Mercenaries could tip balance

Press, Volume CXVI, Issue 34072, 9 February 1976, Page 15

Mercenaries could tip balance

t.V Z.P .4 -Reuter—Copyright) . CAPE TOWN. . February 8. Mercenary forces could w ell swing the tide of battle in Angola, according to Government sources in Cape Town.

Even a few score of these! much-reviled white soldiers of fortune, now reported en route to the civil war from Britain to join others from i South Africa, Mozambique and Angola itself, could help stem the advance of the Soviet-backed and Cuban-led Popular Movement (M.P.L.A.) forces now poised to smash the remaining opposition. Better still would be the intervention by the United States in the form of arms supplies to the beleaguered F.N.L.A. (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and Unita (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) movements, the sources add. But failing that, a mere force of 200 mercenaries capable of using the sophisticated weaponry which Unita and F.N.L.A. are known to have on the sidelines — but which their own ill-trained forces cannot deploy — could change the whole course of events in war-tom Angola, the sources say.

In the aftermath of South Africa’s withdrawal from the battle zones in Angola, Government Ministers, speaking privately, say they are perturbed rather than pessimistic at the situation there. They are relucant to talk about suggestions that South Africa only went into battle in the first place because it had been assured of active s ipport bv the United States. As one top source put it. “1 do not wish to discuss other countries’ involvements or

pledges that they failed tOf fulfil.” ii

The sources are adamant i that South Africa’s Angolan! exploit has not damaged its’ policy of detente in black i Africa. The Prime Minister ! (Mr John Vorster) told Par-1 liament that he thought this; policy had, in fact, been en- [ hanced.

But this is psychologically the wrong moment, for all concerned, to pursue detente openly, black Africa is deeply divided by the Angolan conflict, and agreement with white South Africa could, at this stage, prove counter-productive, the sources say.

Nevertheless, even newly independent Mozambique, which has been clamorous in support of the M.P.L.A., has not chosen to sour its relations with South Africa. Said one Government man: “At the moment, we have been getting on better with Frelimo (the Marxist-style ruling party) in Mozambique than we ever did with the Portuguese when relations were at their best.”

Since independence some 20.000 more Mozambicans have come to work in South African mines, and Frelimo has even helped build the long steel fence now winding along South Africa’s eastern border with Mozambique. The fence is described as [elephant-proof, but it’s not only meant to keep the wild game in South Africa’s Kruger Park — its other function to keep out guerrillas.

Frelimo. these sources say, i could have cut Rhodesia’s trade lifelines to the sea after Mozambique's independence last June, but it chose not to. Now. some 10,000 (tons of goods a day are car■ried on the railway lines to Beira and Maputo (formerly Lourenco Marques), including traffic from South

,Africa, and Frelimo reaps a! good reward. i So, for the moment,' I South Africa sees the main 'threat in Angola. And, according to the ; sources in Cape Town, it isees no chance of the i'M.P.L.A. agreeing to a parItition of that country to allow Unita control of the j southern part. The Soviet I Union would not pennit that, they say, and it would set too much of a precedent for ! potential breakaway movements in the rest of black Africa. . If the M.P.L.A. wins the !present conventional war, it !can expect to face guerrilla! i warfare of the type the! !Angolan nationalists waged! against the Portuguese for so I long, the sources say. It is! 'not thought that the M.P.L.A. I could occupy and control all iof the tribally hostile terrijtory loyal to Unita and {the F.N.L.A. Hit-and-run attacks would I be the order of the day. A {long war would be in prosipect. Already, armed deserters from ali sides in the civil {war are causing problems for i Zambia in her border region {with Angola, the sources say. ! South Africa does not

think there is much chanceof the M.P.L.A. agreeing to] protect the important hydroelectric scheme near the border with South-West Africa (Namibia), thus allowing South Africa to withdraw its troops altogether from Angola. This might have been possible before South Africa intervened in the war chasing the M.P.L.A. far back towards Luanda. But not now, the sources say. If it comes to the crunch, and the Cuban-led M.P.L.A. forces press on south through “Unitaland.” South Africa will make its stand at the Calueque Dam. some 2C miles inside Angola, that feeds the hydro-electric project. sources say. Of immediate concern tc the Government, now that it has pulled back, is the refugee situation developing ir the south of Angola. At the moment. South Africa is feeding some 200( refugees in two camps ir i southern Angola. There arc no refugee camps in South • West Africa. i The sources say the Gov ernment fears that if it allowed refugees into South West Africa, there could be

<a sudden mass influx as the: [M.P.L.A. strikes south. j I The flow could be 50.000: or 60.000 a week, and total) more than half a million. Many would flee south with their cattle and there simply would not be enough (grazing land in Ovanboland, •in the north of South-West 'Africa, to accommodate i them. So far, South Africa has : heard nothing from the •United Nations Refugee Commission which it approached ) about the problem last i month, the sources say.