The Press THURSDAY, AUGUST 28, 1975. Talking over the Zambesi

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33933, 28 August 1975, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, AUGUST 28, 1975. Talking over the Zambesi

English newspapers have summed up this weeks meeting between the Rhodesian Government and Rhodesia’s African nationalists with the expression: “You can lead horses to water, but you cannot make them drink”. The Rhodesian Prime Minister (Mr Smith) and the leader of the African National Council (Bishop Muzorewa) were prodded into their bizarre meeting in a train over the Zambesi River by the determination of Rhodesia's neighbours that, somehow, the country’s constitutional future must be decided without the protracted war and collapse into anarchy which has accompanied black majority rule in other African colonial territories. The meeting took place only because the Governments of South Africa and Zambia have insisted; President Kaunda of Zambia and the South African Prime Minister (Mr Vorster) were on hand themselves to make sure that no trivial excuse prevented serious discussion between their Rhodesian proteges, and to demonstrate to Rhodesians and to the rest of Africa their determination to fine a solution. But once they had got the Rhodesian .. horS es ” - black and white —to the river there was no guarantee that either of them had any intention of drinking the waters of compromise. The ostensible reason for the deadlock at the conference - that Mr Smith refuses to guarantee freedom of movement to some A.N.C. leaders if they attend talks inside Rhodesia — conceals more profound differences. Some of the leaders of the A.N.C. have certainly been responsible for ordering acts of terrorism in Rhodesia, if not for carrying them out. To offer even a temporary amnesty must look to white Rhodesians very much like a betrayal; to deny the amnesty is to imply that some of the A N.C. spokesmen can expect to have no place in Rhodesia, even after a settlement. Mr Smith might well find “other African leaders” with whom to negotiate, as he has threatened to do, but they will not be representative of the most vigorous and aggressive advocates of African rights. Any agreement reached with them might have little lasting effect. Sooner rather than later the Rhodesian Government and the A.N.C. can be expected to meet again The issues are too important for Rhodesia s neighbours to allow the talks to lapse. The rest of the world has South Africa to thank for the presence of Mr Smith at the conference. Not that South Africa has had any change of heart about white rule within its own borders, but events in Angola and Mozambique have forced white South Africans to recognise that they must adjust swiftly to changes among their neighbours. Rhodesia is now South Africa’s only ally and buffer in the region; but it is more of a liability than an asset. The South Africans will not lightly abandon Mr Smith, but they have made it clear that they expect him to make concessions as the price of further South African support In return, Mr Vorster hopes to buy time for his republic by expanding the dialogue which his Government has sought for several years with its more militant black neighbours. Mr Vorster has made his point by reducing his country’s assistance in Rhodesia’s defence. The Rhodesian Government has been left alone, knowing it can probably win all the battles for years against cuerrilla incursions, but knowing also that in the long run it must lose the war if the talks fail. If they succeed. South Africa stands to gain in reputation in the rest of Africa and to achieve on its northern border a multi-racial neighbour in which both races will have reason to be grateful to the republic Zambia, too, wants and needs a settlement in Rhodesia which will prevent hostilities there from spilling across the Zambesi Pressure from neighbours. knowledge of the disaster which would overtake Rhodesia eventually if a compromise is not found—these factors loom large for both sides at the conference But behind Mr Smith and Bishop Muzorewa are militants who would rather fight than talk; these, too. the Rhodesian delegations must take account of. Mr Vorster has the ultimate sanction that Rhodesia depends almost completely now on South Africa for its economic survival. President Kaunda has the power to deny sanctuary to the Rhodesian guerrillas. Neither will want to use these powers if there is any hope of the talks’ succeeding; perhaps neither would have the courage to use them if the talks collapse. But they are powerful weapons.