The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1975. South-East Asia now

Press, Volume CXV, Issue 33814, 10 April 1975, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1975. South-East Asia now

South-East Asia has produced no shrewder politician than the Prime Minister of Singapore (Mr Lee Kuan Yew). As the leader of a small city-State which must depend on international trade and the good will of its neighbours to survive, Mr Lee needs to be realistic. His assessment of events in South-East Asia, given this week during his visit to New Zealand, deserves close attention here. Mr Lee heads a Socialist Government—vigorously anti-Communist in its internal policies—which is demonstrating that a generally pro-Western outlook in international affairs is not inconsistent with better relations with China and Russia.

Mr Lee dismissed as “ inappropriate ” the “ domino theory " of events in Indo-China. but he did acknowledge that events there are having a profound effect in the rest of South-East Asia. In its crude form the domino theory—that the establishment of a Communist government in one country inevitably posed a threat to its neighbours—has never been worth more than a cursory glance. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that, with the exception of Cuba, no lasting Communist regime has been established in a country which did not have a border with a Communist State. The collapse of one domino does not set off a chain reaction that knocks over all the others. Rather, the change resembles the removal of a niece in a game of chess: it invariably alters the relationship and strengths of all the other pieces. Thailand, which already has an internal security problem, will soon for the first time have a border with a Communist State. North Vietnam, for the first time in 21 years of existence, will have a powerful army which will no longer he needed for its own security The American experience has spelt out more clearly than anything American politicians might have said that no Asian State can again expect help from American troops in meeting a threat from insurgents A situation has been reached, in fact, where almost the only country from outside the region which shows even a token readiness to give military assistance to Governments there is New Zealand. On reflection, it is a lonely situation, even when this country’s most direct commitment is to the Singapore of the charming and accomplished Mr Lee. The worst response for those States which have had their hones for Indo-China destroyed bv North Vietnam’s military success would be a precipitate withdrawal of interest and assistance from South-East Asia. As Mr Lee pointed out, the presence of a powerful American fleet, and of American economic aid. will help South-East Asia to adjust gradually to the new reality of life with successful and powerful Communist neighbours. Even Thailand, which has been closely associated with the United States, may be able to use the American withdrawal to improve its relations with its potentially hostile neighbours. The tragedies under way in South Vietnam and Cambodia should not encourage precipitate action which might increase uncertainty among other States in the region. New Zealand should continue to demonstrate its concern for the well being of its traditional friends there—Singapore and Malaysia—in particular. Concern that New Zealand did so little to help South Vietnam when that country's need was greatest should not be made an excuse for further withdrawals.