to carry out the policies they favour, they have to secure the succession first.

But there is a third power centre, the military. They are in the best position tj form a transitional regime when Mao goes — unless their own deep divisions cause them to take sides in a political struggle that could lead to civil war. Copyright 1976, Victro Zorza