China likely to keep to path Chou charted

Press, Volume CXVI, Issue 34047, 10 January 1976, Page 13

China likely to keep to path Chou charted

Fox Butterfield of the “New York Times” (through N.Z.P.A.) analyses the effect Chou’s death will have on politics and life in China.

<--»* Z. Atsn —Copyright) HONG KONG, January' 9. The death in Peking of Premier Chou En-lai, China’s senior administrator for more than two decades, comes at a time when China appears solidly embarked on a broad course of stability and economic development he. himself, had helped to chart during his last years of prolonged illness.

Whether China can achieve the ambitious goal Chou outlined of becoming a “powerful, modem Socialist State” by the end of the century' will be a final test of his legacy to the Chinese revolution. Chou, who was 78. enunciated his vision at the National People’s Congress a year ago. his last major public action.

Over the last two or three tears, the shrewd, sophisticated and tenacious Chou also had helped put together a collective leadership of slightly younger tnen to succeed himself and Chairman Mao T se-tung. With Chou’s death, from cancer, and with the 82-year-old Chairman Mao in frail health, the task of guiding China’s 800 million people will now increasingly fall un them. Foremost among them is Teng Hsiao-ping. the tough pragmatic "1-year-old Senior Deputy Prime' Minister, who •Iso holds the important job cf Chief of Staff of the

Armed F orces and is a vicechairman of the party, thus having a voice in three critical areas — the party, Government and military. It was Teng who, in the absence of Chou, negotiated with President Ford during his trip to Peking.

Perhaps aware that Chou was approaching death, Teng has moved swiftly over the last few months to consoli-

date his power by appoint- ‘ ing a large number of his ' own followers or like- ' minded party veterans to !key jobs. But Teng, a short, I blunt man, was purged during the Cultural Revolution and could still have powerful enemies. . In the view of analysts in ' Hong Kong, the other most 1 important figure may be 'Chang Chun-chiao, the sec- ; ond Deputy Prime Minister, i who is about 66 years old. ’Chang, a smooth, pleasant man whom some Chinese compare with Premier Chou, was a major architect in the Cultural Revolution and ( once was thought to reprei sent the radical faction from | Shanghai. How well he gets along j with Teng, whom he deI nounced during the Cultural j Revolution, is a frequent . matter of conjecture. A Chii nese television film of ; China’s national day on (October 1, 1974, showed the i two men sitting together , stonily. But Chou evidently had a hand in promoting Chang in tandem with Teng, besides I being Second Deputy Premier. he also is chief political commissar of the armed ■ forces and is one of the six ' surviving members of the’

powerful nine-man standing committee of the Politburo. Some analysts believe he also may oe serving as the secretary-general of the party. Beyond Teng and Chang, the possible make-up of a transitional leadership grows even more uncertain. Reflecting the advanced age of the Chinese Communist leaders, two other members of the Politburo standing committee, besides Chou, died during the last year: Tung Pi-wu, a veteran revolutionary’, and Kang Sheng, a security specialist. That leaves, beyond the 82-year-old Chairman Mao and Teng and Chang, three others. They are: Chu Teh, 89, the redoubtable marshal, who also is chairman of the National People’s Congress; Yeh Chien-yiung, 78, the Minister of Defence; and Wang Hungwen, a Shanghai activist in his forties who was catapulated to prominence bv Mao himself in 1973.

But all three are question marks — Chu Teh and Yeh because of their own age and uncertain political power, and Wang because he has been in something of an eclipse most of the year. Others with roles in the transitional period include Li Hsien-nien. 68, the chief economic administrator, Chen Hsi-lien, 63, commander of the Peking Military Garrison, and Hua Kuofeng, the Minister of Public Security. Hua, who is in his early sixties and comes from Mao’s district in Hunan

province, has taken an increasingly prominent role in recent months in everything from agriculture to Tibetan affairs. Except for Wang, all of them are at least in their sixties, two are in their sev-l enties, and two are in their eighties. Few party leaders in their forties and fifties have been promoted to positions of real power. This tendency toward gerontocracy is nothing new in China, where rulers usually have hung on till their deaths. It has been fostered perhaps by the Chinese tradition of respect for the aged and certain institutional factors such as the need to accumulate vast networks of personal ties, which are the cement of political power in China. Although the Chinese leadership still bears some • of the scars of the turmoil I caused by the Cultural Revolution in the late 19605, the task of bridging the transition to the post-Chou and post-Mao era should be made easier by the strong Chinese heritage of central rule, and the highly developed ideology which Mao shaped and Chou helped put into practice. Moreover, Chou had given ample warning of his own end by frequent admissions that he was not in good health and by his prolonged stay in a Peking hospital. He had originally gone into what turned to be nearly permanent residence m a

hospital in April, 1974 shortly after the beginning of a campaign to criticise the sage Confucius and the late Marshal Lin Piao. It seemed possible at the time that the attacks might have been aimed at the Prime Minister himself, and he had gone to the hospital to remove himself as an object of controversy. •

But Chou, always the great survivor — he weathered a conflict with Mao over guerrilla strategy as early as 1932 and personal attacks during the Cultural Revolution — was to emerge again at the National People's Congress last year to influence China's basic direction. Presumably, it was also Chou, the able diplomat, who ensured that President Ford’s visit to China took place last November, despite Peking’s knowledge that, contrary to its earlier hopes, Washington was not prepared to offer concessions I on that important Taiwan! question. In the keynote speech to the National People’s Congress, China’s Parliament, Chou held out a vision of tremendous economic growth that would give China a “relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system” by the end of China’s fifth five-year plan, which begins this year. Then, by the end of the century', Chou told the delegates, China would achieve a “comprehensive modernisation of agriculture, industry,

national defence and science and technology” that would put it "in the front ranks of the world.”

The congress also confirmed the possible interim leadership team of Teng as Deputy Premier, with Chang and the three others as Deputy Premiers. Throughout the year that followed the congress, stress was placed on a new call — said to come from Chairman Mao — for unity, stability and economic growth. The Chinese press played up reports of a record harvest and another 20 per cent increase in oil output, while denouncing a new evil described as “bourgeois factionalism” that was said to interfere with production. Bourgeois factionalism, it turned out, appeared to be a combination of selfish bourgeois demands for higher wages by workers and factional squabbles in factories. In one instance — in the old central coastal city of Hangchow — it led to the deployiment of troops to occupy I factories.

Although confined to the hospital, Chou continued to meet some foreign visitors until September and, presumably, continued to receive important documents and talk with Chinese party leaders. Analysts assume it was Chou that drew up the framework for the important national agricultural conference of last September and October. The conference to steady China’s model agricultural unit, the Tachai Brigade, set goals of vastly increasing grain production and basically mechanising China s ag-

[riculture by 1980. After the) [conference, China embarked [ !on a sweeping and pragmatic' nationwide agricultural campaign, involving tens of millions of workers and cadres. It was the biggest undertaking since the disruptive Gmat Leap Forward in the 19505. Last fall, Mao appeared to be concerned, however, that the stress on stability and growth was in danger of overwhelming China’s revolutionary purity. Although he has never sought absolute authority over China’s day-to-day management, Mao has insisted on following a programme that combines mass mobilisation, egalitarianism and revolutionary enthusiI asm and has warned that any ! deviation can lead to revisionism. i In foreign policy, the field I where the suave Premier iChou first made his interI national reputation, Peking’s ■ hostility towards Moscow I seems likely to continue as ' long as Chairman Mao surI vives. I Whether without Premier Chou Peking will continue to imaintain its interest in close ! relations with the United ! States is less clear. The Secretary of State (Dr J Henry Kissinger) and Chou I seemed to establish an in■stant and special rapport. i Chairman Mao clearly intended to signal his own tn- ' | terest in preserving ties with -.Washington when he talked [with President Ford and then [ last week in an extraordinary [i session received Julie Nixon • Eisenhower. He usually would ;!not meet someone who is ’ neither a Head of State nor ,1a senior party leader.