Hanoi’s objective

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33816, 12 April 1975, Page 15

Hanoi’s objective

By

DREW MIDDLETON,

of the New York Times N eivs Service, through N.Z.P.A.)

April 11. NEW YORK,

The tactical pattern of the heavy’ fighting in South Vietnam at and near An Loc in the last 48 hours indicates to United States military analysts that the North Vietnamese High Command wants to destroy the defending Government divisions in the field, and thus prevent them from falling back to offer a street-by-street defence of Saigon.

Occupation of the capital. 38 miles south-west of An Loc, is Hanoi’s strategic objective.

The invaders would prefer to take the city by political means, the analysts say, through a capitulation arranged with a regime replacing that of President Thieu, but if there is to be a battle for Saigon, the Communists will seek to make it as bloodless as possible, with perhaps only the President’s personal guard of airborne troops offering serious resis-[ tance.

The tactics in the battles around Saigon concentrate primarily on pinning the defending divisions to fixed positions, such as at An Loc by launching heavy conventional attacks. While these are being met by the Government troops, the Communists cut commun-

ications,. harass supply echelons, and engage what Government reinforcements are available.

This approach is possible because the North Vietnamese, although outnumbered lin the Saigon and Mekong Delta sectors, have been able repeatedly to concentrate numerically superior forces for their attacks.

Pentagon sources estimate that North Vietnam now has about 75,000 combat troops in the two sectors, where there are about 100,000 regular South Vietnamese forces, along with perhaps 100,000 less-weß-equipped militiamen.

! Saigon, however, has been' (unable to benefit from this! [reported numerical superior-! I ity. By launching a large num-: iber’of small, but energetic,: 1 attacks in the delta, and by! keeping large forces contin-! ually on the move in the [area between Tay Ninh and (Chon Thanh, north of Sai-: gon, the invaders have been! able to tie up Government: forces which might other-j wise be switched to moreimportant points. Such reinforcing move- 1 ments, although possible, are; daily less feasible because; the defenders are short of motor transport. . [ The conventional battle is, being fought at present. at distances of 25 to 35 miles! from Saigon. Meanwhile, the! analysts say the Communists! have begun the infiltration of highly-trained small units' of two or three men into! Saigon itself. These are re-i ported to be armed and equipped for demolition and; commando operations, and! their role is apparently to

create confusion and panic in the city. The Communists may hope that destruction and disorder in Saigon will itensify efforts to oust President Thieu, and establish a regime prepared to surrender. In any case reports of rioting in the capital can be expected to lower the mor-1 ale of troops fighting in the : hinterland.