Guerrillas in Malaysia

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33874, 20 June 1975, Page 12

Guerrillas in Malaysia

Malaysia and Thailand have responded to the success of Communist insurgent movements in Indo-China with a new agreement to co-operate in attempting to eliminate Communist guerrillas from areas near the Thai-Malay border. Not a great deal may be achieved. Although similar announcements have been made frequently since Malaysia became independent 18 years ago, as many as 2000 armed Communists, most of them Chinese, are believed to be still at large near the border. But the announcement appears to have been timed to make it clear to China and to North Vietnam that, although the Malaysian and Thai Governments want to improve their relations with Communist States, they will not tolerate further interference in their own internal affairs.

Malaysia recognised China a year ago. In a joint communique from Peking the two Governments said that they considered “ all foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion to be impermissible” in relations between States, which sounded as though China was prepared to abandon the remnants of the Malaysian Communist Party to their fate. But the guerrillas responded with the most destructive acts of sabotage since the Malayan “Emergency” had ended 14 years before: radio broadcasts from China continued to support the guerrillas, and attacks on Malaysian soldiers and officials have increased. When the Malaysian Communist Party celebrated its forty-fifth anniversary recently the Chinese sent a message of support for their struggle against “ imperialism, revisionism, and reaction ”. Through those three jargon labels the Chinese were making it clear that they regarded the Malaysian Communists as allies against the United States, the Russians, and the Malaysian Government. When the Malaysians demanded an explanation the Chinese gave a bland assurance that they still regarded the fate of the guerrillas as Malaysia’s affair.

The Malaysians, with Thai help, are apparently going to take the Chinese at their word. Thailand, which is exploring the prospect of closer relations with China, is expected to exchange formal recognition with Peking by the end of next month. But Thailand, too, has an armed and outlawed Communist movement, which receives support from Chinese radio stations and some arms and training from the North Vietnamese. By tougher action against Communist guerrillas, the Thais will demonstrate that they have no intention of drifting from the American sphere of influence to the Chinese sphere. Malaysia and Thailand, like their non-Communist neighbours in the Philippines and Indonesia, have good reason to assume that Communist-led insurgents will receive more help from outside since the wars in Indo-China have ended in Communist victories. They would be foolish not to seek formal ties—even friendly ties—with their Communist neighbours; by concerted action to suppress the guerrillas at the same time they are Indicating that they will not accept lightly an attitude of subservience to China. Malaysia’s success in dealing firmly with Communists at home while seeking better relations with its Communist neighbours should provide a guide to the way in which relations in South-East Asia can be expected to develop in the wake of events in Indo-China.